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Most states list immorality as a statutory cause for teacher 
dismissal. Under the authority of state statutes, school boards are the 
legal agents in employing teachers and in determining what conduct con­
stitutes immorality as a basis for dismissal. Due to the fact that im­
morality is a nebulous term, much debate and litigation centers around 
the lack of a common conception of the term. Teachers have challenged 
the right of school boards to judge their morality and to discipline 
teachers accordingly. And the courts are playing an increasingly promi­
nent role in such matters where constitutional rights are at stake. 
Data for this study are based primarily on dismissal court cases 
during the period of 1967 through January 1976. All state statutes were 
searched to determine statutory provisions for dealing with dismissals 
and to determine any trend toward amendments in view of recent litigation. 
Additional data have been collected through a review of the literature 
and a nation-wide survey of chief state school officers and state 
attorney generals. 
Analysis of the literature and major court cases across the na­
tion indicates a judicial trend toward more protection of teachers and 
closer scrutiny of the arbitrary and capricious use of board power. 
The courts have not said that "immoral" teachers cannot be dis­
charged. They have merely said that constitutional rights have to be 
protected in the process. Teachers can be dismissed for a wide range of 
behaviors on the grounds of immorality. But in order for a dismissal to 
be upheld, the "immoral" act must be proven to render the teacher unfit 
to teach. Generally, the act in question must be proven to relate 
adversely to the teacher-pupil relationship or be detrimental to the 
orderly educational process. 
Analysis of court decisions indicates that teacher dismissals 
for immorality will generally be upheld by the courts if the act in 
question is criminal in nature, attracts notoriety, is committed in 
public or semi-public places, involves students, shows a potential for 
misconduct, or if the accused teacher disqualifies himself through making 
his status known or through deviating from educational objectives in 
promoting divergent life styles. The data show that immorality dis­
missals are not likely to be held legal if the act in question is private 
in nature, does not involve students, is removed in time, is related to 
educational objectives, and demonstrates no potential for misconduct. 
Data from the nation-wide survey of chief state school officers 
and state attorney generals indicate a concern over interpretation and 
application of the term "immorality" as a statutory grounds for teacher 
dismissal but only slight movement toward changes in statutes in view 
of recent court decisions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, in the United States teachers have been expected 
to adhere to high moral standards in their private lives as well as in 
their public lives J Evidence abounds on the fact that school boards 
O  
and the courts hold teachers to be examplars. In 1939, the courts 
upheld the stringent standards of conduct required of teachers by 
school boards. 
It has always been the recognized duty of the teacher to conduct 
himself in such a way as to command the respect and good will of the 
community, though one result of the choice of a teacher's vocation 
may be to deprive him of the same freedom of action enjoyed by 
persons in other vocations.3 
In addition to the Horosko court ruling, in 1958 the United 
States Supreme Court declared, "We find no requirement in the Federal 
Constitution that a teacher's classroom conduct be the sole basis for 
determining his fitness."4 As recent as 1973 in Pettit v. State Board of 
^Edward C. Bolmeier, Teachers' Rights, Restraints and Liabilities 
(Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1971), p. 22; see also Blaine L. 
Carlton, "Pettit v. State Board of Education: Out of Classroom Sexual 
Misconduct as Grounds for Revocation of Teaching Credentials," Utah Law 
Review (Winter 1973), 798. 
2Appeal of Batrus, 148 Pa. Super. 587, 26 A. 2d 124 (Pa. 1942); 
Horosko v. School District of Mount Pleasant Township, 335 Pa. 369 at 
371, 6 A. 2d 866 at 868 (Pa. 1939). 
^Horosko v. School District, op. cit. 
^Beilan v. Board of Education, 386 Pa. 82, 125 A. 2d 327, 357 
U. S. 399 (Pa. 1958). 
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Education,^ the California court maintained that, 
The intimate and delicate relationship between teachers and 
students requires that teachers be held to higher standards of 
morality in their private lives that may not be required of others. 
Standards of teacher morality have generally remained relative 
to the local community and the discretion of school boards, with their 
conduct subject to close public scrutiny.'' In fact, at one time it 
appeared common for teachers to serve at the pleasure of the board. 
Furthermore, "... there has always been concern about the competency 
and  o r i en ta t i on  o f  t eache rs  as  j udged  by  t hose  who  con t ro l  t he  s c h o o l s .  
For example, a teacher's contract in Virginia for the 1935 school year 
stipulated that teachers could not keep company with sorry young men; a 
Tennessee contract required teachers to refrain from any and all question­
able pastimes; and an Alabama contract required the teacher to agree not 
to have company or go automobile riding on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, 
or Thursday nights.9 
Under the authority of state statutes, school boards have 
functioned well within their rights in concerning themselves with the 
moral conduct of teachers in their employ.In fact, an early Arkansas 
Spettit v. State Board of Education, 10 Cal. App. 3d 29, 109 Cal. 
Rptr. 665 at 667 (Calif., 1973). 
Spettit v. State Board of Education, loc. cit. 
^Harold H. Punke, The Teacher and the Courts (Danville, Illinois: 
Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1971), p. 617. 
8Ibid. 
^David Rubin, The Rights of Teachers (New York: Discus Books, 
1972), p. 109. 
lOjohn Carter Davis, "Immorality and Insubordination in Tcfichcr 
Dismissals: An Investigation of Case Law, Statute Law, <jnd Employment. 
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case pointed out that such concern was more than a right, it was an 
obligation.^ 
Through the years the courts have generally deferred to the 
school boards determination that sufficient grounds for dismissal 
exist.12 In support of the discretionary power of school boards to 
dismiss teachers for immorality, a Louisiana court stated, 
No pre-established objective criteria ever are needed to dismiss 
(a) staff member who is guilty of conduct repulsive to minimum 
standards of decency . . . required by virtually all employers of 
their employees, and especially required of public servants such as 
school teachers J 3 
Although the discretionary power of the school boards to deter­
mine immorality and to discharge teachers has much support in state 
statutes and the courts, recent cases demonstrate the fact that school 
board hearings and dismissal proceedings are essentially a judicial 
function over which superior court has a constitutional right of re­
view. ̂  In all dismissal actions the best interests of schools must be 
intended, and arbitrary or capricious use of power will not survive 
judicial scrutiny.15 
Contracts," (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Texas at 
Austin, 1971), 31. 
llSchool District of Fort Smith v. Maury, 53 Ark. 471, 14 S. W. 
669 (1890), quoted by John C. Davis, op. cit., p. 31. 
^Williams v. School District No. 40, 4 Ariz. App. 5, 417 P. 2d 
376 (Ariz. 1966). 
l^Smith v. Concordia Parish School Board, 393 F. Supp. 1101 
(W.D. La. 1975). 
l^Francisco v. Board of Directors of Bellevue Public School 
District No. 405, 537 P. 2d 789 (Calif. 1975). 
l^Beverlin v. Board of Education of Lewis County, 216 S. E. 2d 
554 (W. Va. 1975). 
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Through the nineteenth century the courts have supported the 
inherent right of the employer to dismiss employees without question. 
This legal principle has traditionally encompassed the public school 
domain, with school boards viewing teachers as employees in an employer-
employee relationship. But with the rise of labor unions, professional 
teacher organizations, and court litigation, this principle of employer 
right has eroded J? Perhaps more than for any other factor, the Monge 
v. Beebe Rubber Company case in 1974 abrogated the principle that the 
employer's power to discharge is absolute.^ However diminished the 
principle of the right of the employer to dismiss may be, its influence 
is still evident in the education enterprise. Therein lies part of the 
conflict between teachers and school boards in the area of teacher dis­
missals on grounds of immorality. 
School boards are finding little solace in the statutory 
authority, as federal courts in several recent cases have ruled statutes 
invalid because the term "immorality" as spelled out in education codes 
was too vague to be used as a basis for dismissal.^ Such vagueness 
could conceivably permit unlimited interpretation by school boards to 
the extent that any teacher could be subject to dismissal at the arbi­
trary discretion of a school board. 
^Daniel A. Matthews, "A Common Law Action for the Abusively 
Discharged Employee," Hastings Law Journal, XXVI, (May, 1975), 1435. 
17Ibid. 
18Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A. 2d 549 (N. H., 1974). 
^Burton v. Cascade School District Union High School District 
No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254 (Ore., 1973); see also Jarvella v. Willoughby-
Eastlake City Board of Education, 233 N.E. 2d 143 (Ohio, 1967). 
5 
Where the state statutes spelled out the acts that constitute 
immorality on the part of teachers, the courts have upheld dismissals in 
most instances.20 Yet few state legislatures have to date defined 
immorality. 
Although a number of federal court rulings have been in favor of 
the dismissed teacher as long as the alleged immoral act had no clear 
nexus to job performance or school efficiency, other court cases have 
supported the basic right of school boards to determine cause and to 
dismiss teachers for immoral conduct as long as due process was protected. 
There is a great amount of writing in the area of school law and 
much attention given to isolated court decisions concerning teacher dis­
missals and teacher rights. But there is a scarcity of information 
available of a comprehensive nature dealing exclusively with teacher 
dismissal for immorality. The more comprehensive treatment of the topic 
was by Bolmeier through analysis of selected cases in several publica­
tions^ and one chapter on the topic in an unpublished dissertation by 
Davis in 1971.22 Many changes have occurred since that time. 
This study, among other stated purposes, will examine the 
nature of those changes and the impact of such changes on state superin­
tendents and state attorney generals. Also, evidence of court influence 
on state legislative bodies as revealed through statutory revisions will 
be examined. 
^Hankla v. Governing Board of Roseland School District, 120 Cal. 
Rptr. 827 (1975); and Pettit v. State Board of Education, 10 Cal. App. 
3d 29, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973). 
^Edward C. Bolmeier, loc. cit.; also see The School in the Legal 
Structure (Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Company, 1968); and Sex Litigation 
in the Public Schools (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1975). 
22John Carter Davis, loc. cit. 
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
School boards and school officials are caught in a dilemma. On 
the one hand communities are expecting that traditionally high standards 
of morality be practiced by teachers and are holding school officials 
responsible for disciplining teachers who do not adhere to local moral 
values and mores. On the other hand teachers are increasingly challeng­
ing through the courts the concept of the employer's right to dismiss 
teachers for acts in their private lives as well as the discretionary 
power of school boards to determine immorality and to dismiss teachers 
for immoral causes. 
Different courts have reached different decisions on the issue 
of teacher dismissal for immoral causes. No clear pattern of court 
rulings is evident. State legislative bodies are unable or unwilling to 
remove immorality from their statutes as a cause for teacher dismissal. 
Courts are striking down immorality as a basis for dismissal due to the 
vagueness of the term, yet few legislatures have defined immorality for 
the sake of legal clarity. 
A need clearly exists for examining the status of the problem of 
teacher dismissal for immoral conduct and for formulating a working 
definition of the concept of immorality in the field of public education, 
as well as for setting forth legal guidelines for dealing with the 
issues involved. 
Analysis of the Problem 
This study attempts to examine the problem by seeking to answer 
the following questions: 
1. What is revealed in current literature related to teacher 
dismissal and moral issues? 
7 
2. What is the status of statutory law related to teacher dis­
missal for immoral causes? 
3. What is the status of case law on the issue and what are the 
major decisive factors in case rulings? 
4. Can any discernible patterns and trends be identified and 
legal guidelines set forth from analysis of the research? 
5. What are the problems and opinions of state attorney 
generals and chief state school officials concerning teacher dismissal 
related to moral issues? 
6. Is there widespread agreement on what behaviors or acts 
constitute immorality on the part of public school teachers? 
7. Are state-level movements underway to define and standardize 
the concept and term "immorality" or to brief school officials on the 
legal problems associated with such teacher dismissal? 
IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
Presently, state statutes list immorality as a basis for teacher 
dismissal more often than any other cause. Few statutes define immorality. 
Other state statutes list other causes closely related to immorality such 
as unprofessional conduct, good cause, or general unfitness to teach. 
Few statutes define these terms. Thus school boards have enjoyed broad 
discretionary power in determining what acts constitute immorality. 
Traditionally, the courts have generally deferred to school boards to 
determine whether sufficient cause for dismissal exists. But that 
situation has now changed. 
Recent trends of increased teacher militancy, professional nego­
tiations, unionism, and teacher organizations, coupled with teacher sur­
pluses and due process guarantees, have brought about increased demands 
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for greater teacher autonomy, job security, and protection of constitu­
tional rights for teachers as enjoyed by a'll other citizens. Simultan­
eously, school boards, which serve as guardians of taxpayers' interests, 
view the economic decline and teacher surplus as an opportunity to hold 
teachers more accountable for both classroom performance and high 
standards of moral conduct. 
Teacher demands for greater autonomy and protection against dis­
missal and the school board's view as protectors of community values, 
interests, and mores create an open conflict between the interests of 
the two parties. 
Out of this conflict arise many court cases initiated by teachers 
who believe the school board and its agents acted capriciously or vio­
lated individual constitutional rights. The discretionary power of 
school boards is seriously challenged. State statutes have been struck 
down by the courts for their vagueness and the ambiguous use of the term 
"immorality." Likewise, teachers are challenging through the courts the 
double standard of conduct expected of teachers and not required of 
others. During the litigation, the courts have ruled repeatedly that the 
constitutional right of due process must be guaranteed in all instances. 
The "due process" guarantees have opened avenues for litigation by 
aggrieved teachers. 
In the midst of this milieu, school boards and school administra­
tors are groping for direction. Undoubtedly, some boards will hesitate 
to attempt teacher dismissal on grounds of immorality due to the diffi­
culty of defining exactly what behavior constitutes immorality and 
whether the courts will agree. And undoubtedly others will stand solidly 
behind the inherent right of school boards not only to determine 
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immorality but to identify it in teachers' conduct and to dismiss teach­
ers on the basis of immorality. Either approach is subject to problems 
and litigation. 
It is important to all parties concerned that the problem of 
teacher dismissal related to moral issues be examined to determine the 
nature and extent of the problem and to determine direction for future 
actions. 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of the study is to examine the literature, statutory 
law, and case law related to teacher dismissal for immoral causes. A 
second purpose is to survey state attorney generals and chief state 
school officers concerning the status and magnitude of the issue of 
teacher dismissal for immoral causes as set forth in respective state 
statutes. 
Further, the study proposes to determine if any common agreement 
can be found on what behavior constitutes immorality on the part of 
public school teachers as interpreted by courts, attorney generals, and 
chief state school officers. 
Finally, the purpose of this study is to arrive at some con­
clusions as to the legality of teacher dismissal for immorality, and to 
set forth some legal guidelines and conditions for attempting to dismiss 
teachers for acts that might be construed as immoral under state statutes. 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study is an investigation of the legality of teacher dis­
missal for immoral causes. It encompasses an examination of the Sctiool 
Codes in the statutes of all fifty states, an examination of case law as 
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contained in all related cases heard before the United States Supreme 
Court, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, the Federal District 
Courts, and pertinent state court cases. 
An examination of related literature is made and summarized. In 
cooperation with the North Carolina Attorney General's Office and the 
State Department of Public Instruction, questionnaires were mailed to 
the attorney generals and chief state school officers in all fifty states. 
The first chapter deals with background information, the problem, 
analysis of the problem, importance of the study, purpose and scope of 
the study, methodology, and definition of terms used. 
Chapter Two contains an examination and analysis of the litera­
ture related to teacher dismissal and moral issues: the nature of im­
morality and definitional problems, the court influence in school matters, 
and legal principles from immorality cases. 
Chapter Three is concerned with statutory law on the issue of 
immorality and related causes for teacher dismissal. All fifty states 
statutes are examined. Three tables show the number of states which 
list immorality as a ground for dismissal and the various terms used to 
cover the concept. 
Chapter Four examines case law. An attempt is made to categorize 
all major court cases dealing with teacher dismissals or license revo­
cation for immoral causes during the period of 1939-1975, to examine the 
issues involved and the points each case turned on, and to analyze the 
decisions. 
Chapter Five describes the nature, purpose, treatment, and 
analysis of a nation-wide survey of attorney generals and chief state 
school officers. 
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Chapter Six contains an analysis and summary of the study. Con­
clusions are drawn and guidelines are offered. 
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES OF DATA 
Secondary Sources 
The first stage of the research involved a search of the Educa­
tional Administration Abstracts and Dissertation Abstracts and then 
examination of copies of dissertations whose titles appeared to be re­
lated to the topic under investigation to determine the need for research 
on the problem. The second step was to locate educational and legal 
journal articles dealing with teacher dismissals and moral issues. This 
was accomplished through the Education Index and the Index to Legal 
Periodicals. The Thesaurus of ERIC Descriptors was used to cross-match 
terms related to the dismissal of teachers for immorality5 and these 
terms were used to run a computer search of related literature from the 
Education Resources Information Center (ERIC). Books on school law and 
reports of the National Education Association were located through the 
card catalogs and libraries at UNC-G, UNC-Chapel Hill, and Duke Univer­
sity Law Library. 
Primary Sources 
Questionnaires were mailed to the fifty state attorney generals 
and state school superintendents to obtain current opinions and data. 
State statutes and case law were the primary basis of this study. 
The Education Code and Pocket Supplements of the fifty states were the 
sources of state statutes dealing with teacher dismissal for immoral 
causes. 
The American Digest System, especially the Decennial Digests and 
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the Descriptive Word Index were the major sources of citations related to 
the study. A search of headings "School and School Districts - Teachers," 
141(4) "Grounds for removal or suspension," provided leads to the majority 
of cases. Other key numbers and headings were used to locate marginal 
cases: 648 Judgment; 132 Schools; 90 Constitutional Law; and 141(5) was 
used to locate cases dealing with conduct, weapons, shoplifting, conduct 
unbecoming a teacher, etc. 
Other citations were obtained from the following legal encyclo­
pedias: Corpus Juris Secundum, American Jurisprudence, Words and 
Phrases. State statutes and textbooks were also a source of citations. 
All cited cases were then read in the respective National Re­
porters and the American Law Reports. As a last step the cases were 
shepardized* in Shepard's Citations. 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Certiorari - "A writ issuing from a superior court calling up 
OO 
the record of a proceeding in an inferior court for review." 
Dismiss - "To send away; to discharge; to cause to be removed 
O A  
temporarily or permanently; to release from duty." H 
Legal - "Conforming to the law; according to the law; required or 
permitted by law; not forbidden or discountenanced by the law; good and 
*A commonplace term in legal research used to refer to checking 
for later citations. 
^The American College Dictionary (New York: Random House, 
1967). 
^^Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th Ed. 
(St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1968). 
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effectual in law."25 
Immorality - (1) "Immorality is not necessarily confined to 
matters sexual in their nature; it may be that which is contra bonos 
mores; or not moral, inconsistent with rectitude, purity, or good morals; 
contrary to conscience or moral law; wicked, vicious; licentious, as an 
immoral man or deed. Its synonyms are: corrupt, indecent, depraved, 
dissolute; and its anonyms are: decent, upright, good, right. That 
may be immoral which is not decent."26 
Immorality - (2) Immorality is . . . "not immoral conduct con­
sidered in the abstract . . . (it) must be considered as conduct which 
is hostile to the welfare of the general public; more specifically in 
this case, conduct which is hostile to the welfare of the school com­
munity. "27 
Immoral conduct and immoral cause - These terms are used inter­
changeably with "immorality" when such use may enhance communication of 
concept, due to the relativity and vagueness of the term "immorality." 
Mandamus - "A writ from a superior court to an inferior court 
or to an officer, a corporation, etc. commanding a specified thing to 
be done."28 
Moral Turpitude - . . anything done contrary to justice, 
2^Black, op. cit. 
2®Words and Phrases, Vol. 20 (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing 
Co., 1959). 
27jarvella v. Willoughby - Eastlake City School District Board 
of Education, 233 N. K. 2d 143 (Ohio 1967). 
28jhe American College Dictionary (New York: Random House, 
1967). 
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honesty, modesty, or good morals."2^ 
Notorious - "Widely but unfavorably known."30 
Other causes related to immorality - Some state statutes list in 
lieu of, or in addition to, "immorality" such catch-all terms as "good 
cause," "unprofessional conduct," "general unfitness to teach," under 
which immorality may be listed as a cause for dismissal. 
Sodomy - "Carnal intercourse between persons of the same sex, or 
with an animal, or unnatural carnal intercourse with a person of the 
opposite sex."31 
Teacher - The term "teacher" is used in a broad context in this 
study. It encompasses any public school professional educator below the 
rank of assistant superintendent. 
Turpitude - . . inherent baseness or vileness of principle, 
words or actions; depravity.1,32 
29words and Phrases, Vol. 27A, (1961). 
30ihe American Colleqe Dictionary (New York: Random House, 
1967). 
31 Irving Shapiro, Dictionary of Legal Terms (Jamaica, N. Y.: 
Gould Publications, 1969). 
32words and Phrases, Vol. 42A, (1952). 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the literature related 
to teacher dismissals and moral issues. An attempt is made (1) to re­
view and assess the thinking of scholars in the fields of philosophy, 
education, and law as revealed in the literature; (2) to assess movement 
in the field of education in view of teacher dismissal problems and 
court decisions related to dismissals on grounds of immorality; (3) to 
build a conceptual base for the following chapters. In essence, this 
chapter deals with the question stated in chapter one under the problem 
statement: "What is revealed in current literature related to teacher 
dismissals and moral issues?" In answering the question, the literature 
is treated in three broad categories: (1) the concept, nature, and 
definition of the terms "morality" and "immorality;" (2) the influence 
of the courts on school boards, school policies, and immorality dis­
missals; (3) the literature on immorality and court decisions. 
The Nature of Immorality and Definitional Problems 
The research from this study indicates that most of the problems 
of teacher dismissals for immoral causes center around interpretation of 
the term "immorality." The research shows that traditionally "immoral­
ity" was what school boards said it was. By-and-large school boards 
determined what teacher behavior constituted immorality, and generally 
16 
the courts supported the school board's right to make that determination. 
But the study also shows that such unlimited board discretion is not the 
case today. Teachers over the past decade have increasingly challenged 
the discretionary power of school boards in the area of teacher dis­
missals in general and particularly in the area of dismissal for immoral 
causes. Likewise, the constitutionality of state statutes dealing with 
immorality as a dismissal cause are under attack. A particular point of 
contention related to dismissal for immorality concerns discipline of 
teachers for behavior in their private lives outside the classroom or 
school settingJ 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to examine the nature and defi­
nition of morality and immorality revealed in the literature in search 
of a common understanding of a concept that is the source of much dis­
agreement and litigation. 
Philosophers, the courts, legislatures, and, more recently, 
school boards and educators have grappled with the term "immorality" as 
a statutory cause for teacher dismissal. Immorality is a broad and 
nebulous term that means different things to different individuals and 
groups.^ Philosophers and the courts have attempted to define or limit 
the term "immorality" by examining its root, or the converse of im­
morality, namely, "morality." 
Gert asserts that morality is an "unusual word" seldom used alone 
^Source: Survey of Court Cases Covered in Chapter Four. 
^Burton v. Cascade School District, Union High School No. 5, 
353 F. Supp. 254 (Ore. 1973). 
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without some qualification.3 He hints at part of the conflict surround­
ing interpretation of the term by the courts and school boards through 
his assertion that there is no widespread belief that such a thing as 
morality per se exists.4 He states that, 
. . . there is only this morality and that morality. It is commonly 
thought that there is no universal morality; no code of conduct that, 
in some sense, would be adopted bv all men. But although this be-
belief is widespread it is false.^ 
Gert maintains that no one has yet provided a satisfactory 
account of morality and that, "The main problem has been that no one has 
ever adequately distinguished morality from other things."6 He further 
states that "The problem is the result of the fact that no one realizes 
there is a problem."7 
Accordingly, Gert gets at the problem by attempting to define 
and clarify the term "morality" though a set of ten moral rules, to which 
he adds the dimension of "ideals" to complete the concept of "morality."® 
The list below shows Gert's moral rules in the first column, rules that 
the rational man requires everyone be careful always to obey. The 
second column shows the moral rules as stated when the element of 
"ideals" is incorporated, rules that the rational man encourages one to 
follow. 
The Moral Rules The Moral Ideals 
1. Don't kill Prevent killing 
2. Don't cause pain Prevent the causing of pain 
3. Don't disable Prevent disabling 
^Bernard Gert, The Moral Rules (New York: Harper and Row, Pub­
lishers, 1970), p. 3. 
4Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 4. ^Ibid. 
7Ibid., p. 128. 8Ibid., p. 128 
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4. Don't deprive of freedom 
of opportunity 
5. Don't deprive of pleasure 
Prevent the deprivation of 
freedom of opportunity 
Prevent the deprivation of 
pieasure 
Prevent deceit 
Prevent the breaking of 
promises 
Prevent cheating 
Prevent the breaking of the law 
Prevent the neglect of duty.9 
6. Don't deceive. . 
7. Keep your promise 
8. Don't cheat. 
9. Obey the law 
10. Do your duty 
The above set of rules constitute "morality" as Gert conceives 
the term. It is interesting to note the reflection of the above con­
ception of morality in the various state statutes dealing with immorality 
and teacher dismissals treated in chapter three of this study. 
Frankena, as well as some courts, examine morality in a social 
and cultural context: 
. . . morality starts as a set of culturally defined goals and of 
rules governing achievement of the goals, which are more or less ex­
ternal to the individual and imposed on him or inculcated as 
habits JO 
He speaks to the nature of morality, thus: "Considered as a social sys­
tem of regulation, morality is like law on the one hand and convention 
or etiquette on the other. 
Frankena indicates that morality is the "moral institution" of 
life of which each individual becomes a part and in which different in­
dividuals or groups may have moralities or moral codes and "value systems" 
within the broader meaning of morality.^ He states, 
Morality ... is ... a social enterprise, not just a discovery or 
invention of the individual for his own guidance. Like one's 
9Ibid., p. 128 
l°Will iam K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice 
Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 8. 
11 Ibid., p. 7. ^Ibid., p. 6. 
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language, state or church, it exists before the individual who is 
inducted into it and becomes more or less of a participant in it, 
and it goes on existing after him . . . it is an instrument of 
society as a whole for the guidance of individuals and smaller 
groups. It makes demands on individuals that are . . . external to 
them.'3 
Like Gert, Frankena implies that there is a common morality that 
can be identified as an instrument of society and recognized by members 
of the society. However, the immense volume of litigation related to 
immorality cases as shown in Chapter Four raises a question as to whether 
a common morality exists and can be recognized by individual members of 
the society. Accordingly, the society, and particularly the judiciary, 
is becoming more liberal in its judgment of teacher behavior.^ 
Like the courts in past years, Giruetz speaks to the cultural 
relativity of morality and the basis of morality. In speaking of cul­
tural mores as the standards of good and right, he quotes William 
Graham Sumner: 
The mores can make everything right . . . for the people of a time 
and place their mores are always good . . . for them there can be no 
question of the goodness of their mores. The reason is because the 
standards of good and right are in their mores J 5 
It would appear, however, from the literature and litigation examined in 
this study that the mores are in a state of flux or that there are many 
different sub-culture or pluralistic mores rather than a common morality 
or set of mores. 
Gert, Frankena, and Giruetz add credence to the idea of a 
13lbid. 
^Edward C. Bolmeier, Sex Litigation and.the Public Schools 
(Charlottesville, Va.: The Michie Company, Iy/b), p. b. 
15Harry K. Giruetz, Beyond Right and Wrong (New York: The Free 
Press, 1973), p. 16. 
societal morality rooted in the values and beliefs of social communities, 
a morality similar to law in one respect and convention in other re­
spects. This conception of a common morality would appear to be the 
basis of legislative and school board authority in dealing with the con­
duct of teachers. 
In order to examine the legal conception of morality, it seems 
necessary to look at the construction of the word "morality" as well as 
its antonym, immorality. Morality in its simplest form may be considered 
as behavior which is in accord with the principles or standards of right 
conduct. The state statutes and the courts are concerned with behavior 
not in accord with principles or standards of right conduct, or immoral­
ity. There is no provision in the language for a neutral stance on 
morality, no middle-ground term such as "unmoral." An act or person is 
either moral or immoral. The problem arises over who is to say who or 
what is immoral, especially when it comes to a judgment of teacher 
conduct. 
The courts and philosophers have given some clues toward a com­
mon concept of morality and immorality. As the philosophers have asso­
ciated morality with the social and cultural sphere, so have the courts 
placed "immorality" in a social context. In speaking to the issue, 
Bolmeier states that immorality is a term which is difficult to inter­
pret as a legal cause J 6 He cites Jarvella v. Willoughby as a case in 
point, in which the courts attempted to define immorality: 
Whatever else the term "immorality" may mean to many, it is clear 
that when used in a statute it is inseparable from "conduct" . . . 
But it is not "immoral conduct" considered in the abstract. It must 
16BO Imeier, Teachers' Rights, Restraints and Liabilities, p. 20. 
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be considered in the context in which the legislature considered it, 
as conduct which is hostile to the welfare of the general public.^? 
The phrase, . .as conduct which is hostile to the welfare of 
the general public" should be kept in mind as the study proceeds. It 
would appear that "hostile to the general public" is as vague a term as 
the term "immorality" in a pluralistic society. 
In the quoted passage from Jarvella v. Willoughby, supra, the 
courts attempt to remove "immorality" from the realm of abstraction and 
apply it to the world of human conduct as related to human welfare. How­
ever, the large number of court cases involving immorality, especially 
sexual misconduct as immorality, demonstrates the concern of the Ameri­
can society over possible deviation from cultural mores by its members, 
especially teachers. The volume of litigation also suggests extensive 
disagreement over what constitutes morality and who is to accept the re­
strictions of moral law and convention contained in the cultural mores, 
or common morality of the society. 
The literature contains many discussions of immorality in re­
lation to deviant sexual conduct on the part of teachers. But "immoral­
ity" extends far beyond sexual acts. And the courts have attempted to 
define "immorality" as behavior of many types. According to Bolmeier, 
when the courts have been perplexed in their attempt to interpret the 
statutory term "immorality," they have sought and supplied definitions to 
serve as guidelines. He quotes from an early Michigan case to support 
his point. In that quotation the Supreme Court of Michigan not only 
17lbid., p. 20. 
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related immorality to social mores but broadens its meaning beyond 
sexual matters: 
"Immorality" is not necessarily confined to matters sexual in 
nature; it may be that which is contra bonos mores; or not moral, 
inconsistent with rectitude, purity or good morals, contrary to 
conscience or moral law, wicked . . . .'8 
But noting that charges of "immorality" on the part of teachers still 
connotes sexual misconduct in the minds of many people, the Supreme 
Court of Alaska suggested that other grounds for dismissal be selected 
to avoid stigmatizing teachers for misconduct other than conduct sexual 
in nature. According to the Alaska court, 
(The) designation or title of immorality should be removed from the 
catch-all definition of conduct and a definition of "conduct unbe­
coming a teacher" be substituted. The definition would then cover 
immorality in all its aspects, including all shades of unacceptable 
social behaviorJ9 
Other investigators have illustrated the scope and nature of 
"immorality" as reflected through court cases. Punke claims that 
immorality is primarily thought of in terms of sex behavior, but it has 
wider implications.20 in one chapter of his treatise, Punke demonstrates 
the scope of the term "immorality" through his survey of court cases in 
nine broad categories. The following list shows kinds of behaviors Punke 
found encompassed in immorality cases before the courts: (1) sex 
morality, (2) liquor and intoxication, (3) gambling, (4) cursing and abusive 
language, (5) fraud and deceit in securing and holding a job, (6) financial 
18Schuman v. Pickett, 277 Mich. 225, 269 N. W. 152 (Mich. 1963), 
cited by Bolmeier, Teachers' Rights, Restraints and Liabilities, p. 21. 
19Bolmeier, Teachers' Rights, Restraints and Liabilities, p. 20. 
20punke, The Teachers and the Courts, p. 584. 
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irresponsibility, (7) bad behavior in teaching sex education, (8) several 
aspects of immorality combined, and (9) immorality versus other avail­
able charges.21 
In an unpublished dissertation in the same year of Punke's pub­
lication, supra, Davis1 examination of court cases reflected the scope 
of the legal interpretation of the term "immorality" as a cause for 
teacher dismissal. Davis categorized the cases under "immorality" into 
six broad areas with several subdivisions. An outline of his categories 
fol1ows: 
Sexual misbehavior 
Notoriety 
Co-habitation with a former student 
Improper display of affection 
Suspicion of immorality 
Improper sex instruction 
Immoral acts in former years 
Conviction of a sex offense 
Homosexual behavior 
Vulgarity 
Use of alcohol 
Dishonesty 
Falsification of facts 
Theft 
Cheating on tests 
Acts hostile to the school system or personnel 
Criminal indictment^ 
The studies by Punke and Davis, supra, were published after the Alaska 
case of Watts v. Seward School Board.23 But both studies found that in 
spite of the Alaska court's suggestion that another term be substituted 
21 Ibid., pp. 584-594. 
22john Carter Davis, "Immorality and Insubordination in Teacher 
Dismissals: An Investigation of Case Law, Statute Law, and Employment 
Contracts," (unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Texas at 
Austin, 1971), pp. 31-68. 
23watts v. Seward School Board, 395 P. 2d 591 (Alaska 1964), re­
manded 381 U. S. 126, 421 P. 2d 586 (affirmed), cert, denied 397 U. S. 
921 (1970). 
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for immorality in teacher dismissal cases not involving sexual matters, 
many areas of teacher conduct continued to be treated as immoral before 
the courts. 
In relation to defining immorality as a basis for teacher dis­
missal Kraus states that, 
Clearly the definitional problems fall upon the shoulders of the 
courts . . . each case will revolve around a determination of the 
particular factual situation, and it may be concluded that no pre­
cise definitive rule has yet been adopted.24 
Again, in speaking to the issue of immorality as grounds for 
teacher dismissal, Bolmeier related immorality to community morals and 
projects an opinion. He maintains, 
Since immorality is difficult to define the court is frequently per­
plexed in evaluating the charge "immorality" as a cause for dis­
missal. In most instances a court considered a teacher immoral whose 
conduct offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to 
the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and elevate.25 
Continuing in his latest publication on sex litigation, 
Bolmeier speaks to the changing judiciary view of immorality in the form 
of unorthodox sexual behavior: 
There is no doubt that society and particularly the judiciary is 
becoming more liberal in judging the legality of unorthodox sexual 
behavior. It may be noted, however, . . . that the courts are more 
reluctant to condone alleged sexual misconduct of teachers than of 
others because of potential effects on the pupils in their charge.26 
As the examination of the literature has shown, surely, much 
perplexity exists over the concept of "immorality" and the problem of 
ascertaining the appropriate standard of morality. A note from the 
^Kenneth Kraus, "The Effect of the Stull Bill on Teacher Dis­
missals," Lincoln Law Review, IX (1974), 96. 
25Bolmeier, Sex .Litigation and the Public Schools, p. 5. 
26ibid. 
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Morrison case puts the problem succinctly and serves as an appropriate 
culmination to this section: 
In a secular society--America today—there may be a plurality of 
moralities. Whose morals should be enforced? There is a tendency 
to say that public morals should be enforced. But that just begs 
the question. Whose morals are the: public morals?^' 
"Whose morals should be enforced?" As Kraus has indicated, the problem 
clearly falls on the shoulders of the courts. 
The preceding pages in this section have dealt with an examina­
tion of the nature and definition of immorality as reflected in current 
literature. A summary of this section is offered at the end of this 
chapter. The following section deals with a survey of current litera­
ture on the influence of the courts in educational matters. 
Judicial Influence on School Boards and Policies 
The preceding section of this study was concerneid with the 
nature of "immorality" as a cause for teacher dismissal. The study 
shows wide disagreement on the term between school boards and teachers, 
with the judiciary intervening with increasing frequency on behalf of 
discharged teachers. According to the literature the struggle for a 
common definition of immorality in the school setting and in the judi­
cial setting is far from resolved. As the courts seek to find defini­
tions, clarify terms, and guard constitutional rights, their decisions 
shape educational policy and cast the courts into a more prominent role 
in educational matters. 
In a recent article in the Journal of Educational Research, 
^Morrison v- State Board of Education, 461 P. 2d 375 at 384 
(1969). (Footnote citing, 14 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 581-582). 
Stiles sees the courts as emerging policy-makers for the schools. He 
states, "In the changes that are taking place, the court is emerging as 
the key source of educational policy."28 Although Stiles is speaking of 
general educational policy, his views include matters related to dis­
missal of teachers for immorality. He illustrates the erosion of school 
board authority and the acquisition of court authority in the following 
statements: 
In the area of teacher-board relations, court decisions clearly de­
fine employment policies and employee-employer relations. School 
board policies in such matters are little more than reaffirmations 
of the essential details of applicable decisions and in a majority 
of states such board policies are subject to review and modification 
as a result of court decisions . . . Clearly, court decisions make 
policy for education. From decisions of supporting the rights of 
teachers to organize and the rights of students to dissent to those 
dealing with the more fundamental rights of due process and equal 
protection of the law, court decisions outline and detail the 
policies by which schools operate.™ 
In a similar vein, Hogan sees the courts in a process of rapid 
evolution, evolving from a laissez-faire stance in the early nineteenth 
century to a posture of "strict construction" in school cases of today. 
Based on an analysis of court cases and decisions, he states, "It is 
clear that a new judicial function is taking over," and then sets forth 
five distinct stages in the evolution of the role of the courts in 
education: 
(1) 1789-1850 The stage of strict judicial laissez-faire 
(2) 1850-1950 The stage of state control of education 
(3) 1950-1965 The reformation stage 
(4) 1964- The stage of education under supervision of the 
28|_indley J. Stiles, "Policy and Perspective," The Journal of 
Educational Research, 67 (March 1974), front inside cover. 
29 Ibid.  
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courts 
(5) 1973- The stage of strict construction^® 
In an article designed primarily for school board members, 
M. Chester Nolte writes in a light vein on the issue of school boards' 
power in relation to the courts. He describes in the American School 
Board Journal three separate categories of school board power: (1) power 
boards have and can't use, (2) power boards really don't have but insist 
upon wielding, and (3) power boards have and can wield but must later 
justify.^ Included in the third category "... are actions that 
clearly are within a board's legal bounds but which board members must 
be ready and able to justify, probably to a judge . . . The most clearly 
scrutinized board actions are those involving teachers. 
Hudgins looks at board actions in recent teacher dismissal in­
stances. From his analysis of court cases, Hudgins claims, "While you 
were eyeing school finance suits in the last couple of years, a string 
of important teacher dismissal cases that never made the front pages were 
oo 
moving quietly through the courts."JJ Hudgins examines that "string of 
important cases" and sets forth ten commandments that "you better not 
break" in teacher dismissals.^ Three of those commandments deal with 
^Ojohn C. Hogan, The Schools, The Courts, and the Public Interest 
(Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), pp. 5-6. 
31m. Chester Nolte, "School Board Power and Its Three Cynical 
Categories," The American School Board Journal, 161 (Oct., 1974;, p. 24. 
32lbid. 
33H. C. Hudgins, "The Law and Teacher Dismissals: Ten Command­
ments You Better Not Break," Nation's Schools, 93 (March, 1974), p. 40. 
34it>id. 
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the area of immorality as a grounds for dismissal: (1) "Don't fire a 
teacher who has been arrested for possessing marijuana unless you have 
proof he can no longer function effectively in the classroom." (2) 
"Don't fire a teacher solely for being a homosexual unless his sexual 
inclination adversely affects teaching performance." (3) "Don't fire 
a teacher who brings alcohol into the school unless you prove 'just 
cause.'"35 Hudgins' first commandment is based on the Comings v. State 
Board of Education.36 The second commandment is based on the decision 
of Burton v. Cascade School Pi strict,37 and the third is based on Green 
v. Harrington.38 All three cases are covered in chapter four of this 
study. 
While Stiles, supra, sees the courts as a key source of educa­
tional policy, Hazard believes the courts "have taken over." He asserts: 
"Myths die hard in education. But the myth of local control is in a 
terminal state, because the courts, along with state and federal govern­
ments, have taken over."39 Hazard continues, "School board decisions 
are rarely accepted these days as the last word; more and more, citizens 
regard them as the trigger for legal confrontations.Hazard cites the 
Hobsen v. Hansen case to illustrate the court's justification for 
35lbid., pp. 40-43. 
36Comings v. State Board of Education, 23 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100 
Cal. Rptr. 73 (Calif. 1972). 
37Burton v. Cascade School District, Union High School District 
No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254 (Ore. 1973). 
3^Green v. Harrington, 487 S. W. 2d 612 (Ark. 1973). 
39william R. Hazard, "Courts in the Saddle: School Boards Out," 
Phi Delta Kappan, 56 (Dec. 1974), p. 259. 
4 0Ibid.  
intervention in school matters: 
It would be far better indeed, for these great social and political 
problems to be resolved in the political arena by other branches of 
government. But these are social and political problems which seem 
at times to defy such resolution. In such situations, under our 
system, the judiciary must bear a hand and accept its responsibility 
to assist in the solution where constitutional rights hang in the 
balance.4' 
Although the Hobsen v. Hansen case, supra, dealt with school 
"tracking" rather than teacher dismissals, it illustrates the point that 
the courts are ready and willing, if reluctant, to intervene in school 
matters. This fact will be further supported by the treatment of cases 
in Chapter Four dealing with teacher dismissals for immoral causes. 
Schimmel and Fischer, in support of the increasing involvement of 
the courts in school matters related to teacher dismissals, maintain that 
until recently teachers were certainly second-class citizens.4^ "Only a 
few decades ago it was common practice to regulate all aspects of teach­
ers' lives and to subject them to conditions of employment that violated 
their constitutional rights."^ Schimmel and Fischer speak to the issue 
of the current conflict between teachers and school board members who 
view themselves as guardians of community values, perhaps, against 
individual rights. They assert: 
Many parents, administrators, and school board members all believe 
that local communities can and should control the behavior of teach­
ers. The controls they seek to impose, though less extreme than 
those at the beginning of the century, often lead to a partial 
^Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (Wash., D. C. 1967), cited 
by William R. Hazard. 
^David Schimmel and Louis Fischer, "On the Cutting Edge of the 
Law: The Expansion of Teachers' Rights," School Review, 82 [Feb. 1974)» 
p. 262. 
43Ibid., p. 262. 
revocation of the Bill of Rights in the lives of teachers.^ 
Schimmel and Fischer examine six areas of conflict in which 
teachers, through the courts, have made progress in acquisition of their 
rights as first-class citizens: (1) "Academic freedom," (2) "Freedom of 
speech outside the classroom," (3) "Membership in controversial organi­
zations," (4) "The teacher's personal life," (5) "Personal appearance," 
and (6) "Equal protection."^ Six cases are cited in which teachers were 
upheld in their actions questioned by employing school boards. Four of 
the six enumerated areas, supra, could fall within the category of im­
morality, and have done so in certain instances before different courts. 
The six areas of conflict and teacher gain, with example cases, and the 
author's analysis of court decisions follow: 
(1) Freedom of speech in the classroom was protected under Keefe v. 
GeanakosAccording to the courts, as stated by Schimmel and Fischer, 
Judicial protection of academic freedom is based on the First Amend­
ment and on the belief that teachers and students should be free to 
question and challenge established concepts as a democratic society. 
Like other constitutional rights, however, academic freedom is not 
absolute. Hence, courts use balancing tests to decide these cases: 
they balance the teacher's right to academic freedom against the 
competing interests of society in maintaining reasonable school dis­
cipline. Generally this means that a teacher's use of controversial 
material or language is protected by the First Amendment unless a 
board can demonstrate that (1) it is not relevant to the subject 
being taught, (2) it is not appropriate to the age and maturity of 
the students, or (3) it substantially disrupts the educational pro­
cess. 47 
(2) Freedom of speech outside the classroom was protected under Pickering 
44Ibid., p. 263. 
45Ibid., pp. 263-279. 
46«eefe v. Geanakos, 418 F. 2d 359 (Mass., 1969). 
^Schimmel and Fischer, op. cit., pp. 265-266. 
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48 v. Board of Education. The authors quote the Supreme Court in summing 
up the principle exemplified in the Pickering case: "A teacher's exer­
cise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish 
the basis for his dismissal from public employment. 
(3) The teacher's personal life was protected under the Morrison v. Board 
of Education.^ In the Morrison case the California Supreme Court 
stated, "Today's morals may be tomorrow's ancient and absurd customs. 
According to the court as interpreted by Schimmel and Fischer: 
A teacher's dismissal for conduct that is considered immoral depends 
on the circumstances of the case: whether the conduct was personal and 
private, whether it became public through the indiscretion of the 
teacher, and whether it involved students.^ 
(4) Acts in the teacher's personal life were protected under the Finot v. 
53 Pasadena case. This case merely involves the growing of a beard to which 
the court said ". . . wearing of a beard is a form of expression of an 
individual's personality and that such a right of expression is entitled 
to 'peripheral protection' of the First Amendment. 
(5) Membership in controversial organizations was protected under the 
case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents.^5 The authors contend that, "This 
^Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School Dis­
trict No. 205, 391 U. S. 563 (111. 1968). 
^Schimmel and Fischer, op. cit., p. 262, citing Pickering v. 
Board of Education. 
50^orrison v. State Board of Education, 1 Cal. App. 3d 214, 74 
Cal. Rptr. 116 (1969). 
S^Ibid. 52schimmel and Fischer, op. cit., p. 270. 
S^Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 250 Cal. 2d 189, 
58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967). 
^Schimmel and Fischer, op. cit., p. 272. 
55|<eyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (N. Y. 1967). 
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means that no school board or state legislature could disqualify teachers 
for mere membership in any revolutionary, subversive, or extremist 
organization.1,56 
(6) Cases dealing with equal protection of rights by race and sex are 
too numerous to enumerate here. However, Schimmel and Fischer see this 
area as an instance of significant gain for teachers' rights. They refer 
the reader to the Supreme Court decision in Bradley v. School Board of 
the City of Richmond.^ As Schimmel and Fischer have demonstrated 
teacher gains in acquiring equal rights under the Bill of Rights, they 
have reflected the changing role of the courts and the trend toward 
"greater protection of teachers" as found by Davis. 
Nolte speaks to the "new judicial" attitudes as being in favor of 
teachers. He declares: 
Teachers are suing school boards these days at the drop of a civil 
right . . . 
The fact that there is an increase in the number of lawsuits in 
which teachers allege a denial of their civil rights is, certainly, a 
reflection of the on-again militancy that teachers are demonstrating, 
but it also demonstrates a significant change in the attitude of the 
courts toward relationships of teachers (as employees) to school 
boards (as employers)--no teacher is likely to bring suit if there 
is little chance of winning it. Therefore, the new judicial atti­
tude can be construed as being in favor of teachers, not school 
boards.59 
^Schimmel and Fischer, op. cit., p. 274. 
^Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 382 U. S. 103 
(Va., 1965). 
S^Davis, op. cit., p. 27. 
59M. Chester Nolte, "Those Ugly Lawsuits and Why More Teachers 
are Using Them to Collect from Boardmen," American School Board Journal, 
158 (Dec. 1970), p. 34. 
The preceding pages in this section covered the current litera­
ture in the area of court trends as viewed by a variety of writers. Gen­
erally the literature offers evidence of the fact that courts are moving 
toward greater protection of teacher rights in general and against arbi­
trary dismissal in particular. Nolte addressed the three categories of 
school board power that boards have and can't use, but better be ready 
to go to court. His lightly sarcastic treatment of the topic represents 
a view of seriously deteriorated board power by the courts. 
Stiles envisions a rapid decline in school board authority as the 
courts increasingly emerge as a key source of educational policy. 
Hogan looks across the history of court intervention in school 
matters and sees the courts moving from a laissez-faire beginning to a 
"take-over" of the school board function today. He lists five stages of 
court evolution from laissez-faire to judicial "take-over." 
Hudgins examines court cases in ten areas as basis for his "Ten 
Commandments" in teacher dismissals. His analysis and warnings give sup­
port to the contention that the courts are zealous in protecting teacher 
rights without regard to traditional school board functions. 
Hazard, like Hogan, believes that his study of judicial actions 
evidences a take-over of the local control of the schools by the courts, 
along with the state and federal governments. 
Schimmel and Fischer list six areas in which the courts have 
moved toward granting teachers full protection of the Constitution. 
Davis, also, maintains that the courts are affording teachers 
more protection. And finally, Nolte declares the new judicial attitude 
is in favor of teachers, not school boards. 
In summary the literature demonstrates a movement by the 
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judiciary from a hands-off attitude with great discretionary power 
granted to school boards to a hands-on attitude with school boards 
operating with a careful eye attuned to the courts. 
The following section of this chapter examines the literature 
concerning significant court cases dealing with teacher dismissals for 
immoral causes. 
The Literature on Immorality and Court Decisions 
On the issue of teacher dismissal for immoral causes, the most 
comprehensive treatment in the literature was by Bolmeier,^ Punke,*^ 
and Davis.62 But all three writers treated immorality as one category 
in various treatises on the schools and the courts. Likewise, all three 
writers treated the topic by identifying related cases and summarizing 
each case. 
In a section dealing with teacher dismissals in The School in 
the Legal Structure, Bolmeier states: 
The courts are called upon perennially to determine whether or not 
a school board's dismissal of teachers is legal. So many factors 
are involved in teacher-dismissal cases that it is impossible to 
lay down a single ruling defining the school board's legal latitude 
in the dismissal of teachers.63 
However, Bolmeier maintains that, "Analysis of many court decisions in 
60Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure; also see 
Teachers' Rights, Restraints and Liabilities; and Landmark Supreme 
Court Decisions on Public School Issues. 
GlPunke, loc. cit. 
®2Davis, loc. cit. 
Bolmeier, The School in the Legal Structure, p. 193. 
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past cases do provide some legal principles which may serve as guides to 
school boards, and thereby minimize litigation."^ Accordingly, he sets 
forth twelve principles as guidelines. Although all twelve of Bolmeier's 
legal principles are not concerned with dismissal for immoral causes per 
se, all twelve are pertinent, directly or indirectly, to this study and 
are, therefore, quoted here verbatim: 
1. A school board's power to dismiss a teacher may be derived 
from statute, or in the absence of statute, it may stem from an 
implied authority to dismiss for adequate cause. 
2. The power to dismiss for just cause is absolute and may not 
be limited by contract. 
3. A teacher (as a general rule) may not be dismissed without a 
justifiable cause before the expiration of a contract. 
4. Where the method of dismissal is prescribed by statute, such 
method must be followed in order for the dismissal to be valid. 
5. Even though no method of procedure is set out, the teacher is 
entitled to notices of charges against him and to a fair hearing 
before an impartial board. 
6. As a general rule, a removal for a cause not authorized by 
statute or contract and outside the discretionary power of the school 
authorities is invalid. 
7. The burden of proof rests upon the school board in proving 
incompetency, because the teacher's certificate is prima facie 
evidence of competency. 
8. The teacher has the right to have competency determined on 
the basis of service. 
9. The board can demand of teachers only average qualifications, 
not the highest, in determining incompetency. 
10. The teacher may seek redress in the court if he feels that 
the evidence presented by the board is not sufficient to establish 
his incompetency and if he has exhausted all administrative remedies 
prior to this. 
11. The courts are inclined to accept the testimony of superin­
tendents, supervisors, and principals as to a teacher's ability to 
perform his duties. 
12. Where school board's action appears to be for the welfare of 
the children the dismissal of a teacher is likely to win judicial 
approval.65 
In speaking of immorality, Bolmeier declares, "The mere allega­
tion of immorality or f3oor behavior, or even a 'forced admission', there­
t o  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  c a u s e  f o r  a  l a w f u l  d i s m i s s a l  o f  a  t e a c h e r . H e  
64Ibid. 65Ibid., p. 194 66Ibid., p. 196. 
further claims, "The statutory power of a school board to discharge 
teachers is always freely construed and good cause includes any grounds 
which is put forth by (the) board in good faith."67 He is quick to add, 
however, that there are limits to what constitutes 'just cause' in the 
dismissal of teachers. 
In a later work, Teachers' Rights, Restraints and Liabilities, 
Bolmeier devotes a section to "Immorality as a Cause." Therein he 
treats two areas of immoral causes: (1) unorthodox behavior, and (2) 
the writing of letters. In relation to unorthdox behavior, he states: 
Unorthodox behavior has often been ruled as immoral and grounds for 
dismissal of teachers. The courts, however, cannot rely upon judi­
cial precedence here because of the revolutionized social attitude 
toward sex. That which may have been judged immoral in sexual 
matters a century, or even a decade, ago may be no longer so 
regarded. 
In relation to letter writings as an immoral cause, Bolmeier cites 
Jarvella v. Willoughby - Eastlake School District Board of Education 
as a case in point.^ According to Bolmeier, although the court ruled in 
favor of the teacher, it offered suggestions to school boards to serve as 
guidelines in restraining the conduct of teachers. The court wrote: 
The board can only be concerned with "immoral conduct" to the 
extent that it is, in some way, inimical to the welfare of the 
school community. The private speech or writings of a teacher, not 
in any way inimical to that welfare, are absolutely immaterial in 
the application of such standard. . . . This opinion applies to the 
facts of this case alone and is not intended to suggest that school 
boards may not discharge teachers for "immorality" consisting of 
vulgar or obscene writings in the light of other facts.70 
6?Ibid., p. 196. 
^Bolmeier, Teachers' Rights, Restraints and Liabilities, p. 21. 
69Ibid., p. 23. 
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In another publication of the same year, Bolmeier examines Land­
mark Supreme Court decisions on public school issues in a book by the 
same title.7^ Therein he analyzes three cases that could conceivably be 
categorized as immorality: (1) Beilan v. Board of Education (Dismissal 
for refusal to reveal association), (2) Keyishan v. Board of Regents 
(Dismissal for refusal to sign affidavit of non-affiliation with Communist 
party), and (3) Pickering v. Board of Education (Dismissal for expression 
of public concern). The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the teacher in 
the two latter cases, and in favor of the school board in the Bei1 an case. 
The legal principle quoted by Justice Burton in the Beilan case is worth 
noting in relation to this study. 
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes 
the attitudes of young minds towards the society in which they live. 
In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integ­
rity of the schools. That the school authorities have the right and 
the duty to screen officials, teachers, and employees as to their 
fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools, as a part of 
ordered society, cannot be doubted. 2 
Bolmeier1 s newest publication, Sex Litigation and the Public 
Schools, in press at the time of this writing, devotes one chapter to the 
"Legal Limitations of Sex Behavior." He groups sexual misconduct into 
three categories of immorality: "Homosexuality", "Adulterous and other 
illicit acts", and "Bizarre cases of sexual behavior."73 Each category 
is illustrated by several recent court cases. But since the cases used 
^Bolmeier, Landmark Supreme Court Decisions on Public School 
Issues (Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1973), pp. 104-
145. 
^Bolmeier, op. cit., p. 187, quoting Beilan v. Board of Education, 
357 U.S. 399 (Penn., 1958). 
73Ibid., pp. 40-64. 
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by Bolmeier will be treated in Chapter Four of this study, Bolmeier's 
analysis will not be discussed here. Suffice it to say here, perhaps 
the most significant legal principle to emerge from Bolmeier's exami­
nation is the one taken from Erb v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruc­
tion," . . . conduct must adversely affect the teacher-student rela­
tionship before revocation will be approved."74 
In his treatise on school law entitled The Teacher and The 
Courts, Punke states: 
The moral code for teachers is more rigid than for people in many 
vocations. This seems largely because parents look upon teachers 
as models for imitation by children and because many parents hope 
their children will live on a higher moral plane than the parents do. 
While many people think of morality primarily in terms of sex behav­
ior, it has wider implications as ground for teacher dismissal.75 
One chapter in Punke's book is devoted to "Immorality."76 Like 
Davis' study, it is an examination of court cases dealing with teacher 
dismissal for immoral causes through 1970. The major importance of 
Punke's and Davis'77 parallel studies is their classification of cases 
on immorality beyond sexual misconduct. Included in both studies as im­
morality are such acts as intoxication, gambling, cursing, fraud and 
deceit, family quarrels, financial irresponsibility, bad behavior in 
teaching sex education, notoriety, vulgarily, dishonesty, and criminal 
indictment. 
An article in the North Dakota Law Review by Behling examines 
74Bolmeier, op. cit., p. 48, citing Erb v. State Board of Public 
Instruction, 216 N. W. 2d 339 (Iowa 1974). 
75pUnke, The Teacher and The Courts, p. 584. 
76ibid., pp. 584-594. 
77Davis, op. cit., pp. 31-68. 
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the legal gravity of specific acts in cases of teacher dismissals.78 in 
relation to dismissal for immoral causes, Behling lists six acts which 
are severe enough in legal gravity to merit court concurrence with board 
dismissals: (1) improper conduct in contracting for teacher position 
(Brown v. St. Bernard Parish School Board), (2) falsification of an appli­
cation record (Negrich v. Dade County Board of Public Instruction), (3) 
presenting oneself as a poor example for children (Grover v. Stoval), 
(4) drunkenness at school (Tracy v. School District No. 22, Sheridan County), 
(5) calling the superintendent an "S.O.B.", (Mackenzie v. School Committee 
of Ipswich), and (6) assault and battery (Baird v. School District No. 25). 
Behling's cases in point, supra, deal with rather old court decisions, 
the most recent case being decided in 1961, or fifteen years ago. It 
will be interesting to note the change in the stance of more recent court 
decisions as reflected in other literature in this study and in the 
examination of case law in Chapter Four. 
Two legal principles that have become the central issue in 
teacher dismissals and subsequent litigation are "the right to privacy" 
and demonstration of a "nexus between alleged immoral acts and fitness 
to teach." 
Carlton provides a thorough analysis of Pettit v. State Board of 
Education in comparison with Morrison v. State Board of Education and 
Purifoy v. State Board of Education.79 All three examples are California 
78Herman E. Behling, Jr., "The Legal Gravity of Specific Acts in 
Cases of Teacher Dismissals," North Dakota Law Review, 43 (Summer 1967), 
753-763. 
79Blaine L. Carlton, "Pettit v. State Board of Education: Out-
of-Classroom Misconduct as Grounds for Revocation of Teaching Creden­
tials," Utah Law Review (Winter 1973), 797-807. 
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cases involving license revocation for immorality as specified in the 
state statutes, and each involves the principles of privacy and fitness 
to teach. Carlton draws two distinctions between Morrison in contrast to 
Pettit and Purifoy: the "criminality distinction" and the "privacy dis­
tinction." He concludes: 
The law emerging from Morrison, Purifoy, and Pettit will not please 
those who prefer clearly delineated standards of legally protected 
behavior; Pettit especially seems to obscure the significance of 
clear standards established in Morrison. 
One problem in future revocation cases will be the weight given to 
criminally punishable misconduct in the determination of a teacher's 
fitness to teach . . . 
The more difficult problem raised in these cases is the extent to 
which a teacher's constitutional right to privacy protects him from 
credential revocation proceedings stemming from the Board's objection 
to his private conduct. 
Carlton continues to speak on the issue of privacy. He states: "Con­
ceivably, the state's interest in maintaining the quality of its teachers 
and the moral integrity of its schools is sufficiently compelling to over­
ride the right to privacy." "But, this is not clear."81 
Ostrander deals with the "right.to privacy" principle through 
analysis of the Morrison case, supra, and the Maryland case of Acanfora 
v. Board of Education of Montgomery County.^2 From his analysis 
Ostrander asserts: 
. . .  t h e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  s t a t e  t o  r e g u l a t e  p r o f e s s i o n s  a n d  c o n d i t i o n s  
of government employment must not arbitrarily impair the right of the 
individual to live his private life, apart from his job, as he deems 
fit. 83 
SOcarlton, op. cit., p. 807. 81 Ibid. 
82Acanfora v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 359 F. 
Supp. 843, 491 F. 2d 498 (Md. 1974). 
83Kenneth H. Ostrander, "The Teacher's Duty to Privacy: Court 
Rulings in Sexual Deviancy Cases," Phi Delta Kappan 57 (Sept., 1975), 21. 
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He concludes: "Teachers whose nonconventional behaviors are practiced 
with discretion, particularly in the privacy of their own homes, will be 
protected by the courts."84 Ostrander magnifies the concept, or princi­
ple, stated by the Acanfora court: "A duty to privacy." His brief con­
clusion to his article is worth quoting verbatim here: 
The conduct of teachers is subject to reasonable control by school 
officials. In matters involving nonconventional sexual behavior, 
school officials can discipline and dismiss teachers when it can be 
shown that their behavior is detrimental to an orderly educational 
process. School officials cannot substitute their sense of morality 
for that of their teachers. Teachers whose nonconventional behaviors 
are practiced with discretion and with regard to their reputations, 
particularly when practiced in the privacy of their homes, are likely 
to meet with the protection of the courts. The delicate balance 
between the private rights of teachers and the interests of school 
officials in protecting the integrity of the educational process is 
summed up in the principle, the teacher has a duty to privacy.85 
Another article relating to a teacher's right to privacy was 
written by Walden in the Elementary School Principal.86 Therein, Walden 
discusses the case of Drake v. Covington County Board of Education,87 a 
case which turned on the nature of the school board's evidence and a citi­
zen's right to privacy. Walden states that the Drake case, and others, 
suggests a difference between conduct that is "private" and conduct that 
is "public." In speaking to the issue of immorality, he maintains: 
'Immorality' is easier to define when the prescribed behavior takes 
place in public or when it is so open that the public has general 
knowledge of it. A teacher's private behavior, so long as it re­
mains private, is not subject to an employer's scrutiny.88 
84lbid., p. 20 85ibid., p. 22 
86john C. Walden, "A Right to Privacy," Elementary School Prin-
cipal, Llll (July-August 1974), 86-88. 
87Drake v. Covington County Board of Education, CA. 4144-N, 
U.S.D.C., M.D. (Ala. 1974), cited by Walden. 
88walden, op. cit., p. 88. 
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Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of teacher dismissal in 
the literature is found in the American Law Reports, Annotated.^ Volume 
97 carries an annotated analysis of all dismissal cases in courts covered 
by the Reports. Within that context is a section dealing with "Specific 
conduct as constituting moral unfitness." Therein, cases are grouped 
into two categories: (1) "Conduct involved was not held to be of the 
type which would support revocation of license to teach," and (2) "Partic­
ular conduct which was held to constitute immorality sufficient to affect 
fitness to teach." Two observations gleaned from the annotations are 
presented here. The first deals with the nexus between the immoral act 
and classroom performance: 
Where the courts have been presented with the question whether or 
not specific conduct of a teacher constitutes moral unfitness which 
would justify revocation, they have apparently required that the 
conduct must adversely affect the teacher-student relationship 
before revocation will be approved.90 
The second issue deals with the possibility of judicial review: 
. . . the question whether an administrative determination of 
revocation is subject to judicial review has been answered in the 
light of the pertinent statutes, with the results varying according 
to the statutues and circumstances involved.9' 
Another volume of the American Law Reports deals with the "Use 
of illegal drugs as grounds for dismissal of teachers . . ." The im­
portant legal principal that emerges from analysis of pertinent cases 
covered by the Reports follows: 
. . . use of illegal drugs by a teacher may constitute ground for 
dismissal, or denial or cancellation of a teacher's certificate, to 
the extent that such conduct adversely affects the teacher-student 
relationship and evidences unfitness to teach.9^ 
^Leemoria Crawford and Asemo Nastos et al., 97 ALR 2d 828. 
90Ibid., pp. 837-38. 91 Ibid., p. 837. 
9^Don F. Vaccaro, 47 A.L.R. 3d 754. 
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In relation to the courts and teacher dismissals for immorality, 
a search of the Yearbook of School Law series reveals only scant treat­
ment of the topic. The 1970 Yearbook5^ mentions only one case in the 
area of dismissal for immoral causes: Lombardo v. Board of Education. 
According to Garber and Reutter, the plaintiff's argument on degree of 
proof needed for the school board to dismiss him for improper relations 
with a girl student did not impress the court. Their quotation from the 
court record concerning degree of proof needed for board dismissal of 
teachers illustrates a significant legal principle: 
It is the contention of the plaintiff on this appeal that the evi­
dence to sustain the decision of the Board must be strong and con­
vincing, akin to that required in criminal cases. We do not know of 
any Illinois case supporting this contention, nor has any case so 
holding been brought to our attention. We decline the suggestion 
to so hold.94 
The 1971 Yearbook of School Law^ lists only one court case related to 
immorality and teacher dismissal, the landmark case of Morrison v. State 
Board of Education. Garber and Seitz quote much of the court language 
verbatim, without editorial comment. However, one important point they 
lift from the language of the Morrison court relates immorality to fit­
ness to teach. In their words, 
The court concluded by stressing that it was not saying that homo­
sexuals must be permitted to teach in the public schools of Cali­
fornia. It was requiring only that the board properly find that an 
93[_ee 0. Garber and E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., The Yearbook of School 
Law (Danville, 111.: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 
1970). 
^Garber and Reutter, op. cit., p. 238, citing Lombardo v. Board 
of Education. 
95i_ee 0. Garber and Reynolds C. Seitz, The Yearbook of School 
Law (Danville, 111.: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1971). 
individual is not fit to teach.96 
Robert E. Phay discusses one court case dealing with teacher dismissal 
for immorality in the 1973 Yearbook of School Law.97 The example case 
was Fisher v. Snyder in which the court overruled the dismissal. The 
court drew upon Griswold v. Connecticut in finding the dismissal to be 
an infringement on the teacher's right of free association and privacy. 
A c c o r d i n g  t o  P h a y ' s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l i n g ,  t h e  c o u r t  " . . .  
recognized the board's right to inquire into a teacher's personal asso­
ciations . . . but noted that making inquiry is different from using im-
permissable inferences from the inquiry."98 The same case and legal 
principle were treated in the 1974 Yearbook of School Law99 by Del on 
under the section entitled, "Immorality." Based on the Fisher v. Snyder 
case he states: 
The court, in affirming that a school board may legitimately inquire 
into the character and integrity of its teachers, held that it may 
not dismiss a teacher for arbitrary or capricious reasons.'00 
A New York case involving a teacher who was convicted of a felony 
is treated in the 1975 Yearbook of School Law^ under the heading, 
^Garber and Seitz, op. cit., p. 203, citing Morrison v. State 
Board of Education. 
97Robert E. Phay, ed., The Yearbook of School Law (Topeka, 
Kansas: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1973). 
98phay, op. cit., p. 107, citing Griswold v. Connecticut. 
99Floyd G. Delon, ed., The Yearbook of School Law (Topeka, 
Kansas: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1974). 
100De-}on} 0p. cit., p. 91, citing Fisher v. Snyder. 
101 Phi 1ip K. Piele, ed., The Yearbook of School Law (Topeka, 
Kansas: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1975). 
45 
"Unprofessional Conduct." Since the behavior of the discharged teacher 
in the instant case could have been classified as immoral in other 
states, the legal point made by Piele is pertinent to this study. 
Citing the case of Pordum v. Board of Regents, Piele states: 
In the opinion of the court the extraordinary state interest in pro­
tecting the impressionability of elementary school students over­
rides significant property interest. Each plea of overbreadth, 
equal protection, and vagueness was overruled in the affirmation of 
the lower court holding.'02 
The examination of the literature supports Edwards' declaration: 
"It is well established that the dismissal of a teacher by a board of 
education is not final and conclusive."^3 Hoffman speaks to the in­
creased volume of litigation initiated by teachers by alluding to dif­
ferent role perspectives and reasons for the change in teacher rights. 
He maintains: 
The rights of teachers, as seen and understood by the public, have 
changed somewhat during the past decade or two. But the rights of 
teachers, as perceived by teachers, have changed radically during 
that same period of time. This disparity in the perception of roles, 
rights and responsibilities of teachers has created tensions hereto­
fore unknown in the educational profession J04 
According to Hoffman the reasons for the change in teacher rights and 
attitudes can be attributed to four factors: (1) general relaxation of 
social restraints on all people, (2) improved educational standards of 
teachers and administrators, (3) organizational efforts of the teaching 
profession and the usurpation of responsibilities, (4) decisions in 
various court cases which have confirmed many common rights for 
op. cit., p. 163, citing Pordum v. Board of Regents. 
^03|\|ewton Edwards, The Court and the Public Schools (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 504. 
104£ar] Hoffman, "Are Teachers Citizens of Their Communities?" 
School Management, Vol. 16 (1972), 10. 
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teachersJ05 In summary, Hoffman asserts: "The courts are aware of the 
rights and responsibilities of school boards to administer their schools, 
but they must also be zealous in protecting the rights of individual 
teachers who teach in these districts."^06 
The literature and the examination of court cases in Chapter 
Four of this study indicates a large part of the immorality cases deal 
with homosexuality. Nolte raises a note of caution in dealing with 
"gay" teachers in the classroom. He asserts: 
Because the state controls licensing, employment and tenuring of 
public school teachers (and also revokes their certificates for 
cause), the question of homosexuality among teachers usually has 
been a problem for state courts to handle. Several recent cases, 
however, have been based upon an individual's right to privacy. 
And in such instances, boards of education have had to show cause 
why the declaration of homosexuality constitutes basis for dis­
missal, owing, say, to an undesirable effect a gay person might 
have on students or perhaps basic unfitness to teach JO? 
In Nolte's advice to school boards concerning contemplated dismissal of 
a homosexual teacher, he states, "His (the teacher) being homosexual 
(even self-proclaimed) generally is not cause for firing a gay teacher."^08 
Nolte examines the Wood v. Strickland case and advises school 
boards accordingly. Although the Wood case did not deal with immorality 
or teacher dismissal, Nolte's reasoning is applicable to teacher dis­
missal cases and an appropriate culmination of the review of the litera­
ture for this study. He declares: "School boards seldom get into 
trouble when they exercise their legislative or administrative powers. 
105ibid., p. 10. T06Ibid. 
107m. Chester Nolte, "Gay Teachers: The March from Closet to 
Classroom," The American School Board Journal, Vol. 160 (July 1973), 29. 
108ibid., p. 30. 
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It's when they act as judicial bodies that they so often land in court--
and lose."^09 
SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE 
The literature indicates that traditionally "immorality" was 
what school boards said it was. Boards have enjoyed wide discretion in 
determining immorality as a basis of teacher dismissal. Generally, the 
courts have deferred to school boards the right to determine cause. 
Therefore, relatively few dismissal cases concerned with immorality 
reached the courts. But unlimited board discretion is not the case to­
day. Teachers are suing school boards at the drop of a civil right. 
Many of the legal problems center around the ambiguity of the 
term "immorality" and the often challenged right of school boards to 
make such determinations in disciplining teachers for immoral conduct. 
Philosophers and the courts attempt to define morality. Both 
the philosophers and the courts see morality as a cultural phenomenon, 
like law on the one hand and convention on the other, and rooted in 
community mores. Part of the disagreement over the term "morality" or 
"immorality" stems from the lack of agreement on a common set of mores. 
It appears that cultural mores are in a state of flux or there exist 
many subcultural mores rather than a common set of mores and a common 
morality. The courts have said that morality is inseparable from con­
duct and that "immorality" is conduct hostile to the general public. 
Likewise, the courts have broadened the term "immorality" to encompass 
many types of teacher behavior beyond those which are sexual in nature. 
^M. Chester Nolte, "How to Survive the Supreme Court's Momen­
tous New Strictures on School People," The American School Board Journal 
163 (May 1975), 52. 
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Surely, the definitional problems of "immorality" fall upon the courts, 
and accordingly, the courts are emerging as a key source of educational 
policy. 
According to the literature the courts have evolved from a 
laissez-faire stance toward intervention in school issues to a position 
of strict construction. Two writers view the present involvement of the 
judiciary in school matters as a "take-over", which leaves school boards 
with little authority in dismissal cases. In one case the courts justi­
fy its involvement in school cases by stating that it is the duty of the 
judiciary to lend a hand when constitutional rights hang in the balance. 
School boards are caught in a dilemma. They have pbwer they 
cannot use; power they do not have but insist on using; and power they 
do have and can use but better be ready to justify its use in court. 
The literature further indicates that teachers have made con­
siderable progress through the courts in moving from second-class citi­
zenship, as far as the Bill of Rights is concerned, to full protection 
of rights as first-class citizens. When the courts are involved they 
must balance the teacher's constitutional rights against the competing 
interests of society in maintaining school discipline and integrity. 
A teacher's dismissal for conduct that is considered immoral de­
pends on the circumstances of the case: whether the conduct was personal 
and private, whether it became public through the indiscretion of the 
teacher, and whether it involved students. But the ti?end is clearly to­
ward greater protection for the teacher. According to Nolte, the new 
judicial attitude is in favor of teachers - not school boards. 
So many factors are involved in teacher dismissals, that it is 
impossible to lay down a single rule defining a school board's legal 
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latitude. However, court rulings do provide some guidelines for school 
boards in dismissable cases. Bolmeier offers twelve such guidelines, or 
legal principles. But due to changing social values and revolutionized 
attitudes toward sex, judicial precedence may not be dependable. 
In order for dismissals for immorality to stand, the alleged acts 
must be in some way inimical to the welfare of the school community, 
the conduct must adversely affect the teacher-student relationship. 
Likewise, there must be a clear nexus between the immoral act and fit­
ness to teach. 
The literature indicates that the "right to privacy" has become 
a central issue in dismissal cases based on grounds of immorality. One 
of the most difficult problems is the extent to which a teacher's con­
stitutional right to privacy protects him from a dismissal stemming from 
a school board's objection to his private conduct. At this point in 
time it is not clear whether the state's interest in maintaining the 
quality of its teachers and the moral integrity of its schools is suffi­
ciently compelling to override the teacher's right to privacy. According 
to Ostrander the power of the state to regulate professions and condi­
tions of government employment must not arbitrarily impair the right of 
the individual to live his private life, apart from his job, as he deems 
fit. There is a difference between private conduct and public conduct. 
As long as conduct is private, it is not subject to employer's scrutiny. 
The literature shows that the degree of proof needed in teacher 
dismissal cases involving charges of immorality does not necessarily 
have to be equal to proof required in criminal cases, but that the 
school board must properly find an individual not fit to teach if the 
dismissal is to stand. 
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A school board has the right to inquire into a teacher's per­
sonal associations and life style but cannot use impermissable inferences 
from such inquiry. Nor can boards dismiss teachers for arbitrary or 
capricious reasons. 
Hoffman maintains that teachers' rights have changed. So have 
teachers' views of their rights and public views of teachers' rights 
changed, and are viewed differently. This disparity in the perception 
of roles, rights, and responsibilities of teachers has created many 
tensions and much litigation. The school boards and the courts are 
caught in the middle of the conflict. The courts are aware of the rights 
and responsibilities of school boards to administer their schools, but 
they must also be zealous in protecting the rights of teachers who work 
in their schools. 
Based on the literature, and the court cases reflected in the 
literature, the vast majority of immorality suits are concerned with 
sexual behavior, and especially with homosexuality, as immoral conduct 
on the part of teachers. The literature further indicates that individual 
perceptions of immorality are so diverse that the courts are involved 
perennially to decide such matters. Likewise, teachers no longer can be 
expected to lay down their constitutional rights as a condition for 
continued employment. School boards, and school officials as agents 
of the boards, must now deal with the courts on teacher dismissal matters 
that once were treated as routine matters of board judgment. 
The literature on the topic of teacher dismissals related to 
immoral causes is voluminous. A representative sample of the literature 
has been examined and presented in this chapter as an overview of the 
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topic under study. The following chapter deals with the examination and 
analysis of the fifty state statutes to determine legislative provisions 
for dismissal of teachers who are charged with immoral conduct. 
CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF STATE STATUTES ON IMMORALITY 
This chapter deals with the question under the statement of the 
problem in Chapter One: "What is the status of statutory law related to 
teacher dismissal for immoral causes?" 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the education codes of 
the fifty state statutes to determine the degree of legislative concern 
for the morality of public school teachers and the statutory provisions 
for removal from office those teachers charged with moral misconduct, or 
immorality. 
When looking at the term "immorality" in the state statutes, im­
morality is listed as a grounds for dismissal more often than any other 
cause. When the term "immorality" is considered as a term that includes 
other similar terms such as "immoral conduct," "moral turpitude," "moral 
unfitness," "unworthiness to instruct children," and "just cause," all 
fifty states cover immorality as a cause for dismissal. In addition to 
immorality as a cause, most states list other terms that could cover the 
area also. "Good cause," or its equivalent, is the most frequently 
mentioned catch-all term built into most statutes as a safeguard against 
undesirable teacher actions, including immorality. It is evident from the 
statutes that the legislative bodies of the fifty states consider teacher 
morality to be of prime importance. 
According to an earlier survey based on state statutes through 
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1970J there has.been movement toward more states including immorality 
as a statutory basis for teacher dismissal. In an unpublished disserta­
tion Davis found that thirty-seven states listed immorality as a cause 
for dismissal in 1970. It is not known whether Davis considered im­
morality in its narrowest context or whether the term "immorality" in­
cluded the various other phrasings of the concept. Assuming Davis used 
immorality in its broadest sense, and assuming the survey to be an 
accurate one, the present examination finds that only two states have 
added "immorality" as a grounds for teacher dismissal within the last 
five years. 
The fact that all states have broad statutory provisions for 
dealing with the immoral conduct of teachers demonstrates the breadth of 
legislative concern. It is equally interesting to note the depth, or 
degree, of concern. Table I reflects the following: forty states list 
immorality as a grounds for dismissal; thirty-two states list immorality 
as grounds for revocation of teaching license or certificate; and nine 
states make revocation mandatory if immoral "cause" is substantiated or 
if a teacher is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In only 
eight of the states are the statutes silent on immorality. In each such 
case, however, the issue is covered by the term "good and just" or 
"sufficient and due cause" except Vermont which uses the term "conduct 
unbecoming a teacher." 
Only one state, Alaska, defines "immorality" in its state statutes. 
In that instance immorality is limited to the commission of an act which 
under the laws of the state constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. 
^Davis, "Immorality and Insubordination in Teacher Dismissals," 
loc. cit. 
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TABLE I  
STATE LISTING GOOD CAUSE AND IMMORALITY AS GROUNDS FOR 
TEACHER DISMISSAL, LICENSE REVOCATION, AND 
MANDATORY REVOCATION 
Just Cause IMMORALITY 
State Dismissal and/or Dismissal Possible Revocation 
Revocation Revocation Mandatory 
Alabama X X X X* 
Alaska X* X* 
Ari zona X X X 
Arkansas X 
Cal ifornia X X X X* 
Colorado X X 
Connecticut X X X* 
Delaware X X 
Florida X X 
Georgia X X X 
Hawaii X X 
Idaho X* X* 
111inois X X X 
Indiana X X 
Iowa X 
Kansas X 
Kentucky X X 
Louisiana X X 
Maine X X 
Maryland X 
Massachusetts X 
Michigan X 
Minnesota X X 
Mississippi X 
Missouri X X 
Montana X 
Nebraska X X 
Nevada X* 
New Hampshire X X 
New Jersey X 
New Mexico X X 
New York X X 
North Carolina X 
North Dakota X X X X 
Ohio X X X* 
Oklahoma X X 
Oregon X X X 
Pennsylvania X X 
Rhode Island X 
South Carolina X X X 
South Dakota X X* X* 
Tennessee X** 
Texas X X X*** 
Utah X X X 
Vermont 
Virginia X 
Washington X X 
Wisconsin X X 
West Virginia X X 
Wyominq X X 
TOTALS 20 40 32 9 
•Crimes involving moral turpitude ~ 
**Immorality contained in conduct unbecoming a teacher 
***Unworthiness to instruct children 
A close examination of the fifty state statutes reveals a niyriad 
of legal terms listed as grounds for teacher dismissal. In addition to 
immorality, the leading cause, many of the other terms used would suf­
fice for the same purpose. The "just cause" phrase covers the entire 
spectrum of stated grounds for dismissal since cause must be substanti 
ated in any case. Table II shows the range and nature of terms used in 
the statutes as grounds for teacher dismissal. Among the twenty-eight 
categories shown in Table II, some minor grouping has been done to bring 
the list within manageable proportions. 
Analysis of the statutory terms as provided in Table II reveals 
a legal semantical problem and a great deal of overlapping of areas by 
different causal terms. Although a wide range of language is used to 
acccomplish a common purpose, the fact becomes evident that across the 
nation the various legislatures concerned themselves with five board 
areas of teacher conduct: (1) immoral behavior and attitudes, (2) in­
adequate performance, (3) deviant behavior, (4) violation of laws and 
regulations, and (5) dishonesty and deceit. All of the terms used in 
statutes as grounds for dismissal are grouped under the five general 
categories in Table III. Under the five groupings shown in Table III 
dismissal of teachers for immoral acts could be covered by at least 
nineteen statutory terms. 
In most states school boards have a choice of categories or 
terms under which a teacher might be charged, ranging from due cause on 
the one hand to immorality on the opposite end of the range, with im­
morality being the more stigmatic charge. It is interesting to note at 
this point that the Alaska court spoke to the nature of the charge of 
immorality as compared with other possibilities. The Supreme Court of 
TABLE II 
ENUMERATED GROUNDS TOR TEACHER DISMISSALS AND 
LICENSE REVOCATIONS IN THE FIFTY STATE STATUTES 
Grounds Dismissal Revocation 
lnworal i  tya 43 34 
Incompetency 33 18 
Neglect of Dutyb ?_$ 16 
Good Causec , 21 8* 
Violation of School Regulations & Policies 17 4 
Insubordination 16 2 
Incapacity6 16 4 
Violation of Laws of the State' 14 11 
Inefficiency 13 1 
Violation of Contracts 10 10 
Evident Unfitness" 9 7 
Intemperance1 9 8 
Unprofessional Conduct 9 7 
Conduct Unbecoming a Teacher 8 1 
C rue 1ty 7 6 
Misconduct in Office 4 2 
Failure to Carry Out Duties 3 1 
Violation of Professional Standards 3 2 
Advocating Overthrow of Government 2 1 
Falsification of Records 2 2 
Deceit and Fraud in Securing Certificate ? 2 
Dishonesty. 2 1 
Disloyaltyj 2 2 
Habitual Use of Drugs and Narcotics 2 2 
MerAership in Illegal Organizations 2 
Profanity 1 1 
Criminal Syndication 1 
Brutal Treatment 1 
aImmorality includes such other terms as moral misconduct, 
immoral character, moral turpitude, and sex offenses. 
^Neglect of duty includes gross neglect, inattention to duty, 
neglect of business of the school, and services unprofitable to the 
school. 
cGood cause includes good and just cause, due cause, sufficient 
cause. 
^Violation of regulations and policies includes violation of 
tit le of office and duties, willful violation of regulations and non­
compliance of school policies, rules and regulations. 
incapacity includes physical and mental disability and mental 
derangement 
^Violation of laws of the state include criminal conviction of 
acts involving moral turpitude. 
^Violation of contracts includes breach of contract. 
^Et»ident unfitness evident unworthiness and morally unfit. 
intemperance includes drunkeness. 
^Disloyalty includes teaching disloyalty. 
TABLE III 
THE FIVE BROAD CATEGORIES OF LEGISLATIVE CONCERN IN TEACHER DISMISSAL STATUTES 
Immoral 
Behavior and Attitudes 
I Inadequate 
' Performance 
Devi ant 
Behavior 
Dishonesty 
and Deceit 
Violation of 
Lav.-s and Policie^ 
I mmo ra 1 i ty 
Moral turpitude 
Morally unfit to teach 
Evident unfitness 
Sex offenses 
Felony conviction 
Commission of crime 
Criminal syndication 
Unprofessional conduct 
Conduct unbecoming a 
teacher 
Incompetency 
Intemperance 
Drunkea.ness 
Use of drugs 
Dishonesty 
Disloyal ty 
Teaching disloyalty 
Good-just-due cause 
Inefficiency 
Neglect of duty 
Physical incapcity 
Mental incapacity 
Cruelty to children 
Failure to carry out 
rules and regulations 
Neglect of business of 
school 
Noncompliance with 
school rules 
Inadequate performance 
Mental derangement 
Negligence 
Persistent negligence 
Inattention to duty 
Services unprofitable 
to the school 
Failure to perform 
customary duties 
Good-just-due cause 
Unprofessional conduct 
Conduct unbecoming a 
teacher 
Misconduct in office 
Wi11ful violation of 
regulations 
Violation of contract 
Noncompliance with 
school rules 
Negligence 
Breach of contract 
Profanity 
Inattention to duty 
Services unprofitable 
Evident unfitness 
Brutal treatment 
Dishonesty 
Disloyal ty 
Teaching disloyalty 
Good-just-due cause 
Falsification of 
records 
Dishonesty 
Disloyal ty 
Teaching dis­
loyal ty 
Fraud and deceit 
in certification 
Due-just-good 
cause 
Commission of 
crime 
Membership in 
organization 
not allowed 
by laws 
Use of drugs 
and narcotics 
Brutal treatment 
Advocating the 
overthrow of 
the government 
Moral turpitude 
Good-just-due 
cause 
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Alaska suggested that "conduct unbecoming a teacher" be used as grounds 
for teacher dismissal because it would serve the same purpose without 
stigmatizing the victim with a charge that in the minds of many denotes 
sexual misconduct: 
. . . immorality should be removed from the catch-all definition of 
conduct and a designation such as "conduct unbecoming a teacher" be 
substituted. The definition would then cover immorality in all its 
aspects, including all shades of unacceptable social behavior and 
would continue to serve the useful purpose of a "catch-all" clause 
which so many states have found to be necessary in this area of 
litigation.2 
But whatever charge selected, the burden of proof rests with the 
local employing authority. And whatever the charge, cause has to be sub­
stantiated by the school board and its agents. The courts have spoken to 
the issue of "fair warning" in the statutes so that teachers could be 
forewarned of prohibited teacher conduct, or precisely what was expected 
of them. Accordingly, the courts have nullified state statutes for 
vagueness of the term "immorality," yet only one state has defined im­
morality in its statutes. For example: in the opinion of a United 
States District Court, the Oregon statutes in 1973 were too vague to 
classify homosexuality as being immoral. According to the court in 
Burton v. Cascade School District,3 the statute was void for vagueness. 
This statute vests in the school board the power to dismiss teachers 
for irrmorality. However, the statute does not define immorality. 
Immorality means different things to different people and its defi­
nition depends on tha idiosyncracies of the individual school board 
members. It may be applied so broadly that every teacher in the 
state could be subject to discipline. The potential for arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement is inherent in such a statute. 
A statute so broad makes those charged with its enforcement the 
2Watts v. Seward School Board, 395 p. 2d 591 (Alaska 1964), p. 592. 
^Burton v. Cascade School District, Union High School No. 5, 353 
F. Supp. 254 (Ore. 1973). 
59 
arbiters of morality for the entire community. In doing so, it sub­
jects the livelihood of every teacher to the irrationality and ir­
regularity of such judgments. The statute is vague because it fails 
to give fair warning of what conduct is prohibited and because it 
permits erratic and prejudiced exercises of authority.4 
The two court cases from Alaska and Oregon were cited here as 
examples of the language two courts have used in speaking to the state 
statutes on immorality as grounds for dismissal for license revocation. 
In examining the statutes of those respective states, the impact of the 
courts is evident in subsequent statutory language. Alaska defines im­
morality as: "cormiission of an act which under the laws of the state 
constitute moral turpitude."5 Therefore, immorality is narrowed to spe­
cific acts under the penal code and not subject to school board determi­
nation of what constitutes immorality. Oregon statutes no longer carry 
"immorality" as a grounds for license revocation but use several other 
terms which cover the ground equally well: "conviction of a crime," 
"gross neglect of duty," "any gross unfitness" .... Interestingly, 
Oregon lists several crimes for which the violation of shall require 
revocation of licenses: public indecency, accosting for deviate pur­
poses, rape, sodomy, various forms of sexual abuse, sexual misconduct, 
bigamy, incest, prostitution, furnishing obscene materials to minors.6 
In the first listing above, the statutes indicate that the state may re­
voke certificates for the enumerated causes, most of which cover immoral 
conduct. But turning to the moral misconduct of a more serious nature, 
the legislature defined immorality by making it a crime to commit 
4lbid., p. 255. 
^Oregon Revised Statutes, Article 342, Section 342.175 (1973). 
6lbid. 
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certain immoral acts and for which convictions of shall require license 
revocation. Note the different language "may revoke" in the first case 
and "shall require revocation" in the latter case. 
Examination of the statutes reveals a consistent concern for the 
moral conduct of teachers and various attempts to control behavior in 
private life as well as in the classroom. But perhaps the most signifi­
cant observation is the degree of statutory safeguards for the pro­
tection of "due process" rights of teachers in dismissal cases. Al­
though examination of procedural "due process" is outside the scope of 
this study, it is worth mentioning here. In light of much recent litiga­
tion concerning the constitutional right to due process, most states 
have included in their statutes intricate and detailed procedural steps 
to be followed in dismissal cases. Some states repealed their former 
"grounds for dismissal" and replaced them with due process legislation. 
Kansas is a state in point.? Other states kept immorality as a grounds 
for dismissal in addition to due process legislation. North Carolina is 
a state in point. Many states have established through the statutes 
professional practices commissions, or their equivalents, to deal with 
teacher dismissal charges and to guarantee due process in such matters. 
Chapter Five will treat the degree of professional practices commissions. 
Also, in some states, such as Kansas, the state board of education re­
quires each school district to file a code of conduct for school per­
sonnel .8 
7Kansas Statutes Annotated, Article 72, Section 72-1383 and 
72-5405 (1974). 
8lbid. 
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It seems evident that these movements by state legislatures are 
an attempt to bring a degree of consistency to the discipline of teachers 
and some agreement on acceptable grounds and conditions for termination 
of employment while protecting the constitutional rights of teachers. 
It would seem, too, that such movements are intended to protect teachers 
from arbitrary and capricious dismissals by school boards while providing 
boards and school officials some guidelines when dismissal charges are 
anticipated. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter has dealt with an analysis of the fifty state 
statutes to determine the status of statutory law dealing with the issue 
of teacher dismissal for immoral causes. Although this chapter deals 
with statutory law, it is done in full recognition of the fact that 
statutes are not law until they stand the test of court review. School 
boards operate under the umbrella of the state education codes as their 
source of authority. And until a particular statute is struck down by 
the courts, it carries the full force of law. 
The language of the various state statutes demonstrates the fact 
that all fifty of the state legislative bodies are concerned foremost 
with the moral fiber and conduct of public school teachers. Although 
all states do not list immorality as a grounds for dismissal, all states 
have statutory provisions to cover the ground. The data from the study 
shown in Table III indicate that at least nineteen terms could be used 
to cover the concept of immorality in teacher dismissals. The statutes 
reveal the breadth and depth of concern for teacher morals. Forty 
states list immorality as a cause directly, or indirectly, as a cause 
under such headings as conduct unbecoming a teacher or unfitness to teach. 
Table I indicates that thirty-four states may revoke certificates for 
immorality, but nine states go beyond the permissive language to state 
that revocation is mandatory in immorality dismissals, usually limited to 
cases involving moral turpitude. Only one state is silent on immorality 
and "just cause." In that state immorality is covered under "conduct 
unbecoming a teacher." 
The statutes reflect the impact of recent court decisions con­
cerning the nature of the charge of immorality, the vagueness of the 
term "immorality," and the concern of the courts in protecting the con­
stitutional right to due process. Alaska and Oregon are used as cases 
in point. 
Examination of the statutes reveals that most states have built 
in statutory provisions for guaranteeing procedural due process for 
teachers through detailed plans, professional practices commissions, and 
codes of conduct. 
The statutes reflect a trend toward greater protection for 
teachers from unfair dismissals and a trend toward less discretion by 
local school boards in determining grounds for dismissal, especially in 
terms of immorality as a cause for dismissal. 
The following chapter of this study will seek to determine if 
judicial review of teacher dismissals exhibits a similar trend toward 
greater protection for teachers in immorality cases, and whether any 
legal principles and court trends can be identified and projected as 
guidelines for teachers and school boards in dismissal situations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW OF COURT CASES 
The language of the statutes in the fifty states varies widely 
from great particularity to gross generality. However, it reflects a 
common concern for the moral fiber of teachers and provisions for 
removal of teachers whose conduct is considered immoral. Accordingly, 
more states list immorality as a ground for dismissal arid license 
revocation of teachers than any other single cause. But since there may 
be a plurality or moralities, whose morals shall prevail? 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has indicated that morality is 
relative to geographic areas; thus, the courts are the agents for de­
ciding what is moral or immoral: 
Since that which might be considered immoral in one locality or 
section of this state might be deemed moral in another locality 
or section, in any given case it is left to the court to determine 
and decide what is an immoral purpose.! 
Other court actions have implied that morality or immorality is relative 
to circumstances, place, and time. The Hobsen court has said that in 
these social and political problems which seem at time to defy solution, 
the court must bear a hand and accept its responsibility to assist in 
the solution where constitutional rights hang in the balance.2 Thus, 
1 State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So. 2d 758 at 765 (La. 1947). 
2Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (Washington, D. C. 1967). 
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the stage for litigation is set. 
In this chapter an attempt is made, through analysis of selected 
court cases, to determine if immorality is relative; if so, relative to 
what factors or situations. A further purpose is to determine to what 
degree the courts have lent a hand in the solution or clarification of 
problems related to teacher dismissals for immoral causes. 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The court reports show that the number of lawsuits involving 
teacher dismissals during the period of time from 1939-1975 is great, 
indeed. The number of cases on immorality dismissals alone is too large 
to treat in this study. Accordingly, cases are selected for examination 
according to three criteria: (1) the case must be based on immorality 
as the cause of dismissal, or the act, if based on other grounds for 
dismissal such as "unbecoming conduct" and "evident unfitness", must be 
of such nature that it could be classified as immoral in other situations 
and under other state statutues; (2) the case must be recent. Most cases 
in the period of 1969-1975 are treated in greater detail than earlier 
cases, since the cases through 1969 have been treated in other studies. 
Landmark cases back to 1939 are included to provide the reader with con­
trast and a broader perspective of court trends; (3) the cases selected 
must demonstrate the breadth of immorality in teacher dismissals, not 
just immorality related to sexual misconduct. 
As might be expected in a changing society, the bulk of the liti­
gation concerned with immorality of teachers is in the broad area of 
sexual misconduct and attitudes. Therefore, the greater weight of this 
study deals with major representative sex cases; whereas, relatively 
minor cases in other areas of inmorality are included to demonstrate the 
various kinds of conduct that have been treated as irmioral and to show 
how the courts have treated such cases. 
The year 1939 was chosen as a beginning point for this study be­
cause the landmark case of Horosko v. School District of Mt. Pleasant^ 
of that year not only influenced teacher/board relationships and role 
perspectives, but the courts for three decades. In effect, the Horosko 
case established that the teacher laid down certain constitutional rights 
in accepting the position of teacher, and that as an exemplar of moral 
conduct before children and the community, his private as well as public 
conduct was subject to close scrutiny and board control. Two decades 
after Horosko, the influence of the Horosko principle, although waning, 
was still evident in Beilan v. Board of Education.^ In Beilan, the 
United States Supreme Court still held that a teacher's conduct outside 
the classroom was subject to school board control. The court held that, 
"We find no requirement in the Federal Constitution that a teacher's 
classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining fitness."® 
£ 
The case of Pickering v. Board of Education decided before the 
United States Supreme Court in 1968, although not based on the charge of 
immorality, clearly established that the teacher is also a man, a citizen 
with certain constitutional rights that could not be laid down at the 
school house door—the right to freedom of speech and dissent outside the 
•^Horosko v. School District of Mount Pleasant Township, 335 Pa. 
369, 6 A. 2d 866 (Pa. 1939). 
^Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399 (Pa., 1958). 
5Ibid., p. 358. 
dickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 
No. 205, 391 U. S. 563 (111. 1968). 
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classroom. 
The following year, 1969, in Morrison v. State Board of Educa­
tion^ the court declared, in essence, that the teacher has a right to 
privacy and that unless the alleged immoral act can be proven to adverse­
ly affect the teacher-student relationship, dismissal will not survive 
strict judicial scrutiny. Thus, Morrison established the principle of 
/ 
nexus between private acts and classroom. In this study, hardly a case 
was examined that did not cite Morrison. And the list of citations found 
under Morrison in Shepard's Citations8 is extensive, indeed. Morrison 
promises to affect this decade as Horosko affected the three previous 
ones. 
A study of judicial actions and a survey of the literature show 
that Pickering and Morrison, plus several interim federal cases on pro­
cedural due process guarantees, have all but dealt the death blow to the 
Horosko principle. 
Finally Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company9 in 1974, although not a 
school case, and Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School District^ in 
1975 have completed the emancipation of teachers. Although it is too 
early to determine the overall impact of Monge and Andrews, the principle 
in the two cases promises to be significant in the protection of teach­
ers. Basically, Monge abrogated the principle that the employer's power 
7Morrison v. State Board of Education, 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P. 2d 
375, 81 Cal. Rptr. 175 (Calif. 1969). 
^Shepard's Reporter Citations, Colorado Springs, Colorado. 
9Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company, 316 A. 2d 549 (N. H. 1974). 
^Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School District, 507 F. 2d 
611 (Miss. 1975). 
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to discharge is absolute. And Andrews established the principle that 
teachers and teacher aides cannot be dismissed or discriminated against 
through policies against unwed mothers or immoral acts in the past. 
The examination of the court cases in this chapter reveals a 
challenge of school board and statutory authority as well as a challenge 
of community standards of morality. Perhaps the widespread use of the 
term "alternative life style" is a euphemism that has replaced the term 
"immorality" to describe, in a non-judgmental fashion, divergent be­
haviors of today. Perhaps, also, teachers are swept into the vortex of 
a social evolution, or revolution, characterized as an age of "predatory 
individualism"^--an era in which everyone does "his own thing" without 
thought of long term consequences or traditional cultural constraints. 
The court cases examined in this study appear to support the above state­
ments. Surely, the courts today place a high value on the individual 
and his constitutional rights as against the broader social welfare. 
In the following cases an attempt is made to offer enough narra­
tive to capture the detailed flavor of each case in simple language. 
Direct quotations are made where the language of the court is particu­
larly significant in point, legal principle, or eloquence. 
^Note: The term "predatory individualism" is a term borrowed 
from Dr. Hines1 "competitive predatory individualism" and used to convey 
a slightly different concept therein. Dr. Hines uses the term in the 
following respect: . . social change in our times has permitted the 
persistence of predatory individualism . . . which becomes a socially 
lethal practice in the hands of people who have just escaped some tra­
ditional controls and gained access to new forms of social power." (From 
an address before the Seminar in Educational Leadership at the Univer­
sity of North Carolina at Greensboro, February 5, 1971, by Dr. Joseph 
Hines, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, University of North 
Carolina at Greensboro.) 
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CATEGORIZATION OF IMMORALITY CASES 
For the sake of clarity and over-all perspective, the cases treated 
in this study are categorized into five major groupings according to the 
following outline: 
1. General Immorality 
a. Drinking in Public 
b. Willful Concealment of Facts 
c. Profanity and Anger 
d. Vulgarity 
e. Insubordination 
2. Homosexuality 
a. Homosexual Conduct in Former Years 
b. Admitted Homosexuality 
c. Promoting "Gay Life" 
d. Oral Copulation 
e. Lewd Act Involving Minor 
f. Transsexualism 
3. Sexual Misconduct Other Than Homosexuality 
a. Fornication Involving Adult Student 
b. Fornication Involving Minor 
c. Fornication Involving Former Student 
d. Diverse Sexual Misconduct 
e. Lewd Public Fantasying 
f. Cohabitation 
g. Unwed Motherhood 
h. Masturbation 
i. Adultery 
4. Alleged Improper Classroom Behavior 
a. Vulgarity 
b. Obscene Classwork 
c. Obscene Teacher Theme 
d. Promoting Diverse Life Style 
e. Use of Obscene Literature 
f. Offensive Language and Punishment 
g. Gun in Classroom 
5. Nonsexual Criminal Offenses 
a. Conspiracy to Bribe 
b. Possession of Marijuana 
c. Shoplifting 
d. Public Intoxication 
e. Falsification of Records 
f. Lying 
THE IMMORALITY CASES 
General Immorality 
Drinking and Public Misconduct. Horosko v. School District of Mount 
Pleasant Township, 335 Pa. 369, 6 A. 2d 866 (Pa. 1939). 
This immorality case is presented first and serves as a beginning 
point for this study due to (1) its forthright statement on exemplary 
responsibilities of teachers, (2) its claim that teachers must give up 
certain constitutional rights as members of the teaching profession, 
and (3) due to its controlling influence in later adjudications. 
This early Pennsylvania case is one of the most often quoted 
immorality cases on record and is completely unrelated to sexual mis­
conduct as immorality. Horosko taught as an elementary teacher in the 
small community of Mount Pleasant. She married the owner of a local 
beer garden and worked as a waitress during the summer months and in 
the evenings after school hours during the school term. The court 
record shows that students and citizens in the school community saw her 
not only working at the beer garden, but on occasion drinking beer with 
customers. Testimony showed also that she sometimes offered instruction 
on the fine points of pinball machine operation. Occasionally she was 
seen rolling dice for a drink. 
Although there was neither evidence nor charge that her beer 
drinking was ever excessive or her conduct disorderly, the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania upheld her dismissal. 
In sustaining dismissal the Court speaks to the nature of 
immorality and the exemplary responsibility of teachers: 
. . . immorality is not essentially confined to a deviation from sex 
immorality; it may be such a course of action as offends the morals 
of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a 
teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate . . . . (Id. at 868). 
Further, the court indicates that, a different standard of con­
duct and public scrutiny is required for teachers not required of others: 
It has always been the recognized duty of the teacher to conduct him­
self in such a way as to command the respect and good will of the 
community, though one result of the choice of a teacher's vocation 
may be to deprive him of the same freedom of action enjoyed by 
persons in other vocations. (Id. at 868). 
The two legal concepts illustrated in the court statements above 
are reflected in teacher dismissal litigation for at least three decades 
following Horosko, and to some extent even today. 
Willful Concealment of Facts. Negrich v. Dade County Board of Public 
Instruction, 143 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1962). 
A very controversial dismissal for immorality arose from an 
incident that began fourteen years after the Horosko decision. In 1953 
Negrich applied for a teaching position in the Dade County Schools. On 
his application he falsely stated that he was an American citizen. He 
repeated the concealment when he signed the required loyalty oath. He 
was employed and began teaching in 1954. He acquired permanent teacher 
status in 1957. In 1960 Negrich became a citizen of the United States by 
naturalization. But two months prior to his acquiring citizenship, the 
school board learned of Negrich's deception and notified him that he was 
discharged for his misrepresentation. Negrich appealed, and the circuit 
court denied his appeal. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal, 
Negrich contended that falsifying his records did not constitute "im­
morality." 
The court disagreed. In affirmation of the lower court decision 
the court held: 
Letter by Superintendent of Schools to teacher stated that teacher 
was being suspended on ground that he falsified his records to ob­
tain a position was sufficient to charge teacher with immorality 
as a ground for suspension and dismissal under statute although word 
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'inmorality' was not used in written charge against teacher. (Id. 
at 499.) 
Profanity and Disrespect. Mackenzie v. School Committee of Ipswich, 
342 Mass. 612, 174 N.E. 2d 657 (Mass. 1961). 
Massachusetts statutes do not list "immorality" as a cause for 
dismissal. Accordingly, in 1961 a teacher was dismissed for "conduct 
unbecoming a teacher" for an act of misconduct similar to others of 
that period in other states that were classified as "immorality",^ 
"unprofessional conduct" J3 "neglect of duty."14 
Mackenzie was a teacher in Massachusetts with twenty-three years 
of exemplary service. She had experienced some disagreement with the 
superintendent and was, accordingly, requested to attend a special 
board meeting. She did so with her attorney. In the heat of the meet­
ing, she was heard to call the superintendent a "son of a bitch." Al­
though the teacher's utterance was in a low voice while her head was 
turned away from the superintendent, at least three persons understood 
her words. The teacher was forthright discharged. She appealed the 
board's dismissal. The Superior Court denied relief. 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explained that the 
fact that the teacher's past conduct was otherwise exemplary did not 
prevent the school committee from dismissing teacher for isolated act: 
. . . the lower court's finding that the teacher's utterance was 
improper and unbecoming is 'plainly justified, if not required.' 
(Id. at 661.) 
l^Watts v. Seward, 454 P. 2d 732 (Alaska, 1969). 
13Hall v. Col ley, 277 Ky. 429, 126 S.W. 2d 811 (Ky., 1939). 
^Moffett v. Calcasieu Parish School Board, 179 So. 2d 537 
(La., 1965). 
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Vulgarity. Jarvella v. Milloughby - Eastlake City School District 
Board of Education, 233 N. E. 2d 143 (Ohio 1967). 
Jarvella's dismissal was based on a charge of "immorality" stem­
ming from two private letters he wrote containing foul words. The two 
letters were written to a recently graduated former student of Jar-
veil a' s. According to the court record the letters containing language 
which many adults would find gross, vulgar, and offensive, would be un­
surprising and fairly routine by some eighteen-year-old boys. 
The letters were sent to the former student, Nichols, by first 
class mail in sealed envelopes. Later, Nichols1 mother found the 
letters among her son's personal effects. She turned the letters over 
to the police department. Subsequently the letters were turned over to 
the school district. Jarvella was suspended during investigation, then 
reinstated. 
Somehow the local newspapers picked up the incident of the 
letters, and numerous articles appeared. The County Attorney was 
quoted in the newspapers as having read the letters and described them 
as hardcore obscenity, and the writer as unfit to be a teacher. 
Subsequently, the school board met in special session and termi­
nated the teacher's contract for "immorality." 
On appeal to the courts the school board's decision could not 
stand. The court ruled: 
Teacher's private conduct is proper concern to those who employ him 
only to the extent that it mars him as a teacher; his private acts 
are his own business and may not be basis of discipline where his 
professional achievement is unaffected, and school community is 
placed in no jeopardy. (Id. at 144.) 
Thus, in this case we can see the waning of the Horosko influence 
and the beginning of a foundation for the Morrison decision to follow. 
In essence this case begins to dissolve the earlier court tendencies to 
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impose moral standards of the community upon teachers as a condition of 
employment. 
Insubordination. Watts v. Seward School Board, 395 P. 2d 591, 454 P. 
2d 732 (Alaska 1969J: 
This rather unusual case is presented here to demonstrate the 
scope of behaviors classified as immoral across the nation. 
The case involves two teachers, Watts and Blue, who taught in the 
small Seward School System, which consisted of a staff of only thirty 
teachers. The two teachers were dismissed for "immorality" for the fol­
lowing conduct. They wrote and distributed an open letter critical of 
the superintendent and his administration of school matters. In the 
distributed literature they accused the superintendent of such things as 
causing friction among teachers and students, of stating he was going 
"to get" one-third of the staff this year and an equal amount the 
following year. 
Further, the teachers tried to organize the union and the teach­
ers' association behind their cause. Many other charges leveled against 
the superintendent tended to stress his "disctatorial" behavior as 
superintendent. 
The teachers were dismissed for immorality and the charge was 
affirmed by the courts. Litigation of the case through the various 
state and federal courts extended over nearly a decade. The case was 
remanded back from the United States Supreme Court once, certiorari was 
denied once, and finally a rehearing was denied. 
The courts made a distinction between Watts and Pickering: In 
Pickering the statements were made in good faith; in Watts they were made 
with a reckless disregard of truth. In Pickering the issue involved 
speaking out on matters of public interest; in Watts the issue was on 
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making public attacks on one's superiors. 
Alaska has statutory definition for "immorality" which includes 
all conduct which tends to bring the individual concerned or the teaching 
profession into public disgrace or disrespect. The action of the teach­
ers here was found to do that; namely, the overt actions and false state­
ments designed to remove from office the superintendent and school board, 
and soliciting other teachers on school grounds exceeded statutory 
protection. 
The five cases treated in the preceding pages of this section 
were presented to provide a sweeping overview of the general nature of 
immorality during the period 1939 through 1969 under the influence of the 
Horosko doctrine. Jarvella in 1967 and Pickering in 1968 had momentous 
impact on the diminishing Horosko influence. The upcoming Morrison case 
in 1969 began a new era in court decisions concerning teacher dismissals. 
Homosexuality 
Homosexual Conduct in Former Years. Morrison v. State Board of Education, 
74 Cal. Rptr. 116, 461 P. 2d 375 (Calif. 1969). 
A 1969 California case has become a milestone in sexual immoral­
ity dismissal cases. The court record reveals that while Morrison was a 
teacher in the Lowell Joint School District he gave counsel and advice 
to a fellow teacher and his wife who were entangled in marital and finan­
cial difficulties. During a visit by the friend to Morrison's apartment 
the two men engaged in a limited, non-criminal physical relationship 
which Morrison described as being of a homosexual nature. Although the 
court record does not reveal the details of the homosexual act in ques­
tion, it does state that it was neither sodomy, oral copulation, public 
solicitation of lewd acts, exhibitionism, nor loitering near public 
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toilets. A year later the other teacher involved reported the incident 
to the superintendent of the Lowell Joint School District. Morrison re­
signed, and later the California State Board of Education revoked his 
teaching certificate. 
Morrison petitioned for a writ of mandamus to prevent the state 
from revoking his life diploma to teach children because of his homo­
sexual act. 
The superior court held that the act did not constitute a crime 
under California law, but that the teacher's homosexual act was immoral 
and unprofessional within the Education Code, which authorized revocation 
of the teacher's certificate. 
In affirming the lower court judgment, the Court of Appeals 
placed little importance on the question of whether the petitioner's 
homosexual act affected in any way his teaching performance. 
The court said: 
There is no direct evidence that the acts complained of or the homo­
sexual character of petitioner did in any manner affect petitioner's 
capacity, ability and willingness to perform in a satisfactory manner 
as a teacher or had any effect at any time on any pupils taught by 
him. In our view the lack of such evidence is not significant. The 
school board has a legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity 
of the schools against potential influences on impressionable pupils 
who may be influenced by the conduct of its teachers outside the 
classroom. (Cal. Rptr. Id. at 118.) 
. . .  W e  h a v e  b e f o r e  u s  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  a  h o m o s e x u a l  i s  m o r e  
dangerous to children than a heterosexual. We decide only that 
conduct of one or the other found to be immoral within the meaning 
of the code section is sufficient ground for discharge. (Id. at 
120.) 
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of California looked at the re­
quired nexus between teacher conduct and classroom performance through a 
review of many court cases dealing with immorality and fitness to teach. 
In reversing the judgments of the lower courts, the Supreme Court said: 
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We cannot believe the Legislature intended to compel disciplinary 
measures against teachers who committed such peccadillos if such 
passing conduct did not affect students or fellow teachers. (P. 2d, 
Id. at 183). 
The California Supreme Court found for Morrison and returned the case to 
the superior court for proceedings with its opinion. In the opinion of 
the court: 
Terms such as "immoral or unprofessional conduct" or "moral turpi­
tude" stretch over so wide a range that they embrace an unlimited 
area of conduct. In using them the legislature surely did not mean 
to endow the employing agency with the power to dismiss any employer 
whose personal, private conduct incurred its disapproval. Hence the 
courts have consistently related the terms to the issue of whether, 
when applied to the performance of the employee on the job, the 
employee has disqualified himself. (Id. at 184). 
Thus, in this instance, the teacher had not disqualified himself. 
The act was private and attracted no notoriety, it was non-criminal in 
nature, and it was removed in time. These three factors will be seen as 
criteria for determining immorality in many further cases. 
Admitted Homosexuality. Burton v. Cascade School District, Union High 
School.No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254 (Ore. 1973). 
Peggy Burton was in her second year of teaching at the Cascade 
High School when her principal learned through the mother of a student 
that she was a homosexual. After Burton acknowledged that she was a 
homosexual, the Cascade School Board dismissed her in accordance with the 
Oregon Statutes which stated in part that the district school boards 
shall dismiss teachers for "immorality" (ORS 342.530 (1) (b)). 
Burton sought relief from the board's termination of her con­
tract under the Civil Rights Act. On the plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment the District Court held: 
. . . that statute vesting in school board the power to dismiss 
teachers for immorality without defining immorality is unconstitu­
tionally vague because it fails to give fair warning of what conduct 
is prohibited and permits erratic and prejudiced exercise of 
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authority; the statute also presents serious constitutional problems 
by not requiring a nexus between conduct and teaching performance. 
(Id. at 254.) 
District Judge, Solomon continued: 
I find this statute unconstitutionally vague. "A statute which 
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague . 
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean­
ing and differ as to its application violates the first essential 
of due process of law." 
. . .  N o  a m o u n t  o f  s t a t u t o r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n  c a n  o v e r c o m e  t h e  d e f i c i e n ­
cies of this statute. (Id. at 255.) 
Thus the court struck down the state statute while applying the 
Morrison principle in protecting the teacher's right to privacy and in 
requiring a proven nexus between the alleged immoral conduct and one's 
ability to perform the classroom function effectively. 
Admitted Homosexuality. Ga.ylord v. Tacoma School District No. 10, 85 
Wash. 2d 348, 535 P. 2d 804 (Wash. 1975). 
The courts ruled differently from the Burton court, supra, in 
this similar type of case. In this case the information came from a 
former student and the teacher was ready to publicize his homosexual 
status. 
The central issue of this case is: Can a teacher be dismissed 
when it becomes known by school officials that he is a homosexual? The 
Supreme Court of Washington sidestepped the issue and remanded lower 
court affirmance of the dismissal with certain evidentiary strictness. 
Also, the court placed burden of proof of showing "unfitness to teach" 
on the board of education. 
In this case, Gaylord's dismissal procedures began after the 
principal learned through a former student that Gaylord might be a homo­
sexual. When the principal questioned Gaylord about the accuracy of the 
statement concerning his sexuality, he confirmed his homosexual status 
and commented that he was "coming out of the closet." 
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The Board of Directors of the school district advised Gaylord of 
his cause for dismissal in the following terms: 
The specific probable cause of your discharge is that you have ad­
mitted occupying a public status that is incompatible with the con­
duct required of teachers in this district. Specifically, that you 
have admitted being a publicly known homosexual. (Id. at 807.) 
Gaylord requested a hearing before the Board of Directors. The 
Board of Directors, among other findings, concluded: 
That being a publicly known homosexual is a [sic] moral [sic] con­
duct constituting just cause for dismissal from Tacoma School Dis­
trict No. 10. (Id. at 868.) 
The Board of Directors had adopted written policies for discharge 
as required by state law. Gaylord was discharged under the policy which 
stated in part that, "The Board of Education considers the following as 
justifiable cause for release or dismissal or school employees . . . 
(5) immorality." (Id. at 808.) 
On appeal to Superior Court, the court entered its findings of 
fact: 
There is no allegation or evidence that James Gaylor has ever com­
mitted any overt acts of homosexuality. The sole basis for his dis­
charge is James Gaylord's status as a homosexual. (Id. at 808.) 
The court concluded: 
A teacher may be discharged where his conduct or status would impair 
the optimum learning atmosphere in the school district. The public 
knowledge of James Gaylord's status as a homosexual would impair the 
optimum atmosphere in the classroom and is a cause for dismissal 
.... A rational nexus between Mr. Gaylord's status as publicly 
known homosexual and his job was established by the testimony of The 
Administrators of School District No. 10 that this fact would impair 
the educational process, (id. at 808,) 
The court went on to declare that Gaylord's discharge solely on the basis 
of his status as a publicly known homosexual is not unconstitutional and 
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments nor the right to privacy. The court concluded: 
The allegations of "immorality" as sufficient cause for discharge 
were not maintained at the trial and not seriously argued in this 
court ... 1. Plaintiff was not discharged for "immorality" per 
se. 2. Plaintiff was discharged for a "status" and the improper 
conduct in making "known" his status. (Id. at 810-811.) 
Here the court rules, in effect, that making known one's homo­
sexual status is improper conduct sufficient for dismissal. 
Promoting "Gay Life." Acanfora v. Board of Education of Montgomery 
County, 491 F. 2d 498 (Md. 1974). 
In this case a teacher was relieved of his teaching assignment 
and transferred to an administrative position when the Montgomery County 
School Board learned that the teacher, Acanfora, was a homosexual. 
Montgomery County school officials, unaware that Acanfora was a 
homosexual, employed him as a junior high school science teacher. They 
did not learn of his homosexuality until several weeks after school 
opened in the fall, and only then as a result of a widely publicized 
press conference at which the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education an­
nounced favorable action on Acanfora's application for teaching certifi­
cation in that state. Shortly after the public disclosure, the Mont­
gomery County Deputy Superintendent of Schools transferred Acanfora, 
without reduction in pay, from teaching to administrative duties in which 
he had no contact with children. Acanfora demanded that he be returned 
to his classroom assignment. When school officials would not accede to 
Acanfora's demands, court action was commenced against the school board 
under the Civil Rights Act. 
At this point, Acanfora appeared on television, radio, and press 
interviews and spoke on the difficulties homosexuals encounter. In the 
interviews he did not advocate homosexuality, and stressed that he had 
not and would not discuss his sexuality with children, but he sought 
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community acceptance of homosexuality. 
The United States District Court denied relief. Acanfora ap­
pealed. The United States Court of Appeals ruled against the Appellant, 
but not because of the fact that he was a homosexual nor because of the 
notoriety attached to the press and television interviews, but because he 
withheld from his application for a teaching position material informa­
tion that he thought would have prevented employment in the first place. 
Acanfora withheld the fact that he was a member of the Homophiles of 
Penn State. While a member of the Homophiles he served as treasurer of 
that club of homosexuals and joined other members in bringing a lawsuit 
that established the Homophiles as an official university organization. 
The district court held that school officials wrongfully trans­
ferred Acanfora to a nonteaching position when they discovered that he 
was a homosexual, but denied relief to the appellant because of his sub­
sequent press and television interviews. The Court of Appeals upheld the 
Circuit court decision but on different grounds. 
Circuit Judge, Butzner, states: 
We hold that Acanfora1s public statements were protected by the 
First Amendment. We conclude, however, that he is not entitled to 
relief because of material omissions in his application for a 
teaching position. (Id. at 499.) 
In response to Acanfora's assertion that the principles in the 
instance case do not apply to his situation because the school officials 
transferred him on account of his homosexuality, not the omission from 
his application, the court replied: 
His intentional withholding of facts about his affiliation with the 
Homophiles is extricably linked to his attack on the constitutional­
ity of the school system's refusal to employ homosexuals as teachers. 
Acanfora purposely misled school officials so he could circumvent, 
not challenge, what he considers to be their unconstitutional em­
ployment practices. He cannot now invoke the process of the court 
to obtain a ruling on an issue that he practices deception to 
avoid. (Id. at 504.) 
It seems appropriate at this point to mention, in light of this 
court decision, that the survey of the state statutes for this study re­
vealed that a large number of states now list as a grounds for dismissal 
and license revocation, "any cause that would have prevented the issuance 
of the certificate in the first place." 
Oral Copulation. Board of Education of the El Monte School District of 
Los Angeles County v. Calderon, 110 Cal. Rptr. 916 (Calif. 1974). 
Oral copulation is an act that has a record of court disfavor. 
In a 1974 California case a probationary certificated teacher was 
arrested on the campus of the Los Angeles City College and charged with 
having engaged in an act of oral copulation with another man, a viola­
tion of the California Penal Code. 
The plaintiff board placed the defendant on compulsory leave of 
absence without pay as authorized by state statute. Ten months later the 
defendant was tried on the criminal charge and was acquitted. He noti­
fied the plaintiff board that he desired to resume his teaching duties 
and demanded payment of back salary. The board gave the defendant formal 
notice that it intended to dismiss him within thirty days unless he re­
quested the court review as provided by state statute. The defendant 
entered his request for such a review, and the board filed its complaint 
which initiated the court action. 
Calderon contended that under section 13409 of the Education Code 
the Board is prohibited from discharging him because he was acquitted on 
the criminal charge. 
The Court of Appeal, quoting the trial court, found that the de­
fendant did engage in the act of oral copulation. In the language of 
the lower court: 
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. . .this conduct "was indicative of corruption, indecency, deprav­
ity, dissoluteness, and shamelessness, showing moral indifference to 
opinions of respectable members of the community and an inconsiderate 
attitude toward good order and public welfare," and "was discussed at 
Board meetings attended by teachers and interested parents within the 
community." It concluded that "the defendant's conduct ... is 
immoral conduct ..." and he is not entitled to recover any back 
pay. (Id. at 918.) 
In ruling in favor of the school board the appellate court drew a 
distinction between weight of proof needed in criminal cases as compared 
to dismissal cases. The court said: 
While considering appellant's contention that his acquittal of the 
criminal charge . . . should be sufficient to permit him to continue 
as a teacher, we cannot ignore the fact that a conviction can be 
based only on a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"A judgment of acquittal does not establish that the acts constitut­
ing the offense charged were not committed by the defendant; it means 
only that they were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . 
We reasonably assume, therefore, that our Legislature properly in­
tended ... to permit school boards to shield children of tender 
years from the possible detrimental influence of teachers who commit 
acts therein . . . even though they are not found guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. (Id. at 920-921.) 
The legal principle set forth in this case, in essence, maintains 
that if there is reasonable doubt the teacher dismissal will stand. The 
decision again places children's welfare above individual rights where 
only the property right of employment is involved. 
Oral Copulation. Governing Board of the Mountain View School District of 
Los Angeles County v. Metcalf, 111 Cal. Rptr. 764 (Calif. 1974). 
A few sexual acts such as oral copulation have been viewed by the 
courts as serious enough to constitute immorality per se. 
This case involved a probationary elementary teacher who was charged 
with prostitution (lewd act between persons for money or other consid­
erations), more specifically, with being caught engaged in an act of 
oral copulation in a doorless toilet stall in a public restroom of a 
downtown department store during business hours. 
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The superior court found that the governing board of the school 
district had sufficient cause to place the teacher on compulsory leave 
of absence and thereafter to dismiss him for immoral conduct and evident 
unfitness to teach. The teacher appealed. 
The incident of oral copulation became known only to the district 
superintendent, his secretary, and to the principal of Metcalf's school. 
Regardless of the lack of notoriety, it was the principal's professional 
opinion that if the incident ever became known, the teacher would be un­
able to function effectively and his exemplary image would be destroyed. 
The court agreed. Furthermore, the court cited Pettit v. State Board of 
Education in declaring that the act per se evidenced unfitness to teach. 
A central issue in this case involved the question: Should the 
"exclusionary rule" extend to civil disciplinary trials of this char­
acter? The answer was "No." 
The Court of Appeal speaks to the issue of "exclusionary rule." 
It held: 
. . . misconduct of teacher indicated serious defect of moral char­
acter, normal prudence and good common sense and evinced (sic) an 
unfitness to teach and that evidence of the conduct was admissable 
although it had been obtained by police in violation of Federal and 
State Constitutions. (Id. at 764.) 
Lewd Act Involving Minor. Hank!a v. Governing Board of the Roseland 
School District, 120 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Calif. 1975). 
An elementary principal was charged with two violations of the 
California Penal Code by causing a minor to place his hands on principal's 
penis. The ensuing charges were (1) contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor and (2) indecent exposure, both sex offenses under California law. 
The jury acquitted Hankla on the first charge, and the second 
charge was finally terminated due to the State's failure to give Hankla 
a speedy trial. A major issue of the case involved procedural due pro­
cess and whether Hankla received or knew of his mailed notices. 
The board of education sent Hankla formal notice of its intention 
to discharge hira within thirty days unless he demanded a hearing as pro­
vided by law. A first notice by certified mail was attempted to be 
served upon Hankla. Two weeks later a second notice by certified mail 
was attempted. Hankla claimed he was not notified of impending dismissal. 
The central legal issue concerning the case was whether Hankla 
could be dismissed when criminal conviction was never obtained. The 
court said that it is clear that acquittal of an employee in a criminal 
proceeding does not bar subsequent dismissal proceedings. Pettit v. 
State Board of Education was cited as precedent basis of the ruling. Al­
though the court did not find it necessary to rule on the immoral 
grounds of Hank!a's dismissal, it upheld dismissal on his failure to re­
quest a hearing within thirty days as prescribed by law. He could not 
convince the court that the statutory provisions for legal notice in dis­
missal proceedings or the mail service had failed to serve proper notice. 
The significant legal point made in this case is "that acquittal 
in criminal proceedings does not bar subsequent dismissal proceedings." 
Transsexualism. In Re Grossman, 316 A. 2d 39 (N. J. 1974). 
This novel New Jersey case is presented here because of its 
sexual nature and because the employing school board charged, among other 
things, that the exhibited teacher conduct and behavior deviated from the 
acceptable standards of the community, a phrase identical to the defini­
tion of immorality. Due to the unusual nature of the act in question, 
"conduct unbecoming a teacher" was chosen as the grounds for dismissal 
rather than "immorality" or its counterpart "unfitness to teach." 
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Later in the case, the grounds for dismissal was changed to "incapacity." 
The case involves an elementary music teacher who underwent 
sex-change surgery from male to female gender. 
Paul Monroe Grossman, 54, notified his superiors of his impend­
ing absence from his duties for surgery but did not reveal the nature of 
the operation until he returned for duty two months later. At that time 
he informed the superintendent that he intended to remain in the school 
system as a female. He completed the academic year in male attire. At 
the close of the school year he assumed the name of Paula Miriam Grossman 
and began to live openly as a woman. The school board, in frequent 
conference with Grossman during the summer, offered a proposal to Grossman: 
Grossman would be engaged on a one year contract at the same pay to teach 
the same courses, but on an elective basis at the high school, provided 
Grossman would resign, thus relinquishing tenure, and obtain a new teaching 
certificate in her female name. The offer was rejected. Subsequently 
the board filed charges against Grossman and suspended her without pay 
on the following grounds: 
(1) her presence as a teacher had created and would continue to 
create a degree of sensation and notoriety within the system and the 
community which would severly impair the board's ability to conduct 
an efficient and orderly school system; (2) under the circumstances 
of the case, including the failure to disclose the condition and 
anticipated surgery, Mrs. Grossman had exhibited conduct unbecoming 
a teacher; (3) as a result of the sex-reassignment surgery, Mrs. 
Grossman underwent a fundamental and complete change in her role and 
identification, thereby rendering herself incapable of continuing to 
function as Paul Monroe Grossman, the person who had been engaged as 
a teacher by the board; (4) Mrs. Grossman exhibited conduct and be­
havior deviant from the acceptable standards of the community, and 
(5) she exhibited abnormality. Each of these charges, it was as­
serted, constituted just cause for dismissing her from the school 
system. (Id. at 42.) 
The charges were forwarded to the State Commissioner of Education. When 
the required hearing was held before the Assistant Commissioner of 
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Education.all charges were dropped except the hypothesis of danger of 
psychological harm to children. The Commissioner concluded: 
Paul Monroe Grossman knowingly and voluntarily underwent a sex-
reassignment from male to female. By doing so, he underwent a funda­
mental and complete change in his role and identification in society, 
thereby rendering himself incapable to teach children in Bernards 
Township because of the potential her [Grossman's] presence in the 
classroom presents for psychological harm to the students of Ber­
nards Township. Therefore, Paula a/k/a Paul Monroe Grossman should 
be dismissed from the system by reason of just cause due to 
incapacity. (Id. at 42-43.) 
The Commissioner took into account the unusual nature of the case, and 
finding no moral turpitude, directed the school board to apply to the 
Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund for a disability pension in behalf of 
Mrs. Grossman pursuant to state statutes, as well as to grant her back 
pay. Both sides appealed. 
The State Board of Education reversed the commissioner's order 
to pay Grossman back salary. 
To use the vernacular, the New Jersey Superior Court handled the 
case "like a hot potato." The court said, in effect, that its function 
was not to weigh evidence, to determine credibility of witnesses, or draw 
inferences, but to uphold findings if based on sufficient and credible 
evidence. 
The case covered a myriad of procedural, statutory, administra­
tive and constitutional law points. Finally, the court ruled: 
. . . that the finding that the retention would have an adverse ef­
fect upon the students justified teacher's dismissal due to "in­
capacity" as used in the statute is directly related to fitness to 
teach; that the Commissioner properly directed that local board sub­
mit disability retirement application in teacher's behalf; that the 
teacher was not denied equal protection of the laws; and the teacher 
was entitled to back pay. (Id. at 39.) 
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Sexual Misconduct Other Than Homosexuality 
Fornication Involving Adult Student. Board of Trustees of the Compton 
Junior College District of Los Angeles County v. Stubblefield, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 318 (Calif. 1971). 
The Compton case involves a male teacher at the junior college 
level in the California system of public education. Stubblefield was 
found by a policeman parked on a dark street with a female student from 
his night class. When the policeman approached the parked vehicle, which 
he believed to be abandoned, the defendant sat up in the rear seat of 
the car to confront the investigating officer. Both the defendant and 
the female student were partly nude and appeared to have been engaged in 
sexual relations. The defendant cursed the officer, slammed the car 
door open against the officer and sped away, nearly running over the sur­
prised officer. Pursuit ensued at speeds of 80 to 100 miles per hour. 
The teacher was arrested, and dismissal proceedings were initiated. 
The California statutes state procedures for discharge; 
When school district proffers charges as ground for discharge, and 
employee demands hearing, district can either rescind action or ask 
superior court to conduct hearing; in the latter case court conducts 
what in other areas of civil service would be administrative hearing. 
(Id. at 318.) 
When the Board formally notified Stubblefield of its intention to dismiss 
him after thirty days, based upon charges of "immoral conduct" and "evi­
dent unfitness" to teach, the defendant demanded a hearing as provided 
for in the statutes. The court found that the charges against the de­
fendant were true and constituted sufficient basis for his dismissal. 
Stubblefield1s defense was based upon Morrison v. State Board of 
Education in which a single isolated act of sexual misconduct, or im­
morality, was not found to be "sufficient evidence of unfitness" to 
justify dismissal for immorality under state statutes. 
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The Court drew several interesting distinctions between Morrison 
and Stubblefield: (1) the lapse of time between the conduct and the dis­
charge; (2) the locales where the conduct occurred; (3) the status of 
the parties involved; (4) license revocation versus dismissal; (5) po­
tential for misconduct; and (6) notoriety. In all instances the Stubble-
field arguments were found lacking and the ruling of the trial court was 
affi rmed. 
Fornication Involving Minor. Denton v. South Kitsap School District, 
Wash. App. 516 P. 2d 1080 (Wash. 1973T 
This Washington case involves sexual intercourse by a teacher 
with a minor female student. The teacher, Denton, had permission from 
the student's parents to date their daughter who was a student at Kitsap 
High School. At the time, Denton taught at Marcus Whitman Junior High 
School, where the student had previously attended. The dating began in 
the summer of 1971. In early November the school administrators received 
information from a counselor that the student in question was pregnant 
and that a teacher was involved. When questioned by the principal, and 
later by the principal and assistant superintendent, Denton admitted to 
the girl's pregnancy and that he was responsible. They were married on 
November 12, 1971. 
The Board discharged Denton following a hearing on December 8. 
Denton appealed his case to the superior court, which sustained the 
action of the school board. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Wash­
ington, Denton was again denied relief. 
Denton's defense relied heavily upon Morrison v. State Board of 
Education, claiming that discharge of a teacher cannot be predicated 
upon sexual immorality absent a showing that the conduct rebounds 
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adversely upon the teacher's "fitness to teach." 
To that argument, the court responded: 
While the argument that "immorality" per se is not a ground for dis­
charge without a showing of adverse effect upon "fitness to teach" 
or upon the school has merit . . we decline to set such a require­
ment where the sexual misconduct complained of directly involves a 
teacher and a minor student. In our view, the school board may 
properly conclude in such a situation that the conduct is inherently 
harmful to the teacher-student relationship, and thus to the school 
district. We are accordingly of the opinion that Mr. Denton's con­
duct constituted sufficient cause for discharge. (Id. at 1082.) 
Thus, the court established here that improper relations with 
former students reflect back upon the previous teacher-pupil relation­
ship. 
Fornication Involving Former Student. Go!din v. Board of Education of 
Central School District No. 1, 359 N.Y.S. 2d 384 (N. Y. 1973). 
In the same year as the Denton decision in Washington, a New 
York court found that co-habitation with a former student did not neces­
sarily reflect back on the teacher-student relationship, although the 
teacher was discharged. 
In this case a high school guidance counselor appealed to the 
New York Supreme Court, seeking a declaratory judgment whose effect would 
be to bar the prosecution of two charges lodged against him by the em­
ploying board of education. Goldin was charged with spending the night 
with an eighteen year old female in August after she had graduated in 
June from Ward Melville High School where Goldin served as guidance 
counselor. Secondly, Goldin was charged with repeatedly lying to school 
officials who inquired about the event in question. 
The first question turned on whether or not the consensual sexual 
exploits with a former student developed during the teacher/pupil assoc­
iation at school. In finding for the teacher the Supreme Court Judge, 
Andrew J. DiPaola, stated: 
. . . absent any allegation or proof that high school guidance coun­
selor's consensual sexual exploits with a former student in the 
privacy of her home were the continuation or culmination of an asso­
ciation commenced or an influence exercised while he and the young 
lady maintained the relationship of teacher and pupil, the Board of 
education would be enjoined from prosecuting or taking any other 
action against the guidance counselor with respect to that charge. 
(Id. at 384.) 
The second charge against Goldin is more damaging. The court 
ruled that the board of education could prosecute on the charge of lying 
because such conduct is reflective of teacher's lack of moral character 
and of insubordination. (Id. at 385.) 
The guidance counselor admitted before the court to both charges 
but claimed neither is sufficient cause for dismissal. The case of 
Fisher v. Synder was cited by the court in support of Goldin's claims of 
insufficient cause on the first charge. But the court drew a distinction 
between this case and Puentes v. Board of Education on the second charge. 
In Go!din the issue was lying, in Puentes the issue was refusing to 
answer the questions without advice of counsel. 
Diverse Sexual Misconduct. Pettit v. State Board of Education, 513 P. 
2d 889 (Calif. 1973). 
A widely publicized case that reached the Supreme Court of Cali­
fornia involved a female elementary school teacher whose teaching cre­
dentials were revoked for immorality. 
The court record reveals that Pettit and her husband were members 
of "The Swingers", a private club devoted to promoting diverse sexual 
activities between members at club parties. An undercover officer in­
vestigating the club was accepted for membership and observed the teach­
er, Pettit, during a party at a private residence. He reported that im­
mediately upon entering, he observed a man and woman engaged in sexual 
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intercourse in an open bedroom. During the course of the evening he saw 
various other couples similarly engaged. During a one hour period the 
officer reported that he observed the plaintiff commit three separate 
acts of oral copulation with three separate men. In each case partici­
pants were undressed and other persons were looking on. 
The plaintiff was arrested and charged with violation of the 
Penal Code in the form of moral turpitude. Plea bargaining was arranged 
and Pettit pleaded guilty to a lesser charge: "outraging public decency", 
a misdemeanor. 
License revocation proceedings were initiated on the grounds that 
Pettit's conduct, involved moral turpitude and demonstrated her unfitness 
to teach. During the hearing proceedings Mrs. Pettit did not testify. 
But her husband testified that they had appeared on two television shows 
and discussed "nonconventional sexual life styles, including adultery 
and "wife swapping." Although Mrs. Pettit wore a mask and Mr. Pettit 
wore a false beard, at least one of the plaintiff's fellow teachers 
recognized the Pettits and had discussed the televised statements with 
other teachers. 
The plaintiff presented evidence at the hearing indicating that 
she had received a favorable rating by the principal for her teaching and 
she had a contract for the next school year indicating an offer to hire 
for the next school year. 
The hearing examiner ruledin favor of the school board. In part, 
he said: 
. . . that plaintiff has engaged in acts of sexual intercourse and 
oral copulation with men other than her husband; that, plaintiff 
appeared on television programs while facially disguised and dis­
cussed nonconventional sexual behavior, including wife swapping; that 
although plaintiff's services as a teacher have been "satisfactory",, 
and although she is unlikely to repeat the sexual misconduct, 
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nevertheless she has engaged in immoral and unprofessional conduct, 
in acts involving moral turpitude, and in acts evidencing her un­
fitness for service. (Id. at 89i.) 
The State Board adopted the findings on the hearing officer in toto. The 
case was appealed through the courts to the California Supreme Court. 
There the Morrison doctrine was invoked in defense of Pettit's conduct 
and in support of the claim that the acts under question did not justify 
license revocation. In ruling against the appellate, the court drew three 
distinctions between Morrison and Pettit. The acts committed by Morrison 
were non-criminal, occurred in private, and did not indicate "potential 
to misconduct." Other points that arose in the case included: (1) 
notoriety and publicity of teacher's conduct can be a significant factor 
in determining "unfitness to teach;" (2) there is a definite difference 
between private acts and semi-private acts; (3) publicity may impair 
ability to teach. The theory behind the court's decision seemed to be: 
one who failed to practice morality would have difficulty teaching it. 
Finally, since the courts across the nation are frequently re­
lating immorality to fitness to teach before dismissals will be upheld 
by the courts, it seems that the dissenting opinion of the Pettit court 
represents a significant legal point of view and worthy of mention here. 
That opinion gets at the widely diverse concepts of immorality and the 
inherent problems involved in reaching clear-cut decisions in immorality 
cases. In a lengthy and profound dissent, Justice Tobriner said in part: 
But in traveling this road the majority overlook constitutional pred­
icates. Under the majority's interpretation of Education Code Section 
13202, the opinion of a superintendent that a teacher has committed 
an 'immoral' act is sufficient to bar that teacher permanently from 
the profession; so interpreted, section 13202 would be unconstitu­
tionally vague and overboard. The concept of 'immoral' conduct as 
enunciated by the majority roams without restraint. Undoubtedly 
some school superintendents believe the drinking of alcohol, the 
smoking of tobacco, or the playing of cards is immoral; others believe 
it immoral to serve in the military forces, and still others believe it 
93 
immoral to refuse to serve. As th.e present case illustrates, there 
ts a wide divergence of views on sexual morality; plaintiff did not 
believe her conduct ijnmoral, and many would agree. Since the 
statute, so interpreted, presents a vortex of vagueness, provides no 
warning of the kind of conduct that will lead to discipline, and es­
tablishes no standard by which the decision of the board can be 
measured, it is unconstitutionally vague. These are the reasons why 
this court in Morrison concluded that the only viable test was the 
fitness of the teacher to teach. 
In conclusion, I submit that the majority opinion is blind to 
the reality of sexual behavior. Its view that teachers in their 
_ private lives should exemplify Victorian principles of sexual moral­
ity, and'in the classroom should subliminally indoctrinate the 
pupils in such principles, is hopelessly unrealistic and atavistic. 
The children of California are entitled to competent and dedicated 
teacher; when, as in this case, such a teacher is forced to abandon 
her lifetime profession, the children are the losers. (Id. at 899.) 
Lewd Public Fantasyinq. Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F. 2d 1110 (Mass. 
1974). 
This case distinguishes between "private conduct" and "on pri­
vate property" and validates the constitutionality of "conduct unbecom­
ing a teacher" as grounds for dismissal. 
Massachusetts does not list immorality per se as a statutory 
grounds for teacher dismissal. "Conduct unbecoming a teacher" was used 
as basis for dismissal of an elementary teacher who engaged in lewd pub­
lic acts that may be classified as immorality under different state 
statutes. 
Neighbors of Wishart reported that occasionally until the spring 
of the year, and weekly thereafter on Thursday evenings, Wishart carried 
a mannequin dressed in feminine attire into his yard and caressed the 
breast area of the mannequin. One neighbor observed him lifting the 
skirt and placing it between his legs, others thought they observed 
masturbation. Wishart denied it. 
The school district superintendent, McDonald, went to houses ad­
joining Wishart's house and observed Wishart's act as he moved the 
mannequin to the front, side, and rear of his liouse. 
The Thursday eyening acts attracted much community discussion, 
attracting notoriety. 
Wishart was transferred to non-teaching duties for the remainder 
of the school year. Then, following a hearing with the board, Wishart 
was discharged. 
Action was brought by Wishart against various defendants and the 
school board for declaratory injunctive relief and monetary damages. The 
case reached the United States Court of Appeals for a final decision. 
The court held that the action of the school committee was not 
arbitrary or capricious. Since Wishart admitted engaging in the conduct 
with which he was charged, the question before the court was whether the 
reasons given were related to the education process. 
To Wishart's claim that the school committee was punishing him 
for his constitutionally protected "private" conduct, the court agreed 
that the conduct occurred on his "private property" but refused to equate 
"on private property" with "in private." 
Finally, the court ruled against the plaintiff's contention that 
the statutory term "conduct unbecoming a teacher" is unconstitutionally 
vague. 
The dismissal was affirmed. 
Cohabitation. Fisher v. Synder, 476 F. 2d 375 (Neb. 1975). 
The Fisher case is an example of a school board's unsuccessful 
attempt to dismiss a teacher of suspected immorality through the charge 
of "conduct unbecoming a teacher." The teacher, a middle-aged divorcee 
in a rural Nebraska community, was discharged from her high school teach­
ing position as a result of keeping male overnight guests in her 
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one-bedroom apartment. The guests, mostly young men and friends of her 
son who taught school in a neighboring town, stayed with Mrs, Fisher due 
to limited hotel accommodations in the town and upon the advice of the 
secretary of the Board of Education. The most frequent visitor was a 
young man, age 26, from California for whom Mrs. Fisher made arrangements 
to observe in the high school classrooms as a means of fulfilling certain 
of his college requirements. The visitation arrangements were reported 
i\n the local newspaper and no attempt was made to conceal the fact that 
Mrs. Fisher had frequent visitors. 
In the spring of 1972 the school board notified Mrs. Fisher that 
her contract would not be renewed at the end of the school term. At her 
request, Mrs. Fisher was granted a hearing relative to her dismissal 
notice. The board justified the dismissal. 
On appeal to the District Court, the court ordered reinstatement. 
The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals. In affirming the lower 
court decision, the Court of Appeals cited numerous federal cases in 
setting forth the following legal principles: 
Thus, while a school board may legitimately inquire into the char­
acter and integrity of its teachers ... it must be certain that it 
does not arbitrarily or capriciously dismiss a teacher based on un­
supported conclusions drawn from such inquiries . . . (Id. at 377.) 
The openness of the association, and the age differential between 
Mrs. Fisher and her guests, would seem to belie any inference of im­
propriety. The school board's inference of misconduct was arbitrary 
and capricious and therefore constituted an impermissable reason for 
terminating her employment, since the inference lacked any valid 
basis in fact. (Id. at 378.) 
. . . boards inference that teacher's activity was sociial misbehavior 
not conducive to maintenance of integrity of public school system 
was arbitrary and capricious, and was an impermissable reason for 
terminating her employment. (Id. at 375,) 
The court was saying here that inferring "wrong doing" is one 
thing, but proving wrong doing is a different matter. Contrast this 
case with Sullivan, infra. 
Cohabitation. Sullivan v. Meade County Independent School District No. 
101, 387 F. Supp. 1237 (S. D. 1975). 
This case differs from Fisher, supra, in that impropriety was 
implied or flouted by the accused teacher after warnings of community 
reaction. 
Living with a boyfriend without the benefit of matrimony brought 
forth dismissal of a teacher in South Dakota. The charge was "gross im­
morality," later changed to "gross immorality and incompetency." 
Kathleen Sullivan was employed to teach in the primary grades of 
Meade School located in a small community town. She lived in a mobile 
home owned by the school board and located in a trailer park. In October 
of her first teaching year, a man of similar age moved in with Miss 
Sullivan. Students often visited in her home, and it was open and common 
knowledge that Miss Sullivan was living with a man, whom she readily 
identified as her boyfriend, without benefit of matrimony. After parents 
complained to a board member about the arrangement, the principal spoke 
to the teacher and warned that continuance of the arrangement could 
jeopardize her job. 
Miss Sullivan stated that she had no intention of changing her 
living habits. Later, in three executive board sessions the board tried 
to reach a compromise and persuade the teacher to discontinue living with 
a man in an unwed status and therefore continue her employment with the 
school district. She refused, and was accordingly dismissed. The 
teacher brought charges against the school district and members of the 
school board challenging her dismissal. The teacher claimed that the 
board's action was arbitrary and capricious, a denial of substantive due 
process, and denial of the right to privacy and free association. 
The court concluded that there was a relationship between the 
teacher's private life and the proper functioning of the educational 
process. It stated: 
It is this Court's belief that the plaintiff has failed to show that 
the school board was arbitrary and capricious in her dismissal. This 
Court's decision in no way stands for the proposition that school 
boards have unfettered discretion in dealing with their employees. 
It simply stands for the proposition that the school board proscribe 
the conduct of the plaintiff in the present case and, that the 
reasons for dismissal were related to the proper functioning of the 
educational system, and had a basis in fact. (Id. at 1249.) 
It is important to note here that the principal's statement to 
the teacher relating community concern of her life style constituted 
fair warning sufficient to keep the statutory term "immorality1 intact and 
to relate immorality to community moral standards. 
Unwed Motherhood. Leechburg Area School District v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 239 A. 2d 850 (Pa. 1975). 
This case relates to dismissal for immorality only in that it 
deals with a policy set forth by a school district which treated unwed 
pregnancies as immoral. 
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ruled that Leechburg 
School District maternity leave policy discriminated against females in 
violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The school board 
appealed to the court. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania upheld 
the Commission ruling. 
The interesting part of the case relates to the policy provision 
which withholds maternity leave from unwed mothers as a means of dis­
couraging immoral conduct. The court speaks to that element of the 
policy, thus: 
. . . the instant policy discriminates against females if its 
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laudatory purpose . . . is to insure the moral qualifications of 
public school teachers- The effect of a denial of maternity leave 
to an unwed pregnant female teacher is to terminate absolutely her 
employment. In this sense, the policy functions as a penalty. Yet 
there is no evidence that the appellant has adopted a mandatory ter­
mination policy for unwed male teachers who have fathered illegiti­
mate children or have otherwise participated in extramarital sex. 
(Id. at 853.) 
The court here based its decision on sex discrimination without speaking 
to the issue of immorality. 
In the following case the court goes further in protection of 
teachers and aides with illegitimate children. 
Unwed Mothers. Andrews v. The Drew Municipal Separate School District, 
507 F. 2d 611, 371 F. Supp. 27 (Miss. 1975). 
This case involves a teacher aide rather than professional 
teacher but the legal principles demonstrated herein are equally appli­
cable to teachers. 
Two unwed mothers, one an employed aide and the other an appli­
cant, brought an action under federal civil rights statutes to have de­
clared unconstitutional a school district rule under which unwed 
mothers were ineligible to be hired or to be retained as teacher aides. 
When the superintendent of the Drew school system learned that 
there were some teacher aides presently employed in the school district 
who were parents of illegitimate children, he implemented an unwritten 
edict that parenthood of an illegitimate child would automatically dis­
qualify an individual from employment in the school system, whether 
already employed or an applicant for employment. 
The superintendent, Pettey, initiated the policy without advice 
from or approval by the board. After the lawsuit was commenced the board 
reviewed and adopted the controversial policy which made unwed mothers 
ineligible for employment. The school district then offered to the 
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court three rationales through which it asserted that its rule under 
attack furthers, the creation of a properly moral scholastic environment: 
(1) unwed parenthood is prima facie proof of immorality; (2) unwed 
parents are improper communal role models after whom students may pat­
tern their lives; (3) employment of an unwed parent in a scholastic en­
vironment materially contributes to the problem of school-girl preg­
nancies. (Id. 614.) 
The United States District Court ruled against the school board 
and offered the following reasoning: 
. . .  W e  h o l d  t h a t  t h e  p o l i c y  o r  p r a c t i c e  o f  b a r r i n g  a n  o t h e r w i s e  
qualified person from being employed, or considered for employment, 
in the public schools merely because of one's previously having had 
an illegitimate child has no rational relation to the objectives 
ostensibly sought to be achieved by the school officials and is 
fraught with invidious discrimination; thus, it is constitutionally 
defective under the traditional, and most lenient, standard of equal 
protection and violative of due process as well. (Id. at 31.) 
The court went on to speak to the issue of moral judgment contained in 
the school policy: 
Furthermore, the policy, if based on moral judgment, has inherent 
if unintended defects or shortcomings. While obviously aimed at dis­
couraging prematerial [sic] sex relations, the policy's effect is 
apt to encourage abortion, which is itself staunchly opposed by some 
on ethical or moral grounds. It totally ignores as a disqualifica­
tion, the occurrence of extramarital sex activity, though thought 
of by many as a more serious basis for moral culpability. (Id. at 
33.) 
The court concluded: 
The defendants in this case sub judice have made no showing whatever 
that their policy against employing unwed parents serves a compelling 
state interest or is necessary for the operation of an educational 
program. Hence the policy cannot survive strict judicial scrutiny. 
(Id. at 37.) 
The District Court declared the school board rule unconstitutional but 
refused to award plaintiffs attorney fees, and cross appeals were filed. 
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision 
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and also found no justification to award plaintiff's attorney fees. 
The significance of this case lies in the fact that it under­
mines the influence of community notions of immorality and looks only to 
job performance as a criteria for employment. 
Masturbation. Moser v. State Board of Education, 101 Cal. Rptr. 86 
(Calif. 1972). 
The courts have held that certain acts clearly stand as immoral. 
Masturbation seems to be comparable to oral copulation as an immoral act 
before reasonable men. 
Another California teacher was charged and convicted of a sexual 
offense under the California Penal Code. The conviction resulted from 
the teacher's act of masturbating while in public view in a public rest-
room, and in touching the private parts of another male. The State 
Board of Education began proceedings to revoke the teacher's teaching 
credentials. Moser petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of mandate 
to compel the State Board to rescind its action in revoking petitioner's 
credentials. The Superior Court affirmed the decision of the State 
Board of Education in revoking credentials. Moser appealed to the Court 
of Appeal, and argued that under the doctrine of Morrison he could not 
be dismissed. The court disagreed. It found that the elements of 
notoriety and potential for misconduct were not necessary in this case. 
The act per se constituted moral turpitude and unprofessional and im­
moral conduct. 
Adultery. Erb v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction, 216 N. W. 2d 
339 (iowa 1974T 
This case involves sex relations between two teachers who were 
unfaithful to their spouses. Richard Erb was a teacher of high standing 
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at Nishua Valley Community School for eleven years. He was married and 
had two children. 
A colleague, Margaret Johnson, who worked at the school with Erb 
planned to quit teaching and open a boutique in Red Oak. Erb agreed to 
assist Mrs. Johnson with designing her store. Mr. Johnson became sus­
picious of his wife and Erb after frequent meetings and late-night 
absences. 
One night Mr. Johnson hid in the trunk of his wife's car and 
witnessed sexual activity between his wife and Erb without making his 
presence known. 
On advice of his lawyer to catch his wife in a compromising posi­
tion as evidence for divorce, Mr. Johnson and a few "helpers" as wit­
nesses equipped with cameras eventually located Erb and his wife parked 
in a remote area. The "raiding party" took pictures of Mrs. Johnson and 
Erb who were partially disrobed in the back seat of the car. 
Erb offered to resign his teaching position, but the local school 
board would not accept his resignation. He was retained for the ensuing 
school year and continued to teach. 
But before the State Board hearing, the board voted five to four 
to revoke Erb's teaching certificate. Revocation was stayed by the 
trial court and the Supreme Court of Iowa, awaiting outcome of the 
certiorari action and appeal. 
The trial court held that Erb's admitted adulterous conduct was 
sufficient basis for revocation and annulled the writ. 
In deciding whether the teacher was "morally fit" to teach, the 
Iowa Supreme Court relied on Morrison, Jarvella, Fisher, and Metzger pre­
cedents in reversing the lower court and state board decisions. 
102 
The court stated: 
There was no evidence other than that Erb's misconduct was an 
isolated occurrence in an otherwise unblemished past and is not 
likely to recur. The conduct itself was not an open or public af­
front to community mores; it became public only because it was 
discovered with considerable effort and made public by others'. (Id. 
at 343.) 
Alleged Improper Classroom Behavior 
Vulgarity. Palo Verde Unified School District of Riverside County v. 
Hensey, 88 Cal. Rptr. 570 (Calif. 1970). 
A teacher at the junior college level of the California public 
schools was dismissed for "immoral conduct" and "evident unfitness" 
arising from vulgar language and gestures in the classroom and abuse to 
property. 
Hensey was accused of and discharged for the following acts: 
(1) removing from the wall of his classroom a loudspeaker in the presence 
of students, and telling his superiors that he would do it again if it 
should be remounted; (2) stating to his students that the loudspeaker 
"sounded like a worn out phonograph in a whorehouse," and making numerous 
references to "whore" and "whorehouses" during the semester. Also, when 
reprimanded for his vulgar language, he submitted to the college presi­
dent a thesis justifying his use of terms in question; (3) addressing 
himself to Mexican-American students in the presence of the rest of the 
class and warning them to be careful in San Luis due to super-syphilis 
there; and (4) advising his class that the superintendent could be a 
good superintendent "but that he spent too much time . . . (at this 
point he stepped over to the wall and simulated licking the wall in an 
up and down gesture) . . . licking up the board." 
The superior court upheld the school district's dismissal of 
Hensey. Hensey appealed. 
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The Court of Appeal examined each of the four incidents separate­
ly. To the first three acts, the court found that they could not be 
classified as immoral, but taken together, they would constitute "evident 
unfitness." As to the fourth act, a vulgar gesture intended to describe 
a person who would rather curry favor with his superiors than to do his 
duty and directed specifically to the superintendent, the court was 
provoked: 
Here we have passed the limits of bad taste and vulgarity . . . 
This obscene incident indicates both 'immorality' and 'evident 
unfitness.' (Id. at 575.) 
Naturally, the judgment of the lower court and the school district was 
affirmed. 
Obscene Classwork. Oakland Unified School District of Alameda County v. 
Olicker, 25 Cal. App. 3d 1098, 102 Cal. Rptr. 421 (Calif. 1972). 
dicker was a reading and social studies teacher for thirteen 
and fourteen-year-old students who had a reading level of first through 
third grade. 
She had difficulty in motivating or disciplining the classes of 
fifteen children each period. Based on her professional reading of moti­
vation methods, she asked the students to write about anything they 
wished to write about, and they need not worry about spelling, grammar, 
and punctuation. Most of the writings dealt with sex and drugs, but the 
students were interested. Later she let each student write on a "ditto 
master" which she ran on the duplicator for distribution to students as 
basis for class discussion. The papers were to be collected at the end 
of the class. No paper was to leave the room. One did, however. A 
student dropped a copy in the principal's box. 
The board of education filed a complaint in superior court 
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seeking dismissal of the teacher for immoral conduct and evident unfit­
ness for service. The Superior Court ruled that the teacher was guilty 
of "evident unfitness to teach." 
On appeal to the Court of Appeal the lower court decision was 
reversed. 
Perhaps the issue involved in this case seems trite. It does not, 
however, include an example of the type of writing and degree of ob­
scenity that was involved. The student writings are contained in the 
appendix of the court record. Inclusion here might be repulsive to the 
Puritan conscience. 
Obscene Teacher Theme. Lindros v. Governing Board of the Torrance 
Unified School District, 510 P. 2d 361 (Calif., 1973). 
A probationary tenth grade English teacher petitioned to the 
Supreme Court of Los Angeles County for peremptory writ of mandate to 
compel the school board to set aside the decision not to rehire him for 
the ensuing year. The court denied the writ, and Lindros appealed. 
The Supreme Court of California held that the teacher's reading 
to his class of a theme that he had written which ended with a contro­
versial epithet did not constitute "cause" for dismissal, that presenta­
tion of the theme to his class sought to pursue a bona fide educational 
purpose, and that in doing so neither the welfare of the school nor the 
pupils were adversely affected. 
The incident that prompted the dismissal controversy stemmed from 
the teacher's example of how to write a short study relating a personal 
emotional experience. When the assignment was made to students several 
of them requested that the teacher present them with an example of his 
own work. He obliged with a reading of "The Funeral" which he had written 
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as a rough draft for a television play at Loyola University. The story 
described personal feelings the teacher had experienced while attending 
the funeral of a black student who died of an overdose of heroin. The 
story concluded with the following paragraph included in the court record: 
I felt whipped out; this was a strange two hours; strange to a white 
who had no blackness in him; strange to a white who knew no such 
poverty and desperation; even stranger outside when I greeted a 
young black in a panther-like outfit: 'white-mother-fuckin pig1 . . . 
(Id. at 363.) 
Lindros, the record shows, only used the last phrase with his 
more mature college preparatory classes. He substituted the letters 
"W.M.F.P." for the last phrase in regular classes. 
In this case and 01icker, supra, where the alleged obscene acts 
could be clearly related to sound educational objectives the teacher was 
upheld in his actions. The following case, however, shows a doubtful 
relationship. 
Promoting Diverse Life Style. Brubaker v. Board of Education, School 
District 149, Cook County, Illinois, 502 F. 2d 973 (111. 1974). 
The instant case involves three non-tenured elementary teachers, 
a husband and wife and one colleague, who distributed brochures obtained 
from the movie theater showing "Woodstock" to their primary and eighth 
grade students. When the brochures reached students' parents, school 
officials were informed and, subsequently, the teachers were discharged. 
The teachers appealed, seeking reinstatement, back salary, attorney fees, 
and punitive damages of $200,000 each for willful defamation. 
The poem in question within the Woodstock brochure referred to 
the apparent joys of smoking marijuana, and invited children to "throw 
off discipline imposed on them by the moral environment of their home-
life and enter a new world of love and freedom." As an example of the 
106 
nature of the "Woodstock" language, a comment from the court report is 
herein quoted: 
As a message to the minds of eighth graders, the brochure's poetry 
can and probably must be fairly read as an alluring invitation and 
a beckoning for them to throw off the dull discipline imposed on 
them by the moral environment of their home life, and in exchange to 
enter into a new world of love and freedom—freedom to use acid and 
grass, freedom to take their clothes off and to get an early start 
in the use of such vulgarities as "shit," "fucking," and their com­
panions. (Id. at 976.) 
The dismissal was upheld by the United States Court of Appeal. 
Use of Obscene Literature. Board of Trustees of Los Angeles Junior 
College District of Los Angeles County v. Metzger, 104 Cal. Rptr. 452 
(Calif. 1974). 
A charge of "immoral conduct and evident unfitness for service" 
was brought against a permanent teacher at the junior college level in 
the California system of public education. The board attempted to sus­
pend and dismiss the teacher on the charges. She appealed the action to 
the superior court, which held that the charges were insufficient for 
suspension or discharge. The District Board appealed to the Superior 
Court against reinstatement of the teacher. 
The litigation arose from the teacher's admitted use of a poem 
entitled "Jehovah's Child" and a poem composed and distributed by the 
defendant entitled "You Can Become a Sexual Superman." The poem con­
tained many obscenities, slang references to male and female sexual 
organs, sexual activity, and profane references to Jehovah and Christ. 
The book which the poem advertised, "The Picture Book of Sexual Love," 
contained photographs of an entwined nude couple suggesting sexual 
intercourse. 
The teacher pointed out to the court that none of her students 
were under eighteen years of age, that the materials were used as 
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supplementary materials to show her students that words which, on the 
surface, appear vulgar or coarse can be interpreted in different ways and 
carry out different meanings. 
The poem in question composed by the teacher was sprinkled with 
Anglo-Saxon obscenities, slang references to male and female sex organs 
and to sexual activity, and profane references to Jehovah and Christ. 
[Id. at 453.] 
The school had adopted no regulations or directives restricting 
the types of supplemental material which could be used in English 
classes, and the teacher had used the questioned material before and had 
not been instructed to discontinue the practice. 
The Supreme Court of California held that the teacher had not 
acted with an improper motive and the questioned literature was not out 
of line with modern academic practice. 
Offensive Language and Punishment. Wood v. Goodman, 381 F. Supp. 413. 
(Mass. 1974). 
This case involves dismissal of a junior high school music 
teacher on the grounds of "conduct unbecoming a teacher." The conduct 
in question was use of offensive language and corporal punishment in the 
classroom. The acts were not denied. But the teacher took action under 
the Civil Rights Act against the superintendent and school committee 
seeking compensation and punitive damages. He claimed that the statute 
providing for the suspension of teachers for "unbecoming conduct" was 
unconstitutional. 
The United States District Court found the teacher's acts con­
stituted sufficient basis for the school committee's action, that the 
statutory terms "unbecoming conduct" and "other good cause" are 
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sufficiently definite, and that the teacher was provided procedural 
and substanti.ye due process. (Id. at 414.) 
Gun in Classroom. Wriqht v. Superintending School Committee, City of 
Portland, 331 A. 2d 640 (Me. 1975). 
Wright, who was a teacher in the Portland public schools, was 
also a federally licensed gunsmith and holder of a concealed weapons per­
mit. He brought a small pistol and some ammunitition to school one day 
in the pocket of his jacket which he left hanging in a small alcove of 
the classroom area. 
When he realized the gun was in the jacket pocket he decided to 
leave it there because the lock to his car door was frozen and would be 
difficult to open. 
The incident was discovered, and Wright, a tenured teacher with 
twelve years of satisfactory service, was discharged. Wright filed a 
complaint attacking the action of the school committee. The superior 
court upheld the dismissal and Wright appealed. 
The Supreme Court of Maine reversed the lower court decision. 
The reasoning of the court follows: 
A single, isolated instance of grave lack of judgment which does not 
involve such moral impropriety, professional incompetency, or un-
suitability to the discharge of his duties as to undermine teacher's 
future classroom performance and overall impact on his students does 
not constitute 'unfitness to teach.' (Id. at 641.) 
Here the court excuses poor judgment. This type of act does not compare 
with the more,repulsive acts examined in earlier cases of sexual mis­
conduct. 
Nonsexual Criminal Offenses 
Conspiracy to Bribe. Pordum v. Board of Regents of the State of New York, 
491 F. 2d 1281 (N.Y., 1974]T 
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The revocation of a teaching certificate on any grounds may 
imply "unfitness to teach." Such was the case in Pordum. 
Pordum had secured a two-year leave of absence from his teaching 
position, which was later extended to five years. During the fourth 
year of his leave, while a member of the Erie County Legislature, Pordum 
was convicted of the crime of conspiracy to promote and facilitate the 
bribery of public officials. Subsequently, he was sentenced to three 
years in prison. He was released on parole in eight months. He re­
ported to officials in his school district that he was ready to resume 
teaching. The school district assigned him to a school, but the State 
Commissioner of Education informed Pordum to show cause why his teaching 
certificate should not be revoked. 
Pordum appealed through the courts for relief. The United States 
Court of Appeal upheld the revocation. It held that the appellant's 
right to due process had not been violated, and that the statutes were 
not unconstitutionally vague or overboard. 
Possession of Marijuana. Comings v. State Board of Education, 100 Cal. 
Rptr. 73 (Calif. 1973). 
The central issue in this case deals with whether and upon what 
evidence a teacher may be dismissed after conviction of possession of 
marijuana. 
The instant case heard before California Court of Appeal con­
siders two teacher dismissal and subsequent license revocation actions 
by the State Board of Education. One case attracted a degree of 
notoriety; one was relatively unnoticed. One was affirmed; one was 
reversed. 
The two teachers, Jones and Comings, petitioned to the Superior 
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Court for writ of mandate to compel the State Board of Education to re­
instate certification. The Superior Court affirmed the Board's action. 
Petitioners appealed. 
Jones' case stemmed from an arrest for possession of marijuana 
in Hawaii, to which, as a matter of convenience, he pleaded nolo con­
tendere. However, the incident was picked up and published in the San 
Francisco Chronicle. Also, Jones' principal testified that she believed 
the incident and publicity from it would adversely affect the school pro­
gram and the teacher's effectiveness. 
Comings was arrested and convicted in San Diego for possession 
of marijuana in violation of the California Health and Safety Code. 
Therefore, the State Board of Education said that his teaching certifi­
cate should be revoked "... because he had thereby committed 'acts in­
volving immoral and unprofessional conduct,' 'acts demonstrating his un­
fitness for service' and 'an act or acts involving moral turpitude.'" 
(Id. at 75.) 
Both appellants argued before the courts: 
. . .  ( 1 )  t h a t  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  l a w ,  p o s s e s s i o n  o f  m a r i j u a n a ,  o r  c o n ­
viction for the crime thereof, cannot amount to "immoral or unpro­
fessional conduct," or to an act or crime "involving moral turpi­
tude," or demonstrating "evident unfitness for service," within the 
meaning of these terms as used in Education Code Sections 13202 and 
13129 . . . (2) that as a matter of proof, the contrary conclusion 
reached by the trial court ... is not supported by substantial 
evidence. (Id. at 78.) 
The court's reply, citing Morrison, to the appellant's first 
contention is worthy of quotation here: 
. . . appellant's first argument misses the mark because it amounts 
to semantic preoccupation with the statutory terms of "immoral," and 
the like, as criteria for analyzing the conduct of public school 
teachers, for disciplinary purposes. This approach is incorrect. As 
basis for administrative sanctions against persons who hold govern-
mentally issued credentials which qualify them for employment, the 
statutory terms constitute only lingual abstractions until applied 
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to a specific occupation and given content by a reference to fitness 
for performance of that vocation. (Id. at 80.) 
The court found a connection between Jones' act and fitness for 
service based on publicity of the incident and the probability that the 
school community would have knowledge of the "immoral" act. Therefore, 
license revocation was upheld. The State Board and lower court decisions 
were reversed in Comings' case, basically due to lack of notoriety sur­
rounding the act. 
Shoplifting. Caravel!o v. Board of Education, Norwich City School Dis­
trict, Chenango County, N. Y., 369 N. Y. S. 2d 829 (N. Y., 1975). 
This case stemmed from dismissal of a high school guidance coun­
selor on charges of insubordination and conduct unbecoming a teacher. 
The latter charge is so closely related to immorality that it could have 
been so classified. Therefore, it is treated here. 
The teacher, Dr. Caravello, under the charge of "unbecoming con­
duct" had been involved in three separate incidents of shoplifting and 
had a reputation as such in the community. 
The tenured teacher was given formal notice of suspension with­
out pay and a hearing was held. The hearing panel found many acts of 
unprofessional conduct and insubordination. It recommended that Caravello 
be reinstated at full salary, but pay a fine of $1,000 on the insub­
ordination count. It found that the unbecoming conduct acts, shop­
lifting, in no way impaired the effectiveness of the counselor's role; 
therefore, it recommended no penalty. 
The Board of Education met in special session, reviewed the 
hearing panel's recommendations, and rejected the findings. Caravello's 
contract was terminated. Caravello petitioned the court to review the 
determination of the State Board of Education to terminate his employment. 
112 
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, ruled that 
there was sufficient evidence of insubordination as well as conduct un­
becoming a teacher. On the issue of shoplifting, the court ruled that 
such conduct clearly qualifies as conduct unbecoming a teacher even if 
teaching duties are not affected. It ruled that dismissal was not dis-
proportinate to the offense nor shocking to one's sense of fairness. 
(Id. at 832.) 
Public Intoxication. Watson v. State Board of Education, 99 Cal. Rptr. 
468 (Calif. 1971). 
The Watson case applies the Morrison principles to public 
drunkenness. 
Although the teacher, Watson, in this case was not discharged 
per se, nor charged with immorality, he was refused a secondary life dip! 
by the State due to several arrests for drunk driving over a ten year 
period. Each arrest constituted moral turpitude under California law. 
Watson was a teacher in the public schools of California. In 
March 1969, he applied to the Committee of Credentials, Department of 
Education, for a life diploma. The hearing officer recommended that his 
application be granted for a life certificate, although six separate 
offenses and arrests for intoxication were submitted in evidence at the 
hearing. While the matter was pending before the State Board, however, 
Watson was again arrested for drunk driving. A second hearing was held 
and his application was denied. 
Watson sought a writ of mandate to compel the State Board to set 
aside its refusal to grant him a life diploma. The California Court of 
Appeal affirmed the actions of the State Board of Education. 
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The appellant, Watson, based his argument before the court on 
Morrison y. State Board of Education, contending that his diploma cannot 
be denied unless he is unfit to teach and that the evidence was not suf­
ficient to prove "unfitness to teach." 
The court was not impressed. It stated: "We do not construe 
Morrison as establishing the broad principle for which appellant argues." 
(Id. at 469.) The court continued to distinguish between Morrison and 
Watson. In Watson the acts were public. They were current, and they 
indicated a potential for continued misconduct. 
Presiding Justice, Lillie, summed up the feeling of the court 
with the following statement: 
Perhaps of greater concern in this day when various forces in our 
siociety encourage disrespect for discipline and authority and disre­
gard for law and order, the petitioner's criminal convictions which 
in the judge's opinion "clearly indicate and speak for themselves 
that this man is unfit to teach and work with young people ... I 
don't know what better evidence there could be of immorality than a 
series of criminal convictions. ... It would seem that even mini­
mum responsible conduct on the part of a teacher necessarily ex­
cludes a consistent course of law violations and convictions which 
can do no less than give the students a bad example of proper respect 
for law and authority. The teaching by example as well as precept, 
of obedience to properly constituted authority and discipline neces­
sary to a well ordered society is an important part of education. 
(Id. at 472.) 
Falsification of Records. Caddell v. Ecorse Board of Education, 170 
N.W. 2d 277 (Mich. 1969). 
Although this case is not directly related to immorality charges 
or to a criminal offense, the act of lying, or falsification of records 
in this case, might be treated as an immoral act in another time and 
place. 
The case is included here because it illustrates a court sup­
ported case of teacher dismissal on a rather simple act that could con-
ceively be a rather common occurrence. 
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Caddell, a probationary teacher, was discharged for the follow­
ing reasons: (1) absent from duty one day in September and one day in 
November without reporting the adsences; (2) tardy four days in October; 
and (3) three days in January, Caddell falsified his "sign in" time. 
The Board of Education discharged Caddell on the three charges 
in January. He appealed to the circuit court seeking the balance of the 
salary due him under his contract, or salary from the date of suspension 
to date of dismissal. 
Caddell contended that his suspension was without adequate cause 
or reason. The court ruled that the dismissal was within the board's 
statutory authority. Therfore, the dismissal was upheld with salary 
granted from date of suspension to date of termination of teacher's em­
ployment. 
Lying. Goldin v. Board of Education of Central School District No. 1, 
359 N.Y.S. 2d 384 (N. Y. 1973). 
This case is treated under the previous section of this study: 
Sexual Misconduct other than Homosexuality, "Fornication Involving Adult 
Student." 
In essence, Goldin was cleared of the charge of immorality con­
cerning sexual relations with a former student. But the court upheld his 
dismissal on charges of immorality concerning his lying about his rela­
tions with the female student. The court maintained that the act of 
lying reflected on his moral character. 
SUMMARY 
Thirty-six court cases on teacher dismissals for immorality 
during the period of 1939 through 1975 were presented in this chapter. 
The thirty-seven year time period was broken down into two segments. 
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(1) the thirty-year per.'od under the influence of the Horosko doctrine— 
1939 through 1969, and (2) the eight year period of 1968 through 1976 
under the influence of the Pickerjng and Morrison decisions. 
Five cases were selected to represent the first period and to 
illustrate the scope of teacher conduct considered immoral by the courts. 
Such conduct included drinking in public, using profanity at a board 
meeting, concealment of facts in applying for a job, vulgarity, and 
criticism of superintendent and board. All cases demonstrated that 
teachers are expected to exemplify high standards of public and private 
moral conduct as a condition of continued employment. The language of 
the courts during this period demonstrates frequently recurring phrases 
that convey key concepts held by the judiciary. Such phrases include 
"conduct should not arouse suspicion", "moral standards of the community", 
"to conduct himself in such a way as to command the respect and good will 
of the community", "... though this may deprive the teacher of the 
freedom of action enjoyed by others." 
Beginning in 1967 with Jaravello, followed by Pi eke ring in 1968 
and culminating with Morrison in 1969, however, the language of the 
courts showed a change in stance. The court language from 1969-1976 is 
characterized by such key concepts as, "a right to privacy", act must 
demonstrate "unfitness for service", "potential for misconduct", "void for 
vagueness", "rational relationship to objectives sought by the school", 
"must adversely affect teacher-student relationship", "sufficient evi­
dence of unfitness", "protected by the First Amendment", "a rational 
nexus . . . ." 
There does appear to be a perceptible shift in judicial direction 
after 1967-69, characterized by a shift toward protection of individual 
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rights with a corresponding decrease in concern for the community moral 
standards. It would appear now that a violation of community standards, 
or conduct offensive to the morals of the community, would not, in and of 
itself, stand up in court as a basis for teacher dismissal. The conduct 
must adversely affect the teacher-student relationship and the teacher's 
effectiveness on the job. However the acts of oral copulation and mas­
turbation still stand alone, generally, in and of themselves, as immoral. 
None of the courts have said that a teacher cannot be dismissed 
or that the alleged immoral conduct has to be condoned. They merely 
stressed the necessity of proving a relationship between teacher immoral­
ity and dysfunctional consequences in the school setting. Additionally 
the courts have demonstrated a concern for a teacher's right to a private 
life, to procedural due process, and to the right of dissent. 
Although court rulings in one jurisdiction are not binding on 
other state judicial systems, they do have considerable persuasive 
value, as shown in the cases presented in this chapter. 
The thirty-six cases treated here were taken from seventeen 
states and cover thirty-three types of immoral conduct. California has 
the greatest amount of immorality litigation, followed by New York and 
Massachusetts. This comes as no surprise due to the density of popula­
tion, and, perhaps, their system of handling dismissal due process. 
Also, California law requires license revocation for crimes involving 
moral turpitude. 
Analysis of the cases shows considerable disagreement over the 
interpretation of immorality. But one thing emerges clearly from case 
analysis: whatever ground is chosen as a charge for dismissal, "evident 
unfitness for service" has to be proved by the discharging board before 
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a dismissal can stand the heat of judicial scrutiny. A more complete 
summary of case law is contained in the final chapter on summary and 
conclusions of the study. 
Chapter Five contains information from people across the nation 
who are on the cutting edge of the interface between teachers and the 
courts. The survey of chief state school officers and state attorney 
generals will offer some measure of understanding of court trends, agree­
ment of terms, and adjustments taking place in light of recent litiga-
ti on. 
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CHAPTER V 
NATION-WIDE SURVEY OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS AND 
ATTORNEY GENERALS ON PROBLEMS RELATED TO IMMORALITY 
During the course of this study, the problem associated with 
teacher dismissal for immorality has been identified, the problems and 
views presented in the literature have been examined, and court actions 
dealing with the issue have been analyzed. As an appropriate culmination 
of the study, logic dictates, as a final step, an assessment of the 
nature of the problem as perceived by practitioners in the field. Thus 
attention is turned to those individuals who are most responsible for 
interpreting the law and shaping school policy accordingly—the attorney 
generals and the chief state school officers in the fifty states. 
Slightly different but similar questionnaires were mailed to 
each assistant state school superintendent and to each attorney general 
in the fifty states. This chapter deals with the purpose, the response, 
and the analysis of the nation-wide survey. 
Purpose of the Survey 
The survey and design of the questionnaire items attempted to 
accomplish five broad purposes: To determine: (1) the nature of the 
problem of immorality dismissals across the nation as perceived by those 
individuals in key leadership positions; (2) whether and to what degree 
there is widespread agreement on the definition and legal concept of 
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immorality; (3) whether there is agreement between practitioners and the 
judiciary on what conduct constitutes immorality as legal grounds for 
dismissal; (4) what conditions must be present for immorality charges to 
hold in the courts; (5) to locate court cases and materials that may 
have been missed in the research; and (6) to serve as a final check of 
accuracy of the examination of the statutes presented in Chapter Three. 
Each questionnaire item is presented below followed by an 
explanation of its purpose. 
Survey of Chief State School Officers 
Item 1. Is immorality listed in your state statutes as a cause for 
teacher dismissal? The purpose of this item was to check the accuracy 
of the survey of the state statutes presented in Chapter Three from most 
up-to-date information. 
Item 2. Do your state statutes define immorality? This item was 
designed to update and check the accuracy of the survey of state statutes 
and to see if the interpretation of "definition" held by state officers 
was comparable to the research. 
Item 3. Does your office or any state agency provide a working 
definition of immorality to local school units? This question attempted 
to ascertain if any state-level effort was undertaken to clarify, re­
strict, or define immorality to educators as a matter of "forewarning" 
teachers of prohibited conduct. 
Item 4. Does the relativity or vagueness of the term "immorality" in 
your state statutes create a major interpretation problem for school 
administrators and school boards? The purpose here is to determine 
whether confusion or concern exists over a statutory grounds for teacher 
dismissal. 
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Item 5. In your opinion, which of the following terms do you believe 
could conceiveably constitute immorality on the part of public school 
teachers? This item is designed to measure agreement on behaviors con­
sidered to be immoral and to determine whether practitioners' views are 
related to the views of the courts. 
Item 6. Are you aware of any current efforts by legislative bodies or 
agencies to amend state statutes to either remove immorality as a cause 
for teacher dismissal or to define immorality? Here the purpose is to 
determine whether anyone sees statutory problems related to teacher 
dismissal. 
Item 7. To your knowledge, during the time period 1970-75 have there 
been any teacher dismissals for immoral conduct in your state? The pur­
pose of this item is to determine the magnitude of immorality dismissals. 
Item 8. If you checked "yes" to item #7, did any of the cases reach the 
courts? The obvious purpose of this item is to measure the amount of 
litigation in each state in recent years? 
Item 9. In view of seemingly conflicting rulings by different courts 
across the nation on teacher dismissal for immoral causes, has your 
office or any state agency established guidelines or briefed local 
school governing bodies concerning legal aspects of determining cause 
for dismissal on grounds of immorality? Finally, this item was designed 
to determine if chief state school officers saw immorality as a problem 
in teacher dismissal to the extent that state-level agencies assisted 
local units in the legality of such dismissal proceedings. 
Survey of State Attorney Generals 
Four items on the questionnaire to state attorney generals are 
comparable to items on the questionnaire to chief state school officers 
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in order to determine agreement on common items between the two state 
agencies. Three items are different and are as follows: 
Item 1. Does your state have a state commission to hear cases concern­
ing teacher dismissals or license revocation? The purpose of this item 
was to determine whether there is a trend toward commission hearings in 
view of due process and other constitutional rights gains made by 
teachers through the courts' in recent years. 
Item 2. During the five-year period 1970-1975 have any teachers in your 
state been dismissed for immorality, or "unprofessional conduct," "good 
cause," or other terms that might cover immorality? Same as item number 
seven on other questionnaire. 
Item 3. If your answer to question #2 is "yes," did any cases reach the 
state commission or the courts? Same as item number eight on superin­
tendent's questionnaire. 
Item 4. In your opinion, will dismissal of teachers by school boards 
for "immoral" conduct in their lives outside the classroom stand up in 
the courts? This item was designed to determine if attorney generals 
were affected by recent court cases which held that teachers have a right 
to privacy and that alleged immoral acts must reflect adversely on 
classroom performance. 
Item 5. School boards have the responsibility for determining cause for 
dismissal on grounds of immorality. In your opinion, which factor or 
factors listed below must be present in order for the courts to uphold 
dismissal for immoral causes? Here the purpose was to measure agree­
ment on conditions necessary to sustain immorality dismissals through 
the courts and to determine if attorney generals agreed with the research 
findings of court case analysis in this study. 
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Item 6. Please check the terms below which you believe could conceive-
ably constitute immorality on the part of teachers in public schools. 
Same as item number five on superintendent's questionnaire. 
Item 7. Are efforts underway in your state to amend the statutes to 
define immorality or remove it as a cause for teacher dismissals? Same 
as item number six on superintendent's questionnaire. 
Responses 
Questionnaires were mailed to fifty assistant state superin­
tendents and to fifty attorney generals. Of that number forty-four 
assistant superintendents responded (86%) and thirty-four attorney gen­
erals (68/0 responded. Of the thirty-four attorney generals responding, 
only twenty of those completed and returned questionnaire forms. The 
other fifteen wrote letters to explain why they were unable to complete 
the questionnaire. Most of those were prohibited by state statutes from 
rendering opinions or assistance to private individuals. Accordingly, 
several attorney generals turned the forms over to the state department 
of education for response. 
An item-by-item summary of responses of attorney generals and 
chief state school officers follows. 
Item 1. Thirty-six chief state school officers stated that immorality 
was listed in their respective states as a statutory grounds for teacher 
dismissal. Eight replied "No." A second research of the statutes con­
firmed the accuracy of information printed in Chapter Three. 
Item 2. Four chief state school officers stated that "immorality" was 
defined in their respective statutes. Thirty-eight replied "No," and two 
declined. The number four did not agree with the number found from a 
second search of the statutes. It was determined that the inconsistency 
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was due to different interpretations >of "definition." For example, evi­
dently, some respondents construed the following phrase as a definition 
of immorality: "crimes involving moral turpitude." 
Item 3. Three states, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Florida, reported 
that state level agencies provide a working definition of immorality to 
local school units. Forty said "no", and one failed to respond. 
Item 4. Respondents in twenty-two states indicate that the vagueness of 
the term "immorality" as a statutory dismissal grounds presents major 
problems of interpretation. Sixteen say "no", and six did not respond. 
Item 5. Item five of the questionnaire to chief state school officers 
and its counterpart, item six on the questionnaire to attorney generals, 
attempted to determine conmionality of the concept of immorality, and to 
see if beliefs of respondents were consistent with the courts. 
The results of the responses are presented in Table Four. 
Item 6. Assistant state school superintendents in four states (Kentucky, 
Colorado, Pennsylvania, South Dakota) reported that efforts are underway 
in their respective states to define "immorality" or to remove it from 
the statutes as a cause for dismissal. Thirty-seven respondents said 
"no", three did not reply. Of the twenty responding attorney generals, 
eighteen said "no" and two did not reply to this item. 
Items 7 and 8. Twenty-seven state assistant superintendents stated that 
there had been teacher dismissals for immorality during the last five 
years in their respective state, and seventeen of them stated that im­
morality had reached the courts. Fourteen respondents said that to 
their knowledge there had not been any dismissal for immorality during 
the five-year period, and seven stated that no cases hcid reached t.ho 
courts. Three respondents did not reply to item seven and twenty did 
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TABLE IV 
OPINIONS OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS AND STATE ATTORNEY GENERALS ON 
BEHAVIORS WHICH CONSTITUTE IMMORALITY ON THE PART OF TEACHERS 
*Chief School **Attorney 
Behaviors or Acts Offi cers General 
Prostituti on 32 15 
Illicit Use of Drugs 20 13 
Financial Laxity 4 
Adul tery 19 3 
Cohabitation 16 4 
Vulgarity 4 4 
Inappropriate Sex Instruction 14 2 
Improper Use of Position 9 3 
Improper Relations with Students 20 8 
Improper Relations with Adults 8 2 
Cheating 8 5 
Notoriety 2 
Domestic Relations 2 
Fornication 20 2 
Homosexualtty 23 6 
Theft 20 11 
Fraud 19 12 
Profanity 5 5 
Promoting Atheism 3 1 
Sodomy 26 6 
Public Intoxication 11 4 
Drinking Alcohol in Public 1 
* 44 Responding 
** 20 Responding 
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not reply to item eight. Among the twenty attorney generals responding, 
nine stated that there had been immorality dismissals in their respective 
state in the last five years. One said "no," ten did not know. Five 
stated that immorality dismissal cases had reached the courts. Two said 
"no." Twelve failed to reply or checked "unknown." 
Item 9. Seven assistant superintendents stated that guidelines were 
prepared or briefings were held to inform local school governing bodies 
on the legal aspects of determining cause for dismissal on grounds of 
immorality. Thirty-six said "no." One failed to respond. 
Item 1 on Attorney General's Questionnaire. Thirteen of the twenty 
respondents stated that their respective state had an established state 
commission to hear cases concerning teacher dismissals or license 
revocation. Six said "no" and one declined to respond. 
Item 4 on Attorney General's Questionnaire. This item was designed to 
detect breadth of understanding of much recent court comment on teachers' 
right to privacy and nexus between private acts and classroom perform­
ance. Six attorney generals stated that, in their opinions, dismissals 
of teachers for acts in their private lives would stand up in court. 
One said "no;" one declined to reply; and ten said it all depends on 
the circumstances. 
Item 5 on Attorney General's Questionnaire. The purpose of this item 
was to measure agreement of opinion on the nature of the inmoral act and 
conditions for finding sufficient cause for dismissal to be upheld by 
the court. The data from item five is presented in Table V. 
Analysis of Nation-Wide Survey 
Examination of the data collected under items one, two and three 
supports the findings from the study of the fifty state Education Codes 
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TABLE V 
FACTORS RELATED TO IMMORALITY AND SUCCESSFUL TEACHER DISMISSAL LITIGATION 
AS VIEWED BY STATE ATTORNEY GENERALS 
Relative Factors Number (20) 
The act must show close nexus to classroom performance. 11 
The act must be public or subject to public view. 3 
The act must be offensive to local values and beliefs. 6 
The act must be notorius or attract notoriety. 2 
The act must be proven to be detrimental to school image. 7 
The act must be suspicious, or merely suspected of occurring. 0 
The person must be found guilty of a criminal act by court. 5 
The act must be only adjudged by school board to be immoral. 1 
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and reveals the following conclusions: (1) The vast majority of the 
states use "immorality" as a grounds for teacher dismissal and license 
revocation; (2) A very small number of states, one-three, define im­
morality; and (3) only three states provide a working definition of 
"immorality" for guidance of local school boards. 
The data from item four demonstrates that a notable degree of 
interpretation problems across the nation exist over the vagueness and 
relativity of the term "immorality" as a cause of dismissal. Twenty-four 
respondents report that the vagueness of the term is a problem. Sixteen 
respondents say that it is not a problem. Data collected under item six 
on the chief state school officer questionnaire and item seven on the 
state attorney general questionnaire show that in only four states are 
efforts currently underway by state legislative bodies or state agencies 
to remove or refine "immorality" as a statutory cause for teacher dis­
missal. Three of the states have bills pending before the Legislature 
on refining or removing immorality from the statutes: Kentucky, Colora­
do, and South Dakota. Copies of these three bills are placed in appendix 
E (South Dakota), F (Colorado), and G (Kentucky). Also a bill passed by 
the 1975-76 California Legislature is shown in appendix H, not because it 
removes immorality from the statutes as a cause for dismissal but because 
it relates all license revocation to "fitness to teach," in keeping with 
many major court decisions. 
There were areas of wide agreement and areas of wide disagreement 
on what teacher behavior constitutes immorality as viewed by assistant 
state superintendents and state attorney generals (see Table V for data). 
Both categories of respondents agreed by a large majority that prostitu­
tion, illicit use of drugs, theft and fraud will conceivably constitute 
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immorality. The act of sodomy constitutes the category of widest dis­
agreement. Fifty-eight percent of the school officers see sodomy as 
immoral; thirty percent of the attorney generals see it as such. 
A much larger percentage of the school officer respondents see 
adultery, cohabitation, improper sex instruction, improper public dis­
play of affection with adults, fornication, and homosexuality as im­
moral conduct than do attorney generals. On the other hand, less state 
superintendents see profanity as a basis for immorality than do their 
counterparts. 
The most significant finding of the survey concerning behaviors 
which constitute immorality is the breadth of the perceptions of immoral­
ity, ranging from prostitution to financial laxity. Surely, the data 
help little in attempts to define or restrict the concept of immorality. 
The data show that almost any behavior can conceivably be considered 
immoral by someone. This fact has been well demonstrated in recent 
litigation as shown in preceedinq chapters of this study. 
Items in the survey instruments concerning the number of teacher 
dismissal cases which reached the courts during the period 1970-1975 re­
veal that, from an unduplicated count, thirty states had immorality dis­
missal cases to reach the courts for adjudication. Most of the respond­
ents reported that the number of court cases was unknown. But the 
eleven respondents who gave numbers of cases that reached the courts in­
dicated that a total of eighty-three cases did so. One state attorney 
general indicated that eight teaching licenses had been revoked for im­
morality during the five-year period. Several respondents cited cases 
and several sent photocopies of the relevant cases as printed in the 
state court reports. 
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The data show that only eight state agencies have taken steps to 
establish guidelines or to brief local school governing bodies on the 
legal aspects of teacher dismissal for immoral causes. 
Finally, one item on the survey instrument for attorney generals 
was designed to determine if, in the opinion of the attorney generals, 
immorality was relative to community values and beliefs, and if there was 
agreement between attorney generals and court dictum on factors which 
must be present for immorality to be affirmed by the courts. One-third 
of those responding believed an act offensive to local values and beliefs 
would be a factor in establishing immorality. Fifty-five percent of the 
respondents reported their belief that the alleged immoral act must show 
a close nexus between the act and classroom performance, and thirty per­
cent believe the act must adversely affect the school image or function. 
Only one respondent reported that the school board could determine what 
conduct constitutes immorality. 
Although the research in this chapter is, admittedly, based 
largely on professional opinions, it seems significant because opinions 
of some people become practices of others. Further, the individuals in 
state-level leadership positions are on the interface of a changing so­
ciety and a dynamic judiciary; therefore, they are in the best position 
to experience first the consequences of social and judicial changie and 
to be knowledgeable of trends and problems. This assessment of chief 
state school officers and state attorney generals has been an attempt to 
look at the real world in light of what has been revealed in the litera­
ture and examination of court action, and to measure reflective movement 
in the field. 
Further, the nation-wide survey has produced a wealth of relevant 
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materials, including fourteen copies of state statutes pertinent to the 
study, complete copies of six related court cases, many citations of rele­
vant cases, and many helpful letters. This part of the research pro­
duced several points which will be lifted in the following chapter of 
sumnary and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
From the first step of research to the last page of the written 
report, this study was focused on one major purpose: to determine the 
legality of teacher dismissal for immorality. In order to reach such a 
conclusion the study sought to answer seven questions as set forth under 
"Analysis of the Problem" in Chapter One. Answers to those critical 
questions were sought through a study of the current literature, the 
state statutes, court cases, and from the field through a survey of 
attorney generals and chief state school officers. This chapter of 
summary and conslusions is designed to recapitulate in sequential order 
the major findings, identify trends, and state the conditions under 
which immorality dismissals will stand the test of court review—that is, 
to be held legal. 
SUMMARY 
The problem was identified basically as a conflict of role per­
ception in a period of social change, shifting judicial views, and 
pluralistic cultural mores. School boards, by tradition, have enjoyed 
wide discretionary power in determining not only what conduct constitutes 
immorality, but in discharging teachers for immorality according to the 
board's discretion. Such unchallenged authority of board members sub­
jected the public and private lives and conduct of teachers to close 
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public scrutiny. Thus, for decades in this nation, as a condition of 
continued employment, teachers have had to sacrifice certain constitu­
tional rights afforded individuals in other vocations. 
However, under the auspices of the courts, teachers have made 
tremendous gains in the last decade in acquiring full citizenship rights. 
Teachers are now organized and are socially and politically astute and 
active. They are challenging the double moral standards imposed on them 
by society as well as the authority of school boards to adjudge their 
morality. This progressive stance by teachers flies in the face of tra­
ditional views of school board powers. No longer is the power of the 
employing agency absolute. However, evidence abounds to affirm the fact 
that school boards perceive their role to be guardians of prevailing 
community values and beliefs and protectors of children of tender years. 
Therefore school boards and school administrators are caught in the 
crunch between community expectations and the strong push by teachers and 
the courts to protect the constitutional rights of every citizen, in­
cluding teachers. 
At this point in time when individual rights are weighed against 
the broader social welfare, most often the rights of the individual pre­
vail. This phenomenon of stress and strain, push and pull, between in­
dividual rights and the broader social welfare naturally creates a cli­
mate for heavy court precipitation, and that we have! 
This study examines the judicial climate, and how it affects 
statutes, writers, and state level practitioners in order to determine 
trends and make predictions. 
Examination of the current literature and court records indicates 
that the problem of teacher dismissal for immorality centers around the 
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lack of any common conception of the term "immorality." Immorality means 
different things to different people. For example, the discharged 
teacher in Pettit v. State Board of Education thought that oral copula­
tion in semi-public view was not immoral. The school and the court 
thought that exaggerated public criticism of the superintendent in Watts 
v. Seward was immoral. 
Philosophers have maintained that morality is a social system of 
regulation akin to law and convention. Yet there is a widespread but 
false belief that no such thing as a common morality exists--no code of 
conduct that can be adopted by all men, but only this morality and that 
morality. The philosophers and the courts have related immorality to 
conduct which is hostile to the general public. But the question then 
becomes, who is the general public? In a pluralistic society of America 
today many sets of cultural mores and many moralities exist. Therefore 
whose morals shall prevail? Surely the definitional problems fall on 
the shoulders of the courts. 
When the courts have been perplexed with the term "immorality," 
they have attempted to define it. Based on court definitions, immoral­
ity is defined in Words and Phrases as, ". . . that which is contra 
mores; or not moral, inconsistent with rectitude, purity or good morals 
. . ." But this definition relates to cultural mores and morals. It 
does little to develop a common conception of morality because it fails 
to deal with splinter or sub-cultural values and beliefs that constitute 
many diverse moralities. 
In at least one case the court has recognized that morality is 
relative to different communities and geographical areas. In State v. 
Trub.y the court stated that that which may be considered immoral in one 
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part of the country might be considered moral in another, thus the courts 
must decide such cases. In Sullivan v. Meade County the court found a 
teacher guilty of immorality in a small rural community in South Dakota 
for living with a man without the benefit of marriage, while in many 
other localities such conduct would be protected by the courts under the 
principle of a right to privacy. 
Traditionally, the courts have been loathe to interfere in the 
administration of schools. Thus school boards have been free to deter­
mine what conduct constituted inmorality and, accordingly, to dismiss 
teachers without question. In so doing, teachers' constitutional rights 
were often abrogated. However, the situation is different today. Teach­
ers have used the courts to capture their right of first class citizen­
ship. Surely the courts have played a prominent role in the emancipation 
of teachers. In so doing,the courts have been seen by some as emerging 
as the key source of educational policy, and accused by others as "taking 
over" the operation of the schools and the role of school boards. Such 
a view maintains that court decisions outline and detail the policies by 
which schools operate. There is ample evidence that the judiciary has 
evolved from a stage of lassiez-faire involvement in school matters be­
fore the turn of the century to the present stage of close supervision 
of school board action when constitutional rights are at stake. The 
trend of the courts is definitely toward greater protection of teachers 
and closer scrutiny of arbitrary and capricious use of board power. 
The involvement of the judiciary in the protection of teachers' 
constitutional rights in no way indicates that "immoral" teacher models 
cannot be removed from the classroom. The courts merely have plainly 
and consistently maintained that school board hearings and dismissal 
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proceedings are essentially a judicial function over which the court has 
a constitutional right of review, that the best interests of the school 
must be intended, and that arbitrary or capricious use of power will not 
survive judicial scrutiny. As long as the board's action appears to be 
for the welfare of the children, and constitutional rights of teachers 
are not violated, immorality dismissals are likely to win judicial 
approval. 
The courts have spoken frequently, and continue to speak, to the 
exemplary responsibility of teachers, and to the protection of children 
during their "young and tender years." In each dismissal case the court 
must balance the teacher's rights against the broader social welfare. 
Each case must stand on its own peculiar set of circumstances and each 
decision is based on the facts before the court. For example, as recent 
as 1974 a New York court stated that protection of students overrides the 
property interest of teachers as represented by continued employment. 
The volume of litigation covered in this study reflects the 
conflict between school boards as interpreters and guardians of community 
values and beliefs on the one hand, and teachers who have found new power 
and freedom and who challenge the right of the employing agency to sit in 
judgment of their morals, on the other hand. 
State statutes are the fountainhead of school board authority. 
Although statutes are not law until they stand the test of court review, 
they carry the full force of law until such time as they are struck 
down or affirmed by the courts. In deciding dismissal cases, the courts 
must determine if school boards operated within the scope of their statutory 
authority, while trying to interpret the legislative intent of the re­
spective statute. Thus, an examination of state statutes is presented 
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in this study to add perspective to the investigation, to determine 
legislative concern over the morality of teachers, and to analyze statu­
tory provisions for removal of teachers considered to be immoral. 
The examination of the statutes reveals that they range from 
great particularity to gross generality. However, all state statutes 
reflect a concern, in one way or another, with the moral fiber of 
teachers. Immorality is listed as a grounds for dismissal of teachers 
more often than any other cause. Usually "immorality" is listed 
under the headings, "Grounds for Dismissal" or "Grounds for License 
Revocation." 
Forty states list immorality as a cause for dismissal under 
such terms as "immorality," "moral turpitude," "immoral conduct," and 
"moral unfitness." Most states also use the "catch-all" terms of 
"good and just cause," "evident unfitness," or "conduct unbecoming a 
teacher." These terms also cover immorality. Thus, when immorality is 
considered within the scope of the above terms, all states have 
statutory provisions for dealing with immoral teachers. 
Only one state, Alaska, defines immorality. Several states 
have incorporated causes for dismissal in statutory provisions aimed at 
guaranteeing procedural due process. 
In addition to immorality, the leading cause, many other terms 
could cover the grounds equally well. 
Thirty-two states go beyond dismissal and list immorality as 
a grounds for license revocation in permissive language. Nine states go 
beyond the permissive "may revoke" to the definite "shall revoke" license 
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for immorality. In most cases, mandatory revocation is based on crime 
involving moral turpitude. 
Although a wide range of language is used in the statutes to dis­
charge teachers, the fact becomes evident that across the nation the var­
ious legislatures concerned themselves with five broad areas of teacher 
conduct: (1) immoral attitudes and behavior, (2) inadequate performance, 
(3) deviant behavior, (4) violation of laws and regulations, and (5) dis­
honesty and deceit. 
Under the five broad groupings, dismissal of teachers for immoral 
acts could be covered by at least nineteen statutory terms. 
Although the statutory provisions for teacher dismissal have not 
kept pace with the judiciary, the statutes do reflect a trend toward 
greater protection of teachers from unfair dismissals and a trend toward 
less discretion by school boards in determining cause for dismissal, 
especially in terms of immorality as a cause for dismissal. 
During the course of research for this study dismissal cases 
were examined as far back as 1890. However, the treatment of cases is 
primarily limited to the time period of 1967 through January 1976 for 
three reasons: (1) the seventy-nine year period from School District of 
Fort Smith v. Maury (1890) to Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 
has been adequately examined and published; (2) the period from Jarvella 
v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School District (1967) to the present date 
demonstrates a different judicial view of immorality and teacher rights; 
(3) little research of a comprehensive nature has been published on the 
topics from Morrison to the present time. 
However, as background for the study the Horpsko case serves as a 
point of departure. Five cases are presented under the heading "General 
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Immorality" to illustrate the prevailing legal doctrine until Jarvella 
and Morrison. In essence, that doctrine held that teachers were immoral 
if their public or private conduct offended the morals of the community 
and set a bad example for the youth whose ideals teachers were supposed 
to foster and educate. Moreover, teachers laid down certain rights upon 
entering the teaching profession. Concomitant to that doctrine was the 
right of school boards to determine immorality, and generally immorality 
was what board members said it was. 
Three landmark court cases in three consecutive years, however, 
turned the judicial tide in favor of teacher protection and restoration 
of constitutional rights for teachers. Jarvella (1967), Pickering (1968), 
and Morrison (1969) ushered in a new era of judicial attitude and teacher 
freedom. Decisions from these three cases greatly diminished the influ­
ence of the Horosko principle, although the "exemplary" concept from 
Horosko is still felt today. 
Jarvella, Pickering, and Morrison established that teachers have 
a right to privacy, a right to dissent, and a right to due process. In 
essence, the decisions, especially Morrison, established that dismissal 
cases must turn on whether the alleged immoral act is public or private, 
whether the act is adversely related to the school community and teacher 
effectiveness, whether the act is remote in time, and whether notoriety 
is attracted on the part of the teacher. These legal points have been 
raised in almost all subsequent dismissal cases and are still used as 
standards for judgment in immorality cases. 
Homosexuality and other types of sexual misconduct seem to domi­
nate the judicial scene concerned with immorality dismissals. 
In the area of homosexuality, eight cases are presented in the 
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study. As viewed by the courts, homosexuality per se does not constitute 
irmiorality. Immorality, including homosexuality, must be based on evi­
dent unfitness to teach before a dismissal will stand. According to the 
cases examined, an accused teacher can disqualify himself by promoting 
his beliefs, by practicing his way of life in public or semi-public view 
or in a way that is apt to be exposed. If the act is private, removed in 
time, and becomes known to only a few people through no fault of the 
teacher, the teacher will generally be protected by the courts. 
There is no evidence from the cases, however, to support the be­
lief that the courts will uphold the teacher in advances toward children 
or the act of oral copulation. In two cases the courts found oral copu­
lation so repulsive to the moral conscience, that the act per se consti­
tuted immorality and gross unfitness. 
Traditionally, in the minds of many, immorality has been equated 
with sexual misconduct. The great bulk of dismissal cases dealing with 
sex seem to support the above conclusion. Ten cases dealing with sexual 
misconduct, other than homosexuality, are treated to illustrate the range 
of charges and court decisions. 
The examination of the cases shows that the time and place of 
occurrence, as well as the nature of the sexual act, are factors in estab­
lishing whether the accused teacher is unfit to teach, thus immoral. In 
the case of adultery, an act that occurred in a remote place not apt to 
be discovered except through great effort was not found by the court to 
rebound adversely on the teacher's fitness to teach. But consensual sex 
relations in a parked car on a dark city street was another matter. 
The court upheld the board's right to inquire into the character 
and integrity of its teachers but prohibited dismissal on inferences of 
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"wrong doing" drawn from cohabitation. On the other hand, where a teach­
er was forewarned that her cohabitation was adversely affecting the 
school community through attracted notoriety, dismissal was upheld. 
In several sexual misconduct instances where defense was based on 
Morrison, the courts drew distinctions among private, semi-private, and 
public acts and acts on private property. If the sexual acts are to be 
protected under the "right to privacy" principle they must in fact be 
private and not reasonably subject to discovery. 
Often immorality dismissals for sexual misconduct turn on whether 
the act in question tends to affect the teacher-student relationship. 
When the act involves a minor student it is most likely to be found to 
reflect on previous or future teacher-student relationship, therefore 
not be protected by the court. One case demonstrates that when a student 
has graduated and reached adult status, cohabitation with a teacher does 
not necessarily damage the future teacher-student relationship, but the 
act of lying about the fact was basis for dismissal. 
In two cases the courts spoke plainly to the issue of equating 
unwed motherhood with immoral conduct. Such beliefs as reflected in 
school policies prohibiting employment, terminating employment, and with­
holding maternity leave were seen to forever brand a teacher "immoral" 
for past behavior and amounted to a penalty against women and not against 
men. 
The act of masturbation is viewed by the court as an offense akin 
to oral copulation in seriousness. The act per se in a place subject to 
public view is sufficient to constitute immorality and gross unfitness. 
Quite often improper classroom behavior or questionable teaching 
materials and methods are seen as immoral or unprofessional to the 
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degree that they reflect on the teacher's moral character. Seven such 
cases are presented in the study. 
In the area of improper classroom behavior, the courts have found 
that vulgar gestures about the superintendent in the presence of students 
passes the limit of bad taste and vulgarity and therefore constitute 
immorality and unfitness. 
The courts have ruled that when teachers pursue a bona fide edu­
cational purpose with good intent that neither adversely affects the wel­
fare of the school nor the pupils, although poor judgment was shown, a 
dismissal for immorality for use of obscene materials in class will not 
likely be upheld by the courts. 
However, as shown in Brubaker v. Board of Education, where obscene 
literature is not directly related to educational purposes, and encourages 
students to throw off the dull moral discipline imposed on them by 
their homelife, the teacher's tenure will not be protected by the courts. 
The courts generally excuse isolated instances of poor judgment 
by teachers. Such examples of poor judgment include bringing a gun to 
school in a coat pocket and using well-intended but highly improper in­
structional methods. 
Six example cases of nonsexual criminal offenses are presented to 
illustrate the nature of such "immoral" acts and their treatment by the 
courts. The cases include bribery, possession of marijuana, shoplifting, 
public intoxication, falsification of records and lying. 
The significant legal principles evolving from the criminal cases 
follow: (1) Acquittal on a criminal charge does not bar subsequent dis­
missal proceedings, (2) The "exclusionary rule" does not extend to dis­
missal hearings, (3) Proof beyond a doubt is not needed in dismissal 
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cases to the degree that it is required in criminal cases. 
In the cases of possession of marijuana the courts refused to 
enter debate on the issue of whether marijuana is good or bad or whether 
possession thereof is immoral. The teacher's conduct and the notoriety 
attracted constituted unfitness. 
In general, the courts question the character and fitness of 
teachers who commit crimes, falsify records, or lie to school officials. 
The nation-wide survey of chief state school officers and state 
attorney generals show that the conceptions of conduct that constitute 
immorality are broad indeed. Most of the population associated immoral­
ity with sexual misconduct first and with crimes of theft and fraud 
second. The survey revealed tthat immorality dismissals are a major con­
cern and that some state level movement is underway to'amend statutes, 
adjust policies, and establish due process procedures in view of recent 
court actions. Widespread agreement was found on the belief that a close 
nexus must be shown between the alleged immoral act and teaching perform­
ance before a dismissal action would win court affirmance. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on analysis of this study several conclusions emerge: 
1. Teachers can be dismissed for immorality. The courts merely have • 
said that constitutional rights must be protected in the process. 
2. Many problems of interpretation center around the seemingly unde-
finable nature of the term "immorality." The term continues to mean 
different things to different people. 
3. It is commonly agreed that morality is related to social and cul­
tural mores. The problem seem s to lie in the identification of a common 
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social norm. 
4. The nation is in a transitional period of changing social values, 
newly-acquired teacher rights, and judicial accessibility. 
5. All state legislatures have set forth in different language statu­
tory provisions for providing proper teacher models for children, and 
grounds for removal of teachers of doubtful moral character. 
6. The trend of the judiciary is toward greater protection for teachers 
and their individual rights and, concomitantly, toward limiting the dis­
cretionary freedom of school boards. 
7. The prominent role of the courts in protecting teacher rights is 
creating adjustment problems on the part of school administrators, school 
boards, and state legislative bodies. 
8. In order for a dismissal for immorality to stand before the court, 
the alleged immoral conduct must demonstrate that a teacher is unfit to 
teach. 
9. Evident unfitness is based on the adverse relationship between the 
act in question and the teacher's classroom function. 
10. The degree of proof needed in dismissal cases is not equal to that 
required in criminal cases. 
11. Non-admittable evidence in criminal proceedings may be used in dis­
missal proceedings. The "exclusionary rule" does not apply in dismissal 
cases. 
12. Unwed parenthood cannot be equated with immorality, and school 
policies cannot reflect community morals in this respect. 
13. A teacher may be legally dismissed on the grounds of immorality for 
many types of homosexuality and sexual misconduct, improper classroom 
behavior, and criminal offenses. 
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14. A dismissal for immorality generally will be held legal whenever it 
can be shown that: 
. The act attracts notoriety to the degree that it rebounds adversely 
on the school community. 
. The act is public or subject to public discovery. 
. The act is so divergent from the normal human practice that the 
act per se is immoral. Examples are: oral copulation and mastur­
bation. 
. The commission of the act constitutes a crime. Examples are: 
moral turpitude and possession of illegal drugs. 
. The act is committed with or to the knowledge of students. 
. The act shows a potential for misconduct on the part of the 
teacher. 
. The accused teacher publicly promotes a divergent life style. 
. The accused teacher uses obscene literature and/or language not 
related to the subject taught. 
. The practice of the act is current and known by the school commun­
ity. 
. The act develops from a teacher-student relationship or is likely 
to affect future teacher-student relationship. 
15. A dismissal for immorality generally will not be held legal when­
ever it can be proven that: 
. The act is an isolated instant and does not show a potential for 
misconduct. 
. The act is private and becomes public only through great effort 
or through one individual. 
. The act is committed in a remote place and removed in time. 
. The act is committed with good intent and is related to educational 
objectives. 
. The act is non-criminal in nature and attracts little notoriety. 
. The act is not offensive to community values and beliefs. 
. The act cannot be shown to affect adversely the teacher-pupil re­
lationship or school community. 
. The charges are conclusions drawn from inferences of "wrong doing." 
. The teacher has not been forewarned or directed to discontinue an 
act in question if *"he act has been committed previously. 
Immorality is intact as a statutory grounds for dismissal. 
Dismissals are legal if school boards build their cases well and act 
within the scope of statutory authority and legal guidelines. Then 
the courts must decide if the particular conduct is sufficient to 
constitute immorality and if the teacher is guilty of the charge. 
f 
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1126 South Park Street 
Asheboro, North Carolina 27203 
January 19, 1976 
Honorable Daniel R. McLeod 
Attorney General, State of South Carolina 
Wade Hampton Office Building 
Columbia, South Carolina 29211 
Sir: 
North Carolina, as most states, lists immorality as a statutory 
cause for teacher dismissal. I am seeking clarification of the term 
"immorality" and the possible legality of its use. I have consulted 
with the North Carolina State Attorney General's Office and the North 
Carolina Department of Public Instruction concerning my research. They 
are in support of my research and believe the results will be of value 
to all concerned. 
As a practicing school administrator, 1 find that the vagueness 
of the term "immorality" creates many problems in interpretation and 
administration by school officials and school boards. 
Therefore, I am examining the problem on a nation-wide basis in 
completing a doctoral dissertation at the University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro. I believe this study will be of value to you, to other 
educators, and to school boards and attorneys as well as to the North 
Carolina Attorney General, State Superintendent of Schools and myself. 
The research includes analysis of statutory law, case law, current 
literature, and data from state attorney generals and chief state school 
officers. 
.Results of the nation-wide survey as well as copies of the completed 
dissertation will be mailed to you on request in appreciation of your 
assistance. If you desire a copy, or copies, please check the appropriate 
block on the attached questionnaire along with your name and mailing 
address. 
Regardless of whether you desire the results of my study, I shall 
greatly appreciate your assistance in analyzing a very real problem. 
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The attached questionnaire contains only a few questions directly 
related to the problem under study. Please complete whatever items 
you can to the best of your knowledge and return it in the enclosed 
envelope before January 30. 
Strict confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained. Treat­
ment of the survey data will not identify states or respondents 
unless express permission is obtained before publication. 
I hope you will find that my investigation is of real value to 
your office as well as to my profession. Thank you very much for your 
consideration and prompt assistance. 
Sincerely yours, 
Leonard H. Simmons 
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SURVEY OF STATE ATTORNEY GENERALS ON PROBLEMS 
RELATED TO TEACHER DISMISSAL FOR IMMORAL CAUSES 
Does your state have a state commission to hear cases concerning 
teacher dismissal of license revocation? yes , no . 
During the five-year period 1970-75 have any teachers in your state 
been dismissed for immorality - or "unprofessional conduct,", "good 
cause," or other terms that might cover immorality? yes , no , 
unknown . 
If your answer to question #2 is yes, did any cases reach the state 
commission or the courts? yes , no . If yes, please cite cases: 
In your opinion, will dismissal of teachers by school boards for 
"immoral" conduct in their lives outside the classroom stand up in 
the courts? yes no , relative to situation . 
School boards have the responsibility for determining cause for dismissal 
on grounds of immorality. In your opinion, which factor or factors listed 
below must be present in order for the courts to uphold dismissal for 
immoral causes? 
The alleged "immoral act" must: 
show close nexus to classjoom performance. 
be public or subject to public view. 
be offensive to local values and beliefs. 
be notorious or attract notoriety. 
be proven to be detrimental to school image or function. 
be suspicious, questionable behavior, or merely suspected of occurring. 
be found guilty of a criminal act by the courts. 
only be adjudged by school board to be immoral. 
others: 
Please check the terms below which you believe could conceivably 
constitute immorality on the part of teachers in public schools: 
Prostitution Cheating _ Fraud 
Illicit use of drugs Notoriety Profanity 
Financial laxity Domestic relations Promoting atheism 
Adultery Fornication Sodomy 
Cohabitation Homosexuality Public intoxication 
Vulgarity Jheft Drinking alcohol in publi 
Sex instruction unrelated to course of study being taught 
Use of position to promote divergent life style 
Improper display of affection with students 
Improper display of affection of adults in public view 
Others (please list) 
Are efforts underway in your state to amend the statutes to define 
immorality or remove it as a cause for teacher dismissal? yes , no 
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1126 South Park Street 
Asheboro, North Carolina 27203 
January 19, 1976 
Mr. James S. Gladwell 
Deputy State Superintendent 
State Department of Education 
Building 6, Room 306, Capitol Complex 
Charleston, West Virginia 25305 
Dear Mr. Gladwell: 
In cooperation with the North Carolina Attorney General's Office 
and the State Department of Public Instruction for North Carolina, I 
am conducting a research study in relation to the dismissal of school 
teachers for immoral causes. In searching for the proper contact persons 
to assure accurate and prompt response, I contacted Dr. Jerome Melton, 
Deputy State Superintendent, who was kind enough to suggest that you 
could and would assist me. He joins in sending warm regards to you and 
requests that you provide us with information needed for this research. 
North Carolina, as most states, lists immorality as a statutory 
cause for teacher dismissal. It is apparent that the term "immorality" 
creates many problems in interpretation and administration by school 
officials and school boards. I am attacking this issue on a nation-wide 
basis as a part of my doctoral program at UNC-Greensboro, I believe this 
study will be of value to school officials, school boards, state education 
agencies, and school attorneys. This survey which I am asking you to 
complete is a part of the total research I will be doing in this area. 
Results will be made available to all respondents, local school 
administrative units in North Carolina, and the State Education Agency. 
I think my efforts will be beneficial to all concerned, and I am sincere 
in soliciting your assistance. 
A self-addressed envelope is attached for your convenience in 
responding. Your response on or before January 30 will be greatly 
appreciated. Strict confidentiality will be maintained and no respondent 
will be identified. 
Thank you for your consideration and assistance. 
Sincerely yours, 
Leonard H. Simmons 
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1. Is immorality listed in your state statutes as a cause for teacher 
dismissal? yes , no . 
2. Do your state statutes define immorality? yes , no 
3. Does your office or any state agency provide a working definition 
of immorality to local school units? yes , no . 
4. Does the relativity or vagueness of the term "immorality" in your 
state statutes create a major interpretation problem for school 
administrators and school boards? yes , no . 
5. In your opinion, which of the following terms do you believe could 
conceivably constitute immorality on the part of public school teachers? 
Prostitution Cheating Fraud 
Illicit use of drugs Notoriety Profanity 
Financial laxity Domestic relations Promoting atheism 
Adultery Fornication Sodomy 
Cohabitation Homosexuality Public intoxication 
Vulgarity Theft Drinking alcohol in public 
Sex instruction unrelated to course of study being taught 
Use of position to promotu divergent life style 
Improper display of affection with students 
Improper display of affection of adults in public view 
Others (please list) 
6. Are you aware of any current efforts by legislative bodies or agencies 
to amend state statutes to either remove immorality as a cause for 
teacher dismissal or to define immorality? yes , no . 
7. To your knowledge, during the time period 1970-75 have there been any 
teacher dismissals for immoral conduct in your state? yes (number ), 
no 
8. If you checked "yes" to item #7, did any of the cases reach the courts? 
yes (number ), no . 
9. In view of seemingly conflicting rulings by different courts across the 
nation on teacher dismissal for immoral causes, has your office or any 
state agency established guidelines or briefed local school governinq 
bodies concerning the legal aspects of determining cause for dismissal 
on grounds of immorality? yes , no . Comment: 
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HOUSE BILL NO. 782 
(( )) - -TwCe-f-t f 
Introduced by: Representative Radack ((( f 
1 FOR AN ACT ENTITLED, An Act to amend SDCL 13-42-9 and 
2 13-43-15/ relating to the revocation or suspension of 
3 a teachers certificate and dismissal by the local 
4 board. 
s BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA: 
6 Section 1. That § 13-42-9 be amended to read as 
follows: 
13-4 2-9. The superintendent of elementary and secondary 
education shall have the power to revoke or suspend arty 
certificate for v'(any)) cause (.(which would have prevented 
its issue, or after dismissal for plain violation of 
contract, gross immorality/ incompetency, or flagrant 
neglect of duty)) . The superintendent of elementary and 
secondary education shall suspend any certificate for a 
period not to exceed one year for breaking or jumping a 
16 contract, if such suspension is requested by the school 
7 
3 
9 
10 
11 
12 
14 
15 
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board. 
Section 2. That § 13-43-15 be amended to read as 
follows: 
13-4 3-15. A school board may dismiss any teacher at 
any time for ((plain.violation of contract, gross 
immorality, incompetency, or flagrant neglect of duty)) 
(((cause))). 
APPENDIX F 
PENDING BILL BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE 
OF COLORADO ON REFINING OR REMOVING 
IMMORALITY FROM THE STATUTES 
SEWTE BILL NO. 43. BY SENATORS il. Fowler, Minister, Allshouse, 
Stockton, and Strickland; also REPRESENTATIVES Lucero, Miller, 
Barreigan, Ik)ley, Minman, !5unson, Quinlan, and Scars. 
CONCERNING TFACfER CERTIFICATION. 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Colorado: 
SECTION 1. 22-2-109 (1), Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, is 
REPEALED AN!1 REEMACTED, V.TITl A-IENT)?EE-NTS, to read: 
22-2-109. State board of education - duties. (1) The 
state board of education shall: 
(a) Evaluate and determine and publish its findings as to 
which Colorado institutions of higher education neet the 
requirements of an accepted institution of higher education for 
the preparation of teachers pursuant to section 22-60-103 (1); 
(bj Evaluate and determine and publish its findings as to 
which programs of study in Colorado institutions of higher 
education neet the requirements of an approved program of teacher 
preparation pursuant to section 22-60-103 (2); 
(c) Adopt rules and regulations which prescribe standards 
for the evaluation of teacher preparation programs; 
(d) Adopt rules and regulations for a procedure through 
which statements of partial coripletion of approved prolans may 
be combined, pursuant to section 22-60-10-1 (5) (b) ; 
(e) Make periodic visits as may be necossary to the 
Capital letters indicate new material added to existing statutes; 
dashes through words indicate deletions from existing statutes and 
such material not part of act. 
22-60-110. ('.rounds for annulling, suspending, or revoking 
ccrtificato or letter of authorization. [i) rf any person 
obtains a teacher's certificate or letter of authorization 
through r tis representation or fraud or through misleading 
inforriation or untruthful statement submitted or offered with the 
intent to misrepresent or mislead or to conceal the truth, such 
certificate or letter of authorization ray be annulled by the 
department of education in the fcanner prescribed in section 
22-60-111. 
(2) A certificate or letter of authorization my be 
suspended or revoked in the nanner prescribed in section 
22-60-111, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of 
this section: 
(a) V.hen the holder has been determined to be neritally 
incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction; except that the 
certificate or letter of authorization held by a person who has 
been determined to be mentally incompetent by a court of 
competent jurisdiction shall be revoked or suspended by operation 
of law without a hearing, notwithstanding the provisions of 
section 22-60-111; 
(b) V.hen the holder is found guilty of a violation of any. 
law of this state or any municipal'Taw of this state involving 
imlrnv-ful sexual behavior pursuant to section lfi-3-401, C.R.S. 
m " 
(c) Vrnen the holder is found guilty of a violation of any 
lav: of this state, any municipality of this state, or law of the 
United States involving the illegal sale of narcotics; 
(d) V.Tien the holder is found £uilty_ of a felony in this 
state or, under the laws of any other state, the United States, 
or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the Waited 
States, of a crime which, if comittcd within this state, would 
be a felony, when the commission of said felony, in the judgment 
of the state board of education, renders him unfit to perform the 
services authorized by his' certificate or letter of 
authorization. 
(3) The state board of education may suspend or revoke a 
certificate or letter of authorisation if the state board finds 
and determines that the holder thereof has become professionally 
incompetent or guilty of unethical behavior. 
(4) The state board of education shall promulgate 
appropriate rules and regulations defining the standards of 
unethical behavior and professional incompetency. 
22-60-111. Procedure - denial, suspension, annulment, or 
revocation - certil-icate or letter oi authorisation. Procedures 
for tile denial, suspension, revocation, or annulment of a 
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REGULAR SESSION 1976 
HOUSE BILL NO. 16 
TUESDAY, JANUARY 6,  1976 
The Inter im Joint  Commit tee  on Business  Organizat ions  and Profess ions  
author ized pref i l ing  of  the  fol lowing bi l l  wi th  a  recommendat ion for  passage,  
and des ignated Representa t ives  Terry  L.  Mann and Wil l iam.  Donnermeyer  
as  sponsors  on behalf  of  the  commit tee .  
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AN ACT relating to occupational and professional licens­
ing and public employment for ex-criminal offenders. 
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth 
of Kentucky: 
Section 1. The General Assembly hereby declares 
that it is the policy of the Co-, -nonwealth of Kentucky to 
encourage and contribute to the rehabilitation of crim­
inal offenders and to assist them in the resumption of 
the responsibilities of citizenship. The opportunity to 
secure employment or to pursue, practice, or engage in a 
meaningful and profitable trade, occupation, vocation, 
profession or business is essential to rehabilitation and 
the resumption of the responsibilities of citizenship. 
Section 2. A new section of KRS Chapter 446 is 
created to read as follows: 
As used in this Act, unless the context requires 
otherwise: 
(1) "Occupation" includes all occupations, trades, 
vocations, professions, businesses, or employment of any 
kind for which a license is required to be issued by the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky, its agencies, or political sub­
divisions. . 
(2) "License" includes all licenses, permits, 
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certificates, registrations, or other means required to 
engage in an occupation which are granted or issued by 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky, its agents or political 
subdivisions before a person can pursue, practice, or 
engage in any occupation. 
(3) "Public employment" includes all employment 
with the Commonwealth of Kentucky, its agencies, or 
political subdivisions. 
(4) "Conviction of crime or crimes" shall be 
limited to convictions of felonies, high misdemeanors, 
and misdemeanors for which a jail sentence may be 
imposed. No other criminal conviction shall be consid­
ered. 
(5) "Hiring or licensing authority" shall mean the 
person, board, commission, or department of the Common­
wealth of Kentucky, its agencies or political subdivi­
sions, responsible by law for the hiring of persons for 
public employment or the licensing of persons for occupa­
tions . 
Section 3. A new section of KRS Chapter 446 is 
created to read as follows: 
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to 
the contrary, no person shall be disqualified from public 
employment, nor shall a person be disqualified from pur­
suing, practicing, or engaging in any occupation for 
which a license is required solely or in part because of 
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a prior conviction of a crime or crimes, unless the crime 
or crimes for which convicted directly relate to the 
position of employment sought or the occupation for which 
the license is sought. 
(2) In determining if a conviction directly relates 
to the position of public employment sought or the 
occupation for which the license is sought, the hiring or 
licensing authority shall consider: 
(a) The nature and seriousness of the crime or 
crimes for which the individual was convicted; 
(b) The relationship of the crime or crimes to the 
purposes of regulating the position of public employment 
sought or the occupation for which the license is sought; 
(c) The relationship of the crime or crimes to the 
ability, capacity, and fitness required to perform the 
duties and discharge the responsibilities of the position 
of employment or occupation." 
{3) A person who has been convicted of a crime or 
crimes which directly relate to the public employment 
sought or to the occupation for which a license is sought 
shall not be disqualified from the employment or occupa­
tion if the person can show competent evidence of suffi­
cient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the 
duties of the public employment sought or the occupation 
for which the license is sought. 
(4) Sufficient evidence of rehabilitation for a 
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person who has served out his term or who has raceivt 
final discharge from a parole or probation procrars rr.ay bo 
established by the production of: 
(a) A copy of the local, state, or federal release 
order; and 
(b) Evidence showing that at least one year has 
elapsed since release from any local, state, or federal 
correctional institution, or in the case of a paxclee or 
probationer, final discharge from parole or probation 
supervision and that while on parole or probation the 
person complied with all terms and conditions of preop­
tion or parole; 
(5) In the case of a person on active parcle or 
probation supervision sufficient evidence of rehabilita­
tion may be shown by: 
(a) Evidence showing that the person h~.s complied 
fully with the terms and conditions of the parole or 
probation order for a period of at least one year; ind 
(b) The written recommendation of the person's 
parole or probation officer that the person be permitted 
to encage in the named employment or :::pupation. 
{€) In addition to the docfiViS.-.tary ovidonce pre­
sented, the licensing or hiring authority shall consider 
any evidence presented by the applicant regarding: 
(a) The nature and seriousness of the crime or 
crimes for which convicted; 
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(b) All circumstances relative to the crime or 
crimes, including mitigating circumstances or social 
conditions surrounding the commission of the crime or 
crimes; 
(c) The age of the person at the time the crime or 
crimes were committed; 
(d) The length of time elapsed since the crime or 
crimes were committed; and 
(e) All other competent evidence of rehabilitation 
and present fitness presented, including, but not limited 
to; letters of reference by persons who have been in con­
tact with the applicant since his release from any local, 
state, or federal correctional institution or parole or 
probation program. 
Section 4. A new section of KRS Chapter 446 is 
created to read as follows: 
The following criminal records shall not be used, 
distributed, or disseminated by the Commonwealth of Ken­
tucky, its agents or political subdivisions in connection 
with any application for public employment nor in connec­
tion with an application for a license: 
(1) Records of arrest not followed by a valid con­
viction . 
(2) Convictions which have been, pursuant to law, 
annulled or expunged. 
(3) Misdemeanor convictions for which no jail sen-
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terice can be imposed, or in which the fine was less than 
$50. 
Section 5. A new section of KRS Chapter 446 is 
created to read as follows: 
If a hiring or licensing authority denies an indi­
vidual a position of public employment or disqualifies 
the individual from pursuing, practicing, or engaging in 
any occupation for which a license is required, solely or 
in part because of the individual's prior conviction of a 
crime, the hiring or licensing authority shall notify the 
individual in writing of the following: 
(1) The grounds and reasons for the denial or dis­
qualification ; 
(2) That the individual has the right to a hearing 
if written request for hearing is made within sixty (60) 
days after service of notice; 
(3) The earliest date the person may re-apply for a 
position of public employment or a license; and 
(4) That all competent evidence of rehabilitation 
presented will be considered upon re-application. 
Section 6. A new section of KRS Chapter 446 is 
created to read as follows: 
A person may be denied a license on the grounds that 
he does not possess good moral character, as specified in 
Section 7 of this Act. 
Section 7. A new section of KRS Chapter 44 6 is 
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created to read as follows: 
(1) A person possesses good moral character unless 
he has done any of the following: 
(a) He has done any act which, if done by a licen­
see of the occupation in question, would be grounds for 
the suspension or revocation of his license. 
(b) He has done any act involving dishonesty, 
fraud, or deceit with the intent to substantially benefit 
himself or another, or substantially injure another. 
(c) No act shall be grounds for the denial, revoca­
tion or suspension of a license, however, which does not 
have a substantial relationship to the functions and 
responsibilities of the licensed occupation and in the 
same manner and to the same effect as provided in Section 
3 of this Act. 
(2) A license shall not be denied, suspended, or 
revoked on the grounds of a lack of good moral character 
or any similar grounds relating to an applicant's char­
acter, reputation, personality, or habits unless the 
applicant's character, reputation, personality or habits 
directly contravene the standards of good moral character 
as defined in subsection (1). 
Section 8. A new section of KRS Chapter 446 is 
created to read as follows: 
Within thirty (30) days after final action by the 
hiring or licensing authority following a hearing, an 
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aggrieved party may petition the Franklin Circuit Court 
for review. The court shall decide the case on the 
record, and shall not set aside the hiring or licensing 
authority order except for errors of law, or upon a find­
ing that the hiring or licensing authority's action was 
arbitrary or capricious. 
Section 9. A new section of KRS Chapter 446 is 
created to read as follows: 
The provisions of this Act shall previal over any 
other laws, rules, and regulations which purport to 
govern the granting, denial, renewal, suspension, or 
revocation of a license or the initiation, suspension, or 
termination of public employment on the grounds of con­
viction of a crime or crimes. 
Section 10. A new section of KRS Chapter 446 is 
created to read as follows: 
The provisions of this Act shall not apply to: 
(1) The practice of law; but nothing in this 
section shall be construed to preclude the Court of 
Appeals, in iti; discretion, from adopting the policies 
set forth in this Act. 
(2) The provisions of KRS 61.300. 
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APPENDIX H 
AMENDED BILL FROM THE LEGISLATURE OF 
CALIFORNIA ON REFINING OR REMOVING 
IMMORALITY FROM THE STATUTES 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JANUARY 20, 1976 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JANUARY 6, 1976 
2 CALIKOBMA LEGISLATURE—1975-76 REGLLAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 320 
Introduced by Assemblyman Berman 
February 17, 1975 
REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION 
An act to amend Section 13202 of the Education Code, 
relating to certificated employees. 
• LEGISl-VTIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 820, as amended. Berman (Ed.). Schools: certificated 
employees: revocation. 
Under current statutory law, the Commission for Teacher 
Preparation and Licensing is required to revoke or suspend 
the credential of a person for, among other things, immoral 
or unprofessional conduct or evident unfitness for service. 
Under current decisional law, the conduct in question must 
relate to fitness to teach. 
This bill would amend the statute to specify that such con­
duct must be related to the employee's fitness to teach ar 
eltifisroom performance . 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
AB 820 — 2 — 
The people of the Stale of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. Section 13202 of the Education Code is 
2 amended to read: 
3 13202. The Commission for Teacher Preparation and 
4 Licensing shall revoke or suspend a credential for 
5 immoral or unprofessional conduct, or tor persistent 
6 defiance of, and refusal to obey, the iaus regulating the 
7 duties of persons serving in the public school system, or 
8 for any cause which would have warrantee trie e.enial of 
9 an application for a credential or the renev, jw tnereof, or 
10 for evident unfitness for service, provided, that no 
11 conduct or acts shall be deemed to be immoral or 
12 unprofessional conduct or evident unfitness for service 
13 unless such conduct is related to the certificated 
14 employee's fitness to teach tmti tke employee o eksyroom 
15 performance . 
O 
